Oupac, Inc. D/B/A Oupac Financial Services v. India Renee Sam, Et Ux.

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 4, 2012
• Docket: CA-0011-1495
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 11-1495

OUPAC, INC. D/B/A OUPAC FINANCIAL SERVICES

VERSUS

INDIA RENEE SAM, ET UX.

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APPEAL FROM THE OPELOUSAS CITY COURT PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 31,955 HONORABLE VANESSA HARRIS, CITY COURT JUDGE

BILLY HOWARD EZELL JUDGE

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Michael D. Bass Guglielmo, Lopez, Tuttle, Hunter & Jarrel, LLP P. O. Drawer 1329 Opelousas, LA 70571-1329 (337) 948-8201 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Oupac, Inc., D/B/A Oupac Financial Services Ladonte A. Murphy 1728 Oak Leaf Blvd. Opelousas, LA 70570 (337) 942-7070 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS: India Renee Sam Elton Sam, Jr. EZELL, Judge.

In this matter, India and Elton Sam appeal the decision of the trial court

finding them liable to Oupac Financial Services in the amount of $8,208.29 plus

interest. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm the decision of the trial court.

On August 21, 2006, the Sams purchased a vehicle from Creswell

Automotive, executing a purchase agreement for the car. The purchase was

financed by Oupac and secured by a promissory note on the vehicle. Oupac paid

Creswell $14,309.54, and the Sams received their vehicle. Oupac was not

affiliated, owned by, or even at the same location as Creswell. In fact, the Sams

left the Creswell lot to go to Oupac to secure financing. Sometime after 2006, the

Sams’ vehicle began to have mechanical problems. After several attempts to repair

the vehicle, the Sams decided it was not worth the expense and surrendered the

vehicle to Oupac after failing to make payments for multiple months. Oupac sold

the vehicle and instigated the current litigation to recover the remaining amount

owed on the vehicle. After trial on the merits, the trial court ruled that, despite the

obvious flaws with the vehicle, the Sams could not introduce parol evidence as to

the consideration for the promissory note and found that they owed Oupac

$8,208.29 plus interest for the debt remaining on the vehicle. From this decision,

the Sams appeal.

The Sams assert three assignments of error on appeal. They claim that the

trial court erred in finding that there was no failure of consideration as to the

promissory note; that the trial court erred in failing to consider parol evidence as to

what the Sams believed was the consideration or cause as to the promissory note;

and that the trial court erred in failing to order the promissory note unenforceable.

Because the first and third are so similar and related, we will address them together.

The Sams first claim that the trial court erred in failing to declare the

promissory note was unenforceable for a lack of consideration. For this proposition, they cite Courtesy Financial Services, Inc. v. Hughes, 424 So.2d 1172

(La.App. 1 Cir. 1982), for the proposition that failure of consideration is a defense

to Oupac’s action as they claim Oupac does not have the rights of a holder in due

course. We disagree.

Courtesy is clearly distinguishable from the case in hand in that the seller of

the vehicle and the loan officer writing the promissory note were the same person,

meaning that there was no way for the promissory note holder to not know of any

defects in the vehicle. Here, the vehicle seller, Creswell, and the financer, Oupac,

were completely separate entities with no ties at all. Oupac in no way was

connected to the purchase agreement signed between the Sams and Creswell and in

no way guaranteed or warranted the vehicle the Sams purchased. Simply put, the

Sams entered into two separate and distinct bilateral contracts, each with

independent obligations, causes, and considerations, only one of which is contested

here.

In a suit on a promissory note by a payee against the maker, the plaintiff

will be given the presumption that the instrument was given for value received

unless the maker casts doubt upon the consideration. Brashears v. Williams, 294

So.2d 246 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1974). In this matter, consideration was given the Sams

in the form of $14,309.54 paid to Creswell. The working vehicle the Sams sought

was the consideration for the purchase agreement signed with Creswell, and any

action they have would be against them, and would not serve as a defense against

Oupac’s claims, who neither knew nor could have known of any defenses the Sams

may have had to the note at the time of the making of the instrument. Thus, as

holder in due course of the promissory note, Oupac took the note free from any

defenses against any party with whom it had not dealt. See La.R.S. 10:3–305.

There is no error to the trial court’s rulings that the promissory note was issued for

consideration and that it was enforceable. 2 As their next assignment of error, the Sams assert that the trial court erred in

failing to consider parol evidence as to the consideration behind the promissory

note. Louisiana Civil Code Article 1848 does not allow testimonial or other

evidence not admitted to disprove the contents of an authentic act. That article

states:

Testimonial or other evidence may not be admitted to negate or vary the contents of an authentic act or an act under private signature. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, that evidence may be admitted to prove such circumstances as a vice of consent, or a simulation, or to prove that the written act was modified by a subsequent and valid oral agreement.

Further, “[w]here the words of a contract are clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd

consequences, the meaning and intent of the parties must be sought within the four

corners of the document and cannot be explained or contradicted by parol

evidence.” Sandbom v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 618 So.2d 1019, 1021-22 (La.App.

1 Cir.), writ denied, 625 So.2d 1042 (La.1993).

Based on the facts of this case as noted above, we find that the trial court did

not err in disregarding the Sams’ parol evidence, as none of the exceptions listed in

Article 1848 apply. There was no vice of consent, simulation, or a subsequent valid

oral modification of the agreement. Again, the consideration given for the

promissory note was the cash paid to Creswell, not the vehicle itself. The trial

court made no error in restricting the promissory note to its four corners, as the

terms of the document are clear.

For the above reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

Costs of this appeal are assessed against the Sams.