Owens v. Scheutte

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMarch 29, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-10787
StatusUnknown

This text of Owens v. Scheutte (Owens v. Scheutte) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Owens v. Scheutte, (E.D. Mich. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARVIN OWENS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:24-cv-10787 v.

District Judge GARY SCHEUTTE, et al., Gershwin A. Drain

Defendants. ______________ / ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Before the Court is Plaintiff Marvin Owens’ (“Plaintiff”) Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. ECF No. 2. Defendants in this action, Gary Scheutte, Anthony Stewart, Mike Coburn, and Tiggs Canteen Services, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), have not received official notice of the Motion. Therefore, the Court considers his request for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1). For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is an inmate at Jackson County Jail (“JCC”) and is a practicing Muslim. He thus adheres to the spiritual requirements of Ramadan, a holy month in the Islamic faith during which devotees fast without food or drink from dawn to sunset. This year, Ramadan began roughly at sunset on March 9 and will end April 9 at sunset. Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court on March 28 asserting four

causes of action: Count I – Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); Count II – Violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; Count III – Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment; and Count IV – Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 1. He alleges that for the first three days of Ramadan, March 10–13, JCC officials failed to provide him with pre-dawn and post-sunset meals, requiring him

to rely on items he had previously purchased from the jail commissary. Id. at PageID.9 ¶¶ 19–20. Further, he claims that for multiple days between March 13 and 26, evening meals were provided long after sunset, sometimes by as much as two hours. Id. at ¶ 21.1 Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that every meal he has received in

purported adherence to his religious requirements has been woefully deficient, netting between 1300 and 1900 calories per day between both his pre-dawn and post- sunset meals. Id. at PageID.10 ¶ 24. Other meals have been improperly handled or

stored, rendering them inedible. Id. at PageID.11 ¶ 29. Because of these deficiencies

1 Plaintiff asserts that Islamic teachings “prohibit a Muslim from extending their fast beyond the moment of sunset and require that an adherent Muslim hasten to break their fast during Ramadan.” ECF No. 1, PageID.10 ¶ 23. in his diet, Plaintiff has allegedly been forced to break adherence to his faith and has suffered physical consequences associated with malnutrition.

Shortly after the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 2. He argues that his direct requests for relief have gone unheeded, so the Court must enter an order

requiring Defendants to, among other things, supply him with timely and nutritionally adequate meals during Ramadan. Id. at PageID.56. II. LEGAL STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the Court may issue a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) without notice to the adverse party or parties if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). When deciding a motion for a temporary restraining order, the Court considers (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury to the movant; (3) substantial harm to others caused by the temporary order; and (4) whether the public interest would be served in granting the motion. Bobay v. Wright State Univ., No. 22-4007, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 14825, at *6 (6th Cir. June 13, 2023). These considerations need only be balanced, as they are not prerequisites for issuing a TRO. Smith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 737 F. Supp. 2d 702, 708 (E.D. Mich. 2010).

III. ANALYSIS Plaintiff has moved for both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. However, the Court declines to rule on Plaintiff’s Motion for a

preliminary injunction at this time because such an order may not issue without notice to the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). As the Court will grant the request for a temporary restraining order, it will also schedule a merits hearing on the preliminary injunction request under Rule 65(b)(3). Total Quality Logistics,

LLC v. Traffic Tech, Inc., No. 22-3148/3377, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 2951, at *13 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2023) (finding that failure to provide the adverse party an opportunity to be heard after a TRO is issued constitutes reversible error).

A. Plaintiff Has Exhausted The Available Grievance Procedure. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires an inmate to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing an action related to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An inmate “exhausts a claim by

taking advantage of each step the prison holds out for resolving the claim internally and by following the ‘critical procedural rules’ of the prison’s grievance process to permit prison officials to review and, if necessary, correct the grievance ‘on the

merits’ in the first instance.” Frazier v. Morley, No. 22-5965, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 25286, at *6 (6th Cir. Sep. 22, 2023) (quoting Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010)). Thus, an individual prison’s requirements determine what

constitutes proper exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Nonetheless, an inmate is not required to exhaust unavailable remedies before seeking external relief with the courts. Coopwood v. Wayne Cty., 74 F.4th 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2023).

Remedies incapable of redressing the complaint need not be exhausted. Id. Plaintiff states that the JCC requires inmates to matriculate a four (or more) step grievance process that requires them to coordinate with multiple JCC officials before the process is complete. ECF No. 2, PageID.47. One of the initial steps

includes voicing concerns directly to prison staff on duty at the time the grievance arises. Id. Importantly, the JCC’s procedures do not provide inmates a timeframe for resolution of their grievances. Id. at PageID.48. Plaintiff argues that he has satisfied

the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements. He says he started the process on March 10, 2024 by filing a complaint with JCC officials to complain about his need for religious accommodations. Id. at PageID.46.

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