Outlaw Laboratory, LP v. DG in PB, LLC

District Court, S.D. California·Decided May 4, 2020·No. 3:18-cv-00840·Unknown

Opinion

IN RE: OUTLAW LABORATORIES, LP Case No.: 18CV840 GPC (BGS) LITIGATION, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND . DENYING IN PART THE STORES’ AND OUTLAW LABORATORY’S MOTION TO MODIFY CASE

[ECF 184] Third-party plaintiffs NMRM, Inc. and Skyline Market, Inc. and counterclaimant Roma Mika (the “Stores”) and Plaintiff/counterclaim defendant Outlaw Laboratory, LP (“Outlaw”), and third-party defendants Shawn Lynch and Michael Wear filed a motion seeking a five-month extension of the dates set forth in the existing Scheduling Order. (ECF 184 at 2.1) Third-party defendant Tauler Smith has filed an Opposition. (ECF 186.) The Court will not detail the lengthy history of this case, but for purposes of this Motion identifies the extensions of the schedule that have already been provided to the parties.2 The initial Scheduling Order in this case was issued on September 7, 2018. (ECF 25.) The Schedule was amended on June 7, 2019, at the parties’ request, largely to accommodate the Stores’ Amended Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaint filed in the consolidated action that included claims on behalf of a class against Outlaw. (ECF 86.) As a point of reference on the length of the extensions provided in that order, it provided an eleven-month extension of fact discovery from January 4, 2019 to December 4, 2019. (ECF 25, 86.) After the Stores obtained leave to amend and filed the Second Amended Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaint (“SACC”), (ECF 113-114), Outlaw obtained a 45-day stay to allow it and the newly added parties time to retain new counsel. (ECF 117, 119.) The deadline to complete class discovery and file for class certification passed during the stay, but two weeks after the stay had lapsed the parties had not sought any amendment of the Scheduling Order. Concerned the existing and new parties were not proceeding diligently under existing schedule, the Court set a deadline to seek any amendment based on the SACC and stay. (ECF 124.3) All the parties set forth their varying positions on amendment of the Scheduling Order. (ECF 137.) The Court then issued the current Scheduling Order. (ECF 155.) Like the previous one, it provided lengthy extensions, albeit not as lengthy as requested by the parties. Again, as a point of reference, fact discovery was extended by an additional four months from December 4, 2019 to April 17, 2020. 2 The parties’ briefing fails to identify how many prior extensions have been granted. 3 In the same Order, the Court reset the briefing schedule on the Stores’ Motion to Compel discovery from Outlaw. The Motion to Compel was filed prior to the stay, but had not been briefed. That briefing was delayed further when Outlaw failed to timely file The moving parties now seek five more months in extensions. The parties notified the Court on April 8, 2020 that the Stores and Outlaw wanted an extension and Tauler Smith was opposed. (ECF 183.) Pursuant to the briefing schedule issued by the Court, this Motion followed on April 13, 2020 with Tauler Smith’s opposition timely filed on April 15, 2020. (Id.) A. Legal Standards Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 states that a schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent. In the absence of good cause, the court will not modify the scheduling order. See Johnson v Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992). The inquiry under Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard primarily focuses on the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Id. at 609. “The district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's notes (1983 amendment) and collecting cases). Carelessness is not the same as diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. Id. If the party was not diligent, the inquiry should end. Id. When the motion to extend time is made after time has expired, “the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P 6(b)(1). The determination of excusable neglect takes into account: (1) the danger of prejudice; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reasons for the delay which includes whether it was within the reasonable control of the party seeking to show excusable neglect; and (4) whether that party acted in good faith. Coleman v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1234-35 (D. Kan. 2007). B. Parties’ Positions The parties seeking the five-month extension have different reasons for requesting the extension. The Stores argue Tauler Smith and Outlaw have refused to produce discovery to the Stores, specifically some merits discovery, and suggest that the Court’s decision on its Motion to Compel somehow justifies the Stores having received only class discovery. Additionally, the Stores point to their diligence in seeking discovery from Outlaw, delays in receiving a decision on its Motion to Compel responses from Outlaw, and the case being stayed amidst briefing on that Motion. The Stores also point to their diligence in seeking discovery from Tauler Smith since it became a named party in the case and delays in receiving responses to that discovery. The Stores indicate they “still need to obtain written discovery and documents from Outlaw, Mr. Lynch, and Mr. Wear about the merits of the Stores’ RICO claims and will need the same from Tauler Smith.” (ECF 184 at 4.) They also predict additional time will need “to be built in for another discovery motion, to establish the applicability of the ‘crime-fraud’ exception in this case.” (Id.) And, the Stores assert that after receiving all those productions, the Stores will then need time to take a “handful of depositions.” (Id.) Outlaw points to its efforts to collect documents responsive to the Stores’ discovery requests but concedes it has failed to fully comply. Outlaw also “anticipates that the parties will need five months to complete discovery under normal circumstances” and then suggests even more time may be required as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and stay-at-home orders. (ECF 184 at 4.) Outlaw also indicates it “will likewise seek discovery from the Stores and Tauler Smith.” (Id.) In opposition to the extension, Tauler Smith argues the Stores have not been diligent in pursuing discovery because they have not attempted to depose Tauler Smith, Outlaw, or any other third party despite having identified all of them as co-conspirators in a RICO enterprise 19 months ago. (ECF 186 at 3.) Tauler Smith takes issue with the Stores’ reliance on a purported delay in ruling on the Stores discovery motion as to Tauler Smith by accurately quoting the Discovery Section of the undersigned’s Chambers Rules which indicates “Other Discovery not tolled. Counsel may not stop conducting other discovery due to a dispute.” (Id. (citing Judge Skomal’s Chambers Rules V.F.) Tauler Smith also notes it has now responded to the Stores’ discovery requests and argues any delay related to that motion is the Stores’ own fault. Tauler Smith explains that the Stores could have accepted the Court’s tentative to have Tauler Smith respond in two weeks without having Tauler Smith’s objections waived or simply reserved the discovery, but instead opted to engaged in unnecessary work through a motion that led to the same result. (ECF 186 at 4.) Tauler Smith also argues the movants have failed to show excusable neglect for failing to seek extension of the class discovery deadline prior to the deadline. Finally, Tauler Smith argues it will be prejudiced by any extension because it wou

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Outlaw Laboratory, LP v. DG in PB, LLC, (S.D. Cal. 2020).

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