Overbeck v. Harmeyer

331 N.E.2d 41, 164 Ind. App. 576, 1975 Ind. App. LEXIS 1188
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 25, 1975
Docket1-1074A143
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 331 N.E.2d 41 (Overbeck v. Harmeyer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Overbeck v. Harmeyer, 331 N.E.2d 41, 164 Ind. App. 576, 1975 Ind. App. LEXIS 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

Lowdermilk, J.

Lloyd C. Harmeyer died testate, leaving a gross estate of $403,211.10, all of which he bequeathed and devised to his children and two sons-in-law, one of whom is Charles Overbeck, and with a specific bequest to Hanna’s Creek Christian Church.

Charles Overbeck, husband of Helen Francis Overbeck, a daughter of the decedent, was named executor. Under the *577 terms of the will the Overbecks received more of the estate than did the other children, including all the real estate, which consisted of two farms.

Lloyd C. Harmeyer’s Last Will and Testament was admitted to .probate and Letters Testamentary were issued to Charles Overbeck on February 19,1972.

Prior to this date all the devisees and legatees named in the will, except Hanna’s Creek Christian Church and Charles Overbeck, executed general waivers of notice.

Administration was had and at its close the executor filed with the court his inventory and appraisement of personal property and affidavit and schedule to determine Inheritance Taxes, together with his final report and petition for distribution of assets. The only notice of the filing of the final report was publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the estate was being administered, as required by law. After such notice and on February 9, 1973, the court approved the final report and ordered distribution of the assets to the beneficiaries designated in the report, “less any Federal or State Taxes for which said estate or said legatees may be liable.” On March 2, 1973, appellees herein filed their petition to vacate the order, which order, after hearing thereon, was by the court vacated on November 2, 1973. No notice of the petition to vacate the order or of the hearing thereon or the court’s order setting the same aside was given by appellees to appellants, Hanna’s Creek Christian Church and the executor.

Charles Overbeck, executor, filed a motion to correct errors which was by the court overruled and this appeal now follows.

In Specification A of the motion to correct errors appellant executor Overbeck contends that all parties were entitled to notice before the parties’ rights were affected judicially and that the statute required the trial court to notify the executor and all interested parties as a condition precedent to the court’s order to vacate its own order (the order vacating the order approving the final report and ordering distribution.) *578 Overbeck further contends that the court’s failure to warn or notify the executor and Hanna’s Creek Christian Church violated the constitutional rights of procedural due process and was reversible error.

The order vacating the approval of the executor’s final report states:

“The Court now considers petitioners’ Petition To Vacate Order, filed herein by petitioners March 2, 1973, and upon which considerable legal argument has been had before the Court. Following the disposition of other litigated matters during 1973 in this cause, a hearing on the petition to set aside the order approving the Executor’s Final Report was had September 10, 1973.” (Emphasis added.)

IC 1971, 29-1-1-21 (Burns Code Ed.) on vacation and modification of orders, bears on the point of notice of the vacation of an order of final settlement as follows:

“For illegality, fraud or mistake, upon application filed within one [1] year after the discharge of the personal representative upon final settlement, the court may vacate or modify its orders, judgments and decrees or grant a rehearing therein. Before any such order, judgment or decree shall be vacated or modified, notice of such application and hearing shall be given to the personal representative and all interested persons as provided in section 112 [29-1-1-12] of this [Probate] Code. . . .”

Applications to set aside final settlements must allege and show that the complaining party was not notified to appear and did not appear at the hearing of the final settlement. Crum, Administrator v. Meeks (1891), 128 Ind. 360. In that case, our Supreme Court held:

“. . . any person interested in an estate which has been finally settled, if he was not personally served with summons and did not appear at the hearing of such final settlement, may have the same set aside if it affects him adversely, for any of the causes therein specified. . . .” 128 Ind. at 363.

Executor Overbeck cannot be heard to complain that he was not served with notice, as the record above discloses there was a hearing on the petition to set aside the order approving the executor’s final report, which Overbeck attended. Further, *579 in oral argument Overbeck’s attorney expressly waived the defect of failure to give notice, as same was waived by Over-beck’s appearance at the hearing.

It is not incumbent upon this court to determine if Hanna’s Creek Christian Church was an “interested party” under the statute, as the petition filed did not propose to take anything away from the church. The church is making no objection in this cause and the objection is personal to the church and cannot be raised at the instance of a third party.

If there was error in not giving notice of final hearing to the church, it was harmless, as the court ordered its bequest be paid before the report of distribution was filed. Appellees, in oral argument, had the following to say about the church’s failure to object to failure to receive notice, in saying: “Church entitled to its $2,500.00 without taxes. No questions raised about that.”

Specification of error B 1 is that the trial court erred in vacating the order approving the final account on the grounds that no provision had been made by the executor for payment of Federal Estate and Indiana Inheritance Taxes, when, in fact and at law, provisions had been made therefor.

The contention that no provision had been made for the payment of Federal Estate and Indiana Inheritance Taxes is without merit. The Indiana Inheritance Tax schedule, Federal Estate Tax schedule, and the final report, which provided for the distribution to beneficiaries in specific amounts, “less any Federal or State Taxes for which said estate or said legatees may be liable”, were each filed on January 18, 1973. The 1972 Federal Income Tax could not be determined until after December 31st of that year and was then payable on or before April 15, 1973. Executor Overbeck advised the court in oral argument “No 1972 income tax was due, and, of course, none paid.”

The executor is responsible for the payment of Federal Estate Tax and Indiana Inheritance Tax and the certificates *580 of clearance thereon. It is incumbent upon him to file the Federal and State Income Tax returns for the estate.

It was represented in the executor’s final report that the Federal Estate Tax had been paid and Indiana Inheritance Tax would be paid out of the balance of the estate, all of which was approved by the trial court in its order on the final report.

IC 1971, 6-4-1-13 (Burns Code Ed.) provides as follows:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
331 N.E.2d 41, 164 Ind. App. 576, 1975 Ind. App. LEXIS 1188, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/overbeck-v-harmeyer-indctapp-1975.