Overfield v. Wellpath, LLC

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 16, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00199
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 LESLEY OVERFIELD, et al., No. 2:24-cv-00199-TLN-AC 11 Plaintiffs, 12 v. ORDER 13 WELLPATH COMMUNITY CARE, LLC, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant County of El Dorado’s (“Defendant”) 18 Motion to Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiffs Lesley Overfield (“Lesley”) and minor children, 19 A.O. and B.O., (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 46.) Defendant filed a 20 reply. (ECF No. 48.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to 21 Dismiss. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 1 Defendants California Forensic Medical Group, Inc., Wellpath, LLC, Ross Chapman, Emily Walker, Daryl Lauffer, Abdurrahman Bilal, Stephen Kowalczyk, and Matthew Foxworthy 28 are still named defendants in the action but do not join in the instant motion. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On February 21, 2022, Nicholas Overfield (“Nick”), Lesley’s son and A.O. and B.O.’s 3 father, was arrested and detained at the El Dorado County Jail for 63 days. (ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 2–5.) 4 Plaintiffs allege Nick repeatedly requested his prescribed HIV medication during that time but 5 was continuously denied. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs further allege, as a result of not receiving his 6 prescribed HIV medication, Nick’s HIV developed into AIDS and on June 21, 2022, Nick died. 7 (Id. ¶¶ 6–7.) Nick’s death certificate identified encephalitis varicella zoster virus as the 8 immediate cause of death and indicated Nick had contracted the virus two months prior to his 9 death. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiffs allege Nick contracted the virus while he was a pre-trial detainee of 10 Defendant and under the care of Wellpath, LLC. (Id.) 11 On August 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging the 12 following claims against Defendant: municipal liability for an unconstitutional custom or practice 13 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) and failure to accommodate under Title II of the Americans 14 with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (ECF No. 38.) On September 23, 2024, Defendant filed the 15 instant motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 41.) 16 II. STANDARD OF LAW 17 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 19 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 20 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 21 Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in 22 federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 23 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 24 citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal 25 discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose 26 of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 27 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 28 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 1 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 2 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 3 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 4 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 5 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 6 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 7 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 8 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 9 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 10 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 11 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 12 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 13 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 14 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 15 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 16 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 17 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 18 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 19 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 20 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 21 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 22 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 23 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 24 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 25 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 26 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 27 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 28 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits 1 thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 2 See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. 3 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Daniels- 4 Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court need not accept as true 5 allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice). 6 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 7 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 8 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 9 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 10 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 11 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 12 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 13 deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.” 14 Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 15 Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 16 III. ANALYSIS 17 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and ADA claims against Defendant for 18 failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 41.) The Court will address 19 the claims in turn. 20 A. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claim 21 Plaintiffs allege a claim for municipal liability for an unconstitutional custom or practice 22 under § 1983 against Defendant. (ECF No. 38 at 38–42.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend 23 Defendant has a widespread custom of ignoring medical requests, denying necessary medication, 24 and failing to provide sufficient medical treatment, which Plaintiffs allege happened to Nick and 25 at least eleven other inmates. (Id. ¶¶ 87, 104.) 26 The Ninth Circuit recognizes four theories for establishing municipal liability under 27 § 1983: “(1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, 28 or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa 1 Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019). To state a §1983 claim against a municipality 2 under a pervasive practice or custom theory, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating “that an 3 ‘official policy, custom, or pattern’ on the part of [the municipality] was ‘the actionable cause of 4 the claimed injury.’” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harper 5 v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Mendiola-Martinez v. 6 Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that to establish municipal liability under 7 § 1983, a plaintiff must show a direct causal link between the municipal policy or custom and the 8 alleged constitutional violation). A “custom” for purposes of municipal liability is a “widespread 9 practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent 10 and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 11 458 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). 12 Defendant contends Plaintiffs cite to and rely on eleven filed lawsuits to establish their 13 claim that Defendant maintained a custom of denying medical care to detainees. (ECF No. 41-1 14 at 4.) Defendant argues the lawsuits cited by Plaintiffs do not support a § 1983 claim because 15 they do not involve HIV-positive detainees or the denial of HIV medication and are therefore not 16 substantially similar to the instant matter. (Id.) Defendant further contends even if the three 17 lawsuits which involve medication denial2 are deemed substantially similar, they still fail to 18 support a § 1983 claim because they are remote in time and unproven incidents. (Id. at 5.) 19 In opposition, Plaintiffs contend the incidents involving the eleven other inmates include 20 failures to provide necessary medical treatment, such as not taking a detainee to the hospital 21 during methamphetamine withdrawals and denying prescribed mental health medication. (ECF 22 No. 46 at 8, 12.) Plaintiffs argue the incidents are factually analogous to the instant matter, 23 demonstrating a custom of ignoring medical requests, denying necessary medication, and failing 24 to provide sufficient medical treatment. (Id. at 12.) 25 2 See Complaint, Ellsworth v. El Dorado Cnty. Nursing Staff, No. 2:21-CV-1070-EFB P 26 (E.D. Cal. 2021), ECF No. 1; Third Amended Complaint, Spears v. El Dorado Cnty. Jail, No. 2:16-CV-2177 EFB P (E.D. Cal. 2019), ECF No. 65; and First Amended Complaint, Mizerak v. 27 Eslick, No. 2:16-cv-00323-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal. 2016), ECF No. 28.

28 1 Additionally, Plaintiffs argue their case is similar to Chaidez v. Cnty of Alameda, in which 2 the plaintiff made multiple complaints that insufficient medical attention created unsanitary 3 conditions for his stoma. No. 3:21-cv-04240-RS, 2023 WL 6466358, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 4 2023) Plaintiffs contend the court in Chaidez found allegations of nine instances over the course 5 of ten years where inmates had not received adequate medical care with “facts supporting each 6 example, including the name of the detainee and the circumstances of inadequate medical care” 7 were “analogous to the [plaintiff’s] factual averments regarding his own experience . . . including 8 ‘ignored’ medical requests, denials of necessary medication, and insufficient medical treatment.” 9 ECF No. 46 at 13. Plaintiffs argue their allegations regarding eleven lawsuits over a period of 10 eight years, the majority occurring within two years, is an even stronger showing of a policy and 11 custom than Chaidez. Id. at 14. 12 Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendant knew or should have known that El Dorado County Jail 13 staff, including sheriff deputies and jail medical staff, deprived Nick of necessary medical 14 treatment and medications. (ECF No. 38 ¶ 104.) Plaintiffs further allege none of the staff were 15 found to be in violation of jail policy, disciplined, or retrained. (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs allege 16 Defendant’s actions were part of a specifically identified custom or practice. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 88, 17 104 (alleging instances demonstrating Defendant had a custom or practice of condoning 18 constitutionally inadequate medical care by failing to discipline, retrain and supervise).) While 19 Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding previously filed lawsuits against Defendant is not conclusive, the 20 allegations of prior incidents help illuminate the plausibility of the existence of the alleged 21 unconstitutional customs or practices. See Bagos v. Vallejo, No. 2:20-cv-00185-KJM-AC, 2020 22 WL 6043949, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2020) (“Prior incidents involving lawsuits alone, even 23 those which do not result in a finding or admission of wrongdoing, can be sufficient for Monell 24 liability purposes in the face of a motion to dismiss.”); see also McCoy v. City of Vallejo, No. 25 2:19-cv-001191-JAM-CKD, 2020 WL 374356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020) (finding 26 unsubstantiated allegations in lawsuits were sufficient to establish pattern of failure to discipline 27 and ratification at the motion to dismiss stage.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding previously 28 filed lawsuits sufficiently advance Plaintiffs’ claims beyond the threshold of “possibility” to 1 “plausibility,” demonstrating that these customs and practices are not isolated incidents but rather 2 part of a longstanding pattern of behavior. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. 4 B. Plaintiffs’ ADA Claim 5 Plaintiffs allege a claim for failure to accommodate under Title II of the ADA against 6 Defendant. (ECF No. 38 at 42–43.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend Defendant violated the ADA 7 by denying Nick his prescribed HIV medication during his detention, despite knowing his HIV- 8 positive status. (ECF No. 46 at 16.) 9 Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 10 of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 11 programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 12 U.S.C. § 12132. “To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that[:] (1) 13 [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or 14 otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity's services, programs, or activities; 15 and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 16 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). To recover monetary damages, a plaintiff must prove 17 intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 18 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). 19 Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ SAC fails to establish an ADA claim as it does not show 20 discrimination because of a disability, or causation. (ECF No. 41-1 at 6.) Defendant contends 21 Plaintiffs rely on the following alleged statement to Nick by a member of the medical staff as 22 evidence of discriminatory intent to support an ADA claim: “You’re not taking care of yourself 23 on the street, why should I take care of you in here?” (Id. at 6.) Defendant argues the alleged 24 statement does not reference Nick’s HIV status or imply any discrimination based on that 25 disability and therefore does not support a claim of discrimination under the ADA. (Id.; see also 26 ECF No. 48 at 3.) 27 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue Defendant violated the ADA by denying Nick his 28 prescribed HIV medication during his detention, despite knowing his HIV-positive status. (ECF 1 No. 46 at 16.) Plaintiffs contend the statement by the member of the medical staff, taken with the 2 jail records documenting that Nick was known to be HIV positive, is evidence of discriminatory 3 animus against people with HIV. (Id. at 15.) 4 Here, based on the allegations, Defendant knew of Nick’s HIV status (ECF No. 38 ¶ 29); 5 Defendant possessed medical records proving that Nick was prescribed HIV medication and had 6 reported taking HIV medication just nine days prior to his detention (Id. ¶ 37); Nick repeatedly 7 requested his prescribed HIV medication (Id. ¶ 3); and medical staff at El Dorado County Jail 8 denied Plaintiff medical treatment (Id. ¶¶ 7, 114). The reasonable inference from Plaintiffs’ 9 allegations is that Defendant denied Nick medical treatment because of his HIV status. The Court 10 finds Plaintiffs have therefore alleged a cognizable ADA claim. Anderson v. Cnty. of Siskiyou, 11 No. C 10-01428 SBA, 2010 WL 3619821, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (finding “[t]he ADA 12 may be violated where there is an ‘outright denial of medical services’ because the complete lack 13 of access to services may be ‘so unreasonable as to demonstrate that they were discriminating 14 against [plaintiff] because of his disability.’ (citing Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Corr., 451 15 F.3d 274, 285 (1st Cir. 2006))). 16 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ ADA claim. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 19 41.) Defendant County of El Dorado shall file an answer not later than twenty-one (21) days 20 from the electronic filing date of this Order. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Date: June 11, 2025 23 24 25 26 27 28