P. Silverman & Son v. United States

27 C.C.P.A. 324, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 20
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMarch 4, 1940
DocketNo. 4262
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 27 C.C.P.A. 324 (P. Silverman & Son v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
P. Silverman & Son v. United States, 27 C.C.P.A. 324, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 20 (ccpa 1940).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal presents for decision the question of the proper classification for customs duty purposes of “Old Woolen Dryer Felt Waste”' imported at the port of Portland, Maine, under the Tariff Act of 1930.

The merchandise was classified by the collector as woolen rags and assessed with duty at the rate of 18 cents per pound under the provisions therefor in paragraph 1105 of said act.

In the original protest and in an amendment thereto, numerous claims were made by the importer, but here appellant relies for the-most part upon the “principal claim” that the merchandise is properly dutiable under paragraph 1555 as “Waste, not specially provided for,” at 10 per centum ad valorem.

The merchandise consists of so-called Palmer or sanforizing blankets-which are in a worn-out condition and no longer serviceable for their original purpose. When new, they are chiefly used in textile finishing-operations, and “discarded when they have become so worn and burnt by heat and friction as to render them unsuitable for their original, purpose.” They are then sold for waste for whatever they will, bring. When so dealt in, they are commonly known as dryer felts. They are imported in sizes varying from 3 feet to 40 feet in width and from 5 feet to 50 feet in length. Some of the merchandise is imported in rolls which have to be unrolled and cut into pieces.

At the trial below, six witnesses testified for the importer, and by the record it is clearly established that the merchandise cannot be used in the woolen industry due largely to the fact that the fibers are too short, and to the additional fact that the heat to which the merchandise has been subjected has rendered it unsuitable for any textile or woolen remanufacture. It is disclosed in the record that although attempts were made to sell the merchandise to manufacturers of woolen wastes, for such purposes as the making of shoddy, mungo, or flocks, it was not salable as such.

The United States Customs Court, First Division, made the following finding of facts:

The record clearly establishes that the merchandise in issue is useless for the purpose for which it was originally made and is fit only for use, after manipulation, for another purpose, i. e., for wiping and abrasive purposes in the steel and optical glass industries. It therefore falls within the meaning of the term “waste” as it has been defined and limited by prior decisions of this and other courts. See Cia Algodonera v. United States, 23 C. C. P. A. 42, T. D. 47686, and cases therein cited.

A sample of the imported merchandise was introduced as Exhibit 2, and is a piece, about 6 inches square and one-quarter inch thick, [326]*326of heavy closely woven felt-like material. One of the special uses shown by the record for the instant merchandise is in the steel industry where it is used to brush away the oxidization of steel before it goes into the roll. After being so used it is thrown away. In order to be used for this purpose, it must be cleaned of excessive grease, and rust which is caused by the material being burned in the textile mill. No use has been found for the very small pieces which have been cut from the larger ones in the preparation of the material for sale.

The trial court held that the merchandise was waste. This fact is conceded by all. The trial court also held that the merchandise had been erroneously classified and that the importation does not respond to the term “woolen rags.” Since it is conceded here that the classification is wrong, and since it would seem clear that the imported articles are not the kind of woolen rags for which provision is made in said paragraph 1105, we need give no further consideration to the woolen rag question.

The majority of the court below held, Brown, Judge, dissenting, that since the merchandise was waste and concededly of wool, it was provided for under the term “all other wool wastes not specially provided for,” at 24 cents per pound under paragraph 1105, and the protest was overruled without approving the collector’s classification. From the judgment of the trial court so holding, importer has appealed here.

The issue presented here is whether or not the merchandise is “Waste, not specially provided for,” under paragraph 1555, or whether it is dutiable under the provision “all other wool wastes not specially provided for” in paragraph 1105.

The two paragraphs involved read:

Par. 1105 (a) Top waste, slubbing waste, roving waste, and ring waste, 37 cents per pound; garnetted waste, 26 cents per pound; noils, carbonized, 30 cents per pound; noils, not carbonized, 23 cents per pound; thread or yarn waste, 25 cents per pound; card or burr waste, carbonized, 23 cents per pound; not carbonized, 16 cents per pound; all other wool wastes not specially provided for, 24 cents per pound; shoddy, and wool extract, 24 cents per pound; mungo, 10 cents per pound; wool rags, 18 cents per pound; flocks, 8 cents per pound.
(b) Wastes of the hair of the Angora goat, Cashmere goat, alpaca and other like animals, shall be dutiable at the rates provided for similar types of wool wastes.
Par. 1555. Waste, not specially provided for, 10 per centum ad valorem.

The importer contends that the holding of the majority of the trial court is erroneous in that the instant merchandise is not a wool waste as that term is understood in the trade, and that Congress only intended to include in the term “wool wastes not specially provided for,” such wastes as were fit for further woolen manufacture.

We have examined all the authorities cited, and while there is language in some of the decisions which seems to fit the facts at bar [327]*327to some extent, the facts in all the cases differ very materially from those disclosed by the instant record.

For reasons presently stated, we must conclude that the contention of the Government and the holding of the majority of the trial court cannot be sustained. We agree with the contention of the importer that Congress never intended to include within the term “all other wool wastes not specially provided for” in paragraph 1105 every form of waste that might have a wool characteristic. We are brought to this conclusion, for the most part, by a consideration of the context of paragraph 1105, its legislative history and certain court decisions to which further reference will presently be made. An analysis of paragraph 1105 discloses that everything named therein specifically had, either at the time of the passage of the act or at some time in the prior history thereof, a use in the wool industry in which it came in direct competition with wool.

It is a matter of common knowledge that in all the history of our customs legislation no single article of importation has been given more careful consideration by the various Congresses than has wool and its-by-products. Throughout the years, conflicts of interests and the importance of the subject matter seem to have brought about on the part of Congress, especially the legislative committees concerned, a-most careful and analytical study of the facts relating to the importation, manufacture and American production of wool and wool articles and it is to be doubted if any other article of international commerce has received more thorough legislative attention.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
27 C.C.P.A. 324, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/p-silverman-son-v-united-states-ccpa-1940.