Outcault Advertising Co. v. Smalley

168 P. 677, 101 Kan. 645, 1917 Kan. LEXIS 168
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedNovember 10, 1917
DocketNo. 20,880
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 168 P. 677 (Outcault Advertising Co. v. Smalley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Outcault Advertising Co. v. Smalley, 168 P. 677, 101 Kan. 645, 1917 Kan. LEXIS 168 (kan 1917).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Marshall, J.:

The plaintiff sought to recover judgment on a written contract providing for the payment of money. The defendants pleaded fraud and obtained judgment for costs. The plaintiff appeals.

The defendants signed a written contract stipulating that they should pay to the plaintiff $2.10 per week, during the period of one year, for the exclusive right to use certain advertising matter in Parsons. The defense was that the contract had been obtained by false and fraudulent representa[646]*646tions made by the plaintiff’s agent; that the agent had represented that he had made arrangements . with certain newspapers to carry the -advertising matter for five or six dollars per month; that that representation was false; and that the defendants relied upon that representation and believed that it was true, and signed the contract. The evidence to establish this fraud was as follows:

“A. Rounsaville came in and introduced himself with a copy of the Parsons Sun in his hand, told us that he was selling- — •
“By the Court': Well, if he did, he said something to Mr. Smalley. A. He said he was selling Outcault advertising cuts and he took this paper, spread it out and asked us about what size ad we usually run and took his pencil and showed us the column and size that this cut would occupy and how much space it would leave us for quoting prices, etc., and he told us and in his talk all the way through guaranteed us—
“Objected to by the plaintiff. Objection sustained by the court. Defendants except.
“Q. Just state what he said. A. I am trying to give it as near as I can, I probably can’t use the exact words.
“Q. Well, in substance.. A. In substance, I am trying to give it that way. He said, ‘I will guarantee that you will get this size ad on account of taking the contract with the newspapers for five and six dollars a month,’ that was the size and space that we had been paying ten and twelve dollars for.
“Q. You may state what, if anything, you said to him. A. That is what I said to him. That it would cost us but very little more .on account of being able to get this special rate, the difference in the special rate and the regular rate would, in fact, pay for the Outcault system.
“Q. Was there anything said about the newspapers? A. He said that he had been — he said that he had been to these newspapers, and that he would guarantee that we would be able to get this special rate.
“Q. Now you speak of a special rate that you would be able to get this special rate, now what do you refer to? A. Refer to just what he said, that he had been to the newspapers and that we would be able to get this special rate.
“Q. Now you may state what is the fact as to whether he had any cuts with him. A. He had the copies of cuts of which he used. I presume it would be all right for me to explain that.
“Q. Yes. A. He took these pictures and compared them on the space that we had been in the custom of buying and showed us how much there would be left for quoting prices, etc., then when we received the first of these cuts we discovered that they would practically occupy all of the space when we inserted our name and address, etc.
“Q. Now, Mr. Smalley, after receiving these cuts and covering the space you stated to the jury, what difference, if any, would there be in [647]*647the advertising rate for the space covered by these cuts and the advertising rates that you had been paying previous to the signing of this order? A. Well, there would be a difference of eight to twelve dollars a month, on account of the increase in space.
“Q. Tell me what special rate Eounsaville said he made with the paper. What special rate did he tell you he had gotten with the local papers? A. He used the expression, he said, T will guarantee you get this other space,’ and showed us two columns, eight or ten inches long, and said, ‘You can get this for six\or six twenty-five a month’; the same space would have cost us ten or twelve dollars.
“Q. Is that the same price that you were paying for your ad? A. What price, how much?
“Q. For the ads you run before you ever entered into this agreement. A. What, six twenty-five?
“Q. Yes. A. No, I had been paying ten or twelve dollars, which he said would cost six or six twenty-five under this special arrangement.”

The plaintiff complains of the admission of evidence introduced by the defendants. The evidence complained of is above set out, and was that which was introduced to show that false representations had been made. The plaintiff’s criticism of the evidence is that it was parol evidence, and tended to vary and alter the terms of the written instrument. It was competent to introduce parol evidence to show that the contract was obtained by fraud, although that evidence might have proved that the contract made was different from the one signed. (Brook v. Teague, 52 Kan. 119, 34 Pac. 374; Deming v. Wallace, 73 Kan. 291, 85 Pac. 139; Hart v. Haynes, 96 Kan. 262, 150 Pac. 530; Griesa v. Thomas, 99 Kan. 335, 161 Pac. 670.)

2. The plaintiff demurred to the defendant’s evidence. That demurrer was overruled. The plaintiff complains of the order overruling his demurrer. The evidence to show, fraud has been set out in detail. The kernel of that evidence is, “I will guarantee that you will get this size ad on account of taking this contract with the newspapers for five and six dollars a month.” As used in the testimony above set out, an ordinary business man would understand by the language quoted, that arrangements had been made with the newspapers to carry the advertising matter at the rates named. The court, in passing on the demurrer to the evidence, was warranted in attaching that meaning to the language used. The evidence tended to show that no arrangements had been made with the [648]*648newspapers; that the defendants relied on the representation and believed that such arrangements had been made; and that by that representation the defendants were induced to sign the contract. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to compel the submission of the cause to the jury for determination of the facts under proper instructions, and the demurrer to the evidence was properly overruled.

3. The plaintiff contends that the court erred in refusing to give instructions requested by him. One of the requested instructions was to the effect that evidence should not be considered for the purpose of explaining, qualifying, restricting, or enlarging any of the' terms of the contract. Other requested instructions were, in substance, that since the contract on its face provided that “All promises and agreements are stated herein; verbal agreements with salesmen not authorized,” any representation made by the plaintiff which ingrafted upon the contract a condition not appearing therein would not be binding on the plaintiff, and would be no defense.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Diehl v. Barker
20 P.2d 534 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1933)
Swartz v. Linn
274 P. 217 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1929)
Boxer v. Watchorn Oil & Gas Co.
243 P. 316 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1926)
Abmeyer v. German-American State Bank
179 P. 368 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1918)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
168 P. 677, 101 Kan. 645, 1917 Kan. LEXIS 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/outcault-advertising-co-v-smalley-kan-1917.