Owens v. Pearce

78 Tenn. 45
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 15, 1882
StatusPublished

This text of 78 Tenn. 45 (Owens v. Pearce) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Owens v. Pearce, 78 Tenn. 45 (Tenn. 1882).

Opinion

FreeMAN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

John Roller died in February, 1868, leaving a will, appointing defendant, Samuel Pearce, his executor and testamentary trustee.

After providing for paying his debts, he directed all’ his personal property, and a lot in the town of Kings-port to be sold. By the fourth clause he provided: “That the expense of educating, clothing and raising my children, be attached to my estate in common.” Fifth, “That my land be rented at the discretion of my executor for. the best interest of my estate, giving my children preference when capable of managing and farming the land. The proceeds after my debts are paid, to be funded for the benefit of my estate, except that my executor out of the rents may keep up the fences and ditches, and remove the barn and houses out of the Island to the south side of the river, and have them put up in good condition for me.”

He then provides for prosecution of certain suits pending in which he was interested, and in eighth clause he says: “ When my children have all arrived at twenty-one years of age, then my entire estate remaining shall be divided equally between all my children.” He then appoints Samuel Pearce executor, and authorizes him to do all acts and things necessary to .carry out the provision of the will.

[47]*47The testator- left seven children, of whom complainant, Elizabeth, is the oldest — one having died since the testator. Plis estate was considerable — consisting of three tracts of land. Besides this there was a tract of land, which went to his children under the will of their grand-iathei’, William Pearce, on the death of their father. This tract was owned by the children, and not subject to the trusts of the will, and will be further noticed hereafter. The executor was the uncle of the children, their mother having been his sister, and seems to have been the trusted friend of the father — and we take it a man of good estate — but himself childless.

The executor and .uncle took the children to his house — probably a portion had made their home mainly at his house since the death of their mother, two years before their father, and seems to have provided for them comfortably, evidently, as we think is shown by the record, with no intent to charge board at all, but to give them a home in his childless family. This continued till this complainant provoked the ire of her uncle by marriage with her present husband, against whom he expressed the utmost dislike, claiming he was not the equal of his niece. The complainants, thereupon, desiring to get the use of the property of the wife, if possible, and being poor, filed this hill, charging, among other things, that the respondent, Pearce, had never made any settlement of his accounts as executor, or any showing as to his management of the estate, but refused to let complainant know anything- as to the situation of the property, or make any settle[48]*48ment with her and husband, in a word, had treated their applications in this respect, with contempt.

They further charge that he had no rightful control over the Barilla Roller tract of land, and that he had taken charge of that with the estate of his testator, and refused to make any account of its rents and profits. They go on the theory, that under the will they were then entitled to have a full account of the estate and the share of complainant which the will set apart to her. As to the Barilla Roller tract, they seek a partition of the same, with account of rents. They charge that there was a large personal estate of their ancestor that went into the hands of the executor, and this is shown to be true, and insist they are entitled to be paid over their share of the personalty, with rents of realty, and to be put into possession after partition of the share of the wife, both of the Barilla Roüer tract, and of the rest of the lands of the father. They pray for an account of the personalty and rents to this end, and for general relief.

The executor answers this bill, and zealously contests the question as to- whether partition can be had of the Barilla Roller tract, and after much proof obtains a decree of reference for an inquiry on this question. The chancellor, however, held ultimately, it could be divided, and an account was also ordered as between complainants and defendant Pearce, as to rents of said land. Also an account of the amount of the personal estate, that had come into his hands from William Pearce’s estate — -it having been charged complainant was entitled to something from this source.

[49]*49The account was solely as between the complainant and defendant, and such matters as might exist between them. It settled no principle, however, or any other matter as to the general estate. It was made in 1874. In 1875, on reviving this order, a general account of the estate of Roller was ordered, showing what property had come to his hands, what disbursements had been made, and that in ascertaining what amount was due to each heir, the clerk was to credit Pearce with all sums paid out for schooling, clothing, and other expenses of the children, and also a reasonable compensation for boarding them, and lastly, what would be a proper compensation to Pearce for his services as executor.

Ho adjudication was made, or could be made, as to the character or extent of the disbursements, at this time, as nothing was before the court on which it could decide the question.

The master under this decree made an elaborate report, which was excepted to in many of its conclusions, and at December term, 1878, a decree was made sustaining some of the exceptions, overruling others, and recommitting the' matter to the clerk and master for a report in accord with the directions given in the decree.

From this decree, inadvertently probably, an appeal was granted to ' this court. This court, however, took cognizance of the cash and affirmed the decree of the-chancellor, except it decreed that the executor is not required, and will not be, to make division of the-lands or the rents accumulated, or personalty till the-[50]*50youngest child came of age. The case was then remanded for taking the accounts ordered, and to be further proceeded in.

In the court below, the case was re-referred to the master, to take the account in exact accordance with the decree of 1878, as affirmed by this court, and also a direction to the commissioner to proceed with the partition of the Barilla Roller land. The master made several reports, which were excepted to, and at last report, No. 3, as it is termed, was made, the result of which shows a balance due the executor of $10,311.18 up to November 28, 1881, on which .interest was allowed up to the decree, and it was adjudged that this amount was due from the estate of John Roller, deceased, to Pearce, executor. ■

We need but say here, that this enormous debt is largely made up> of expense for boarding, schooling and taking care of 'the wards of the testamentary guardian. This result is so astounding that it deserves tq be looked into carefully, as it is evident that if sustained, it presents the case of a testamentary guardian taking charge of a fair estate, and in a period extending from January, 1868, to 1881 — something over twelve years, not only using all the income of their estate, but creating a debt against them, that from the proof in this record would absorb the entire estate, and leave his wards in his debt, at the end of his trust, when the youngest comes of age.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
78 Tenn. 45, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/owens-v-pearce-tenn-1882.