Overing v. Foote

65 N.Y. 263
CourtCommission of Appeals
DecidedMay 15, 1875
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 65 N.Y. 263 (Overing v. Foote) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commission of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Overing v. Foote, 65 N.Y. 263 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1875).

Opinion

Reynolds, C.

Upon a comparison of the facts assumed by the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the Court of Appeals in these cases, in 43 Flew York, 290, with the facts now found by the learned judge before whom the last trial was had, there is, in some particulars, a different state of facts presented, which it is claimed changes their legal aspect. For example, Peckham, J., said (43 FT. Y., 297): “ Here the name of the plaintiff was on the roll, but the particular rents for which alone he was to be assessed were not carried out but his agent furnished to the assessors a list of the lots from which the rents accrued for the purpose of assessment.” It now appears that no list of lots for assessment and taxation was furnished by the plaintiffs or their agent, but he did furnish a list of lots sold which do not appear in the assessment roll and protested against the names of the Overings being put upon the roll, or that they be, in any form, assessed for taxation.

It is also found that when the notice to the tax-payers had been posted and when the assessment roll was examined by the plaintiffs’ agent there appeared on it “ no Overing name, no entry of any of the lease lots in question, no amounts of plaintiffs’ annual rents reserved and no value of plaintiffs’ personal property, and nothing indicating an intention to assess the plaintiffs was upon the roll; ” and, further, that the whole assessment was made and the name of the plaintiff and the property in question were put upon the roll after the roll was completed and after notices given for correction, and after the plaintiff had examined the rolls pursuant to the notice and found no assessment thereon.”

The opinion of the Court of Appeals in these cases before referred to was apparently controlled by supposed facts not now in the case, for it is said (p. 297): “ Under the facts of [269]*269this case we think the assessment roll was not completed, as to this plaintiff, until the assessors had inserted in the blanks left for that purpose the particular rents assessed,” but proceeds to add that the plaintiffs’ agent saw the roll about the middle of July and the blanks were filled within two days afterwards, and that then it was complete as against the plaintiffs, and that the previous notice of the assessment might be regarded as put on and running from that time as against the plaintiffs ; and then it is further said, as before stated, that the plaintiffs’ names were on the roll and that only the particular rents for which they were to be assessed were not carried out, and that the list for assessment was duly furnished by the plaintiffs’ agent upon which the assessors, as if by the consent of the plaintiffs, acted. Upon this, supposed condition of the fact we might not disagree in this respect with the rule of law there declared, but as a very different state of the fact in this respect is now presented we may consider the case res nova.

The proceedings of town assessors are of the greatest consequence to every tax-payer of the State, and they are defined by statute with reasonable precision in most particulars at least. That their duties have been fearfully abused or violated, either by ignorance or design, is a fact known and acknowledged by every intelligent citizen of the State, and such things have been ordinarily done with comparative impunity, so far as any relief is to be had in the courts. There is great authority for saying now that they must obey the rule of the statute or their acts are void, and give no exemption from personal liability, and their void action can confer no right, whether the result of ignorance or design. (The Nat. Bk. of Chemung v. The City of Elmira, 53 N. Y., 49.) The general theory under our laws for taxation of property is, that the citizen to be affected must have some sort of notice of the proceeding to be had against his property, and that, in some form, he may be heard, if wrong is apprehended, before any portion of his estate is seized for the support of the government; and I think all our laws for the assessment of property for the purposes of taxation are founded upon this notion of justice. [270]*270The town assessors are, therefore, required “ between the first days of May and July in each year * * * to proceed to ascertain, by diligent inquiry, the names of all the taxable inhabitants in their respective towns or wards, and, also, all the taxable property, real or personal, within the same.” (1 R. 5., 390, § 8.) And they are required to make an assessment roll in which names, amounts and values are to be specially stated. The words of the statute are clear, and the decision of the courts of the highest authority is, that these duties prescribed bylaw must be strictly observed (Clark v. Norton, 49 N. Y., 243); and that the assessment roll for the current year, containing the names of the persons to be assessed, and the amount and nature of the property to be assessed, must be, in one sense, determined upon by the assessors on or before the first day of July in each year. It is very clear that they cannot extend the time for the performance of this duty without assuming the functions of the legislature any more than they can enlarge their powers in other respects. It is probably the rule of the statute that the determination of the names of the persons who are to be assessed, and the property to be assessed, must be made on or before the first day of July, and on that day the assessment roll for the year must be regarded as completed in the sense that no additional names or property can thereafter be added. During the months of May and June, they are to “ ascertain, by diligent inquiry, the names of the taxable inhabitants ” in their towns or wards, and for this purpose are authorized to divide the town into as many convenient districts as there are assessors. (1 R. 5., 390, §§ 7, 8.) They are then allowed until the first day of August to complete and copy the assessment roll; after which they are to give notice that on the third Tuesday of August they will review their assessments, and that parties aggrieved can be heard.

In Mygatt v. Washburn (15 N. Y., 316, 319), Dbnio, Oh. J., says: The period for ascertaining the names of the taxpaying persons it is thus seen includes the months of May and June, and is limited to those months.” And the same [271]*271learned judge, in the same case, further says (p. 320): “ Evidently, there must be some day in the course of the proceeding in which the assessment may be said to be made. The fixing of this day cannot depend upon the degree of diligence with which assessors perform their duties, for in that case it would be different in different towns. * * * In my opinion, the assessment should be considered as made at the expiration of the time limited for making the inquiry, namely, on the first of July. If there is any change of residence or property after that day, it does not affect the assessment roll. The inquiries are then completed. Any changes which the assessors are authorized to make after that time are such as may be required to correct mistakes. Ho earlier day can be assumed, because what is done by one or all of the assessors prior to the first of July is inchoate and preparatory, arid liable to be altered according to their final judgment in the matter. When the statute speaks of the time £ when the assessment is made ’ it refers to the binding and conclusive act which designates the tax-payers and the amount of taxable property. If I am correct in what has been said, it follows that the time referred to in the statute is the first of July.

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Bluebook (online)
65 N.Y. 263, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/overing-v-foote-nycommnapp-1875.