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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 OUCHO SAELEE and LAI CHIEM CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00735-TL SAELEE, 12 ORDER ON PETITIONERS’ Petitioners, MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 13 v. 14 JULIO HERNANDEZ et al, 15 Respondents. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Clarification (Dkt. No. 11) brought by 18 Petitioners Oucho Saelee and Lai Chiem Saelee. The Court ordered Respondents to file a 19 response, if they had one, by today, June 29, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. Dkt. No. 14 (“Order for 20 Response”). Respondents filed their response on Sunday, June 28, 2026. Dkt. No. 16.1 The Court 21 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for clarification. 22 // 23 //
24 1 The Court appreciates Respondents filing a response on short order. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioners are two stateless refugees from Laos who have lived in the United States for 3 forty-six years. Dkt. No. 9 (Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Injunctive Relief 4 (“Habeas Order”)) at 2–3. Both were ordered removed at the end of the last century but could not
5 be returned to Laos; consequently, they were allowed to remain in the United States on orders of 6 supervision, and built full, productive lives and families in this country. Id. at 3–4. Now elderly 7 and both living with serious medical conditions, Petitioners recently learned that Respondents 8 are taking steps to execute their decades-old removal orders and return them to Laos, a country 9 that they fled as teenagers and that will not recognize them as citizens. Id. at 1, 4, 5. 10 On March 3, 2026, Petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Injunctive 11 Relief (“habeas petition”), substantively asking the Court to (1) enjoin respondents from 12 detaining Petitioners at their upcoming check-ins with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 13 (“ICE”), and (2) to enjoin respondents from detaining Petitioners at any other time “without 14 advance notice of at least six months to one year, a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and a
15 showing that detention is necessary to secure their removal[.]” Dkt. No. 1 at 28. The Court 16 denied all relief, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition 17 because “order[ing] that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioners at their next appointments and 18 must give six months’ to a years’ worth of notice and a pre-deprivation hearing . . . would usurp 19 the executive’s discretion as to whether to execute a removal order and when to do it[.]” Dkt. 20 No. 9 at 10. Although it denied the habeas petition and all relief, the Court emphasized that 21 this Order does not negate Respondent’s obligation to afford Petitioners any due process required by law prior to any future re- 22 detention. Respondents are expected to provide Petitioners with due process in any re-detention procedure. Further, the Court 23 expects that Respondents will abide by the representations made by their counsel as an officer of Court as supported by a 24 1 declaration from a representative of DHS that “ICE does not intend to detain Petitioners without first securing a travel document.” 2 3 Id. at 11 (quoting Dkt. No. 5 (Respondents’ Return Memorandum) at 3). 4 Petitioners present the instant motion to “seek clarification on what ‘due process’ the 5 Court believes is ‘required by law prior to any future re-detention.’” Dkt. No. 11 at 2 (quoting 6 Dkt. No. 9 at 11). Petitioners also report that they have made numerous attempts to discuss the 7 legal question underlying this request with counsel for Respondents but have not received a 8 response. Id. at 3. In Response, Respondents assert that the Court did not err in finding it did not 9 have jurisdiction over Petitioners’ request (Dkt. No. 16 at 1) and that, even if the Court had 10 jurisdiction, the Court’s Habeas Order confirms Petitioners have not met their burden for 11 injunctive relief because “revocations of release pursuant to the applicable regulations for the 12 purposes of execution of a removal order do not violate due process” (id. at 3 (citing Saechao v. 13 Scott, No. C26-548, 2026 WL 626765 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2026)). 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD
15 “[T]here is no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure specifically governing ‘motions for 16 clarification.’” Beyond Blond Prods., LLC v. Heldman, No. C20-5581, 2020 WL 11886260, at 17 *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2020) (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 18 164, 168 (D.D.C. 2011)). The Local Civil Rules of this District also do not provide for such a 19 motion. However, “[a] district court has discretion to clarify . . . the scope of an injunction.” 20 Familias Unidas por la Justicia, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. C24-637, 2025 WL 21 963246, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 31, 2025) (quoting Safari Club Int'l v. Bonta, 2024 WL 22 4682396, *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2024)); see also N.A. Sales Co., Inc. v. Chapman Indus. Corp., 23 736 F.2d 854, 858 (2d Cir. 1984). “While such relief is in the sound discretion of the court,
24 courts should not ‘withhold a clarification in the light of a concrete situation that left parties . . . 1 in the dark as to their duty toward the court.’” Beyond Blond Productions, 2020 WL 11886260 at 2 *1 (quoting Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945)). 3 In some cases, a “motion for clarification” that assigns error to a district judge’s prior 4 order may be properly interpreted as a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Munoz-Munoz v.
5 Locke, No. C10-1475, 2013 WL 11319006, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2013), aff’d sub nom. 6 Munoz v. Locke, 634 F. App’x 166 (9th Cir. 2015). 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 A. Clarification Without Reconsideration Is Inappropriate Here 9 The primary relief Petitioners seek in their motion is “clarification on what ‘due process’ 10 the Court believes is ‘required by law prior to any future re-detention.’” Dkt. No. 11 at 2 11 (quoting Dkt. No. 9 at 11). Plaintiffs explain that “[w]ithout a court order articulating [what due 12 process requires before they may be re-detained], Petitioners are still subject to the 13 Government’s continued practice of re-detaining individuals at their scheduled check ins without 14 pre-deprivation notice and a hearing.” Id. at 3.
15 In one sense, this resembles a typical request for clarification of the contours of an order 16 granting injunctive relief. “The Supreme Court teaches that when questions arise as to the 17 interpretation or application of an injunction order, a party should seek clarification or 18 modification from the issuing court, rather than risk disobedience and contempt.” Regents of the 19 Univ. of California v. Aisen, No. C15-1766, 2016 WL 4681177, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016) 20 (citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949)). While such a request 21 would classically be asked by an enjoined party, it may be reasonable for a plaintiff or petitioner 22 to ask, “what, precisely, is defendant/respondent enjoined from doing?” This seems to be the 23 question Petitioners are asking here.
24 With regard to the Habeas Order entered in this case, though, there is no injunction to 1 clarify; the Court denied the habeas petition and all injunctive relief. The language Petitioners 2 seek to clarify is simply the Court’s general admonition reminding Respondents of their 3 “obligation to afford Petitioners any due process required by law.” But that admonition was 4 general for a reason. The habeas petition did not present the question of precisely what due
5 process is required in any hypothetical re-detention of Petitioners; it presented the narrower 6 questions of (a) whether it would be unlawful for Respondents to re-detain Petitioners without a 7 hearing and six months’ notice, and (b) whether it would be unlawful for Respondents to re- 8 detain Petitioners without notice at their ICE check-ins. While the law and the Constitution have 9 more to say about the applicable limits on any future action to re-detain Petitioners (as the 10 Court’s admonition attests), this Court’s prior order does not. The particular arguments and 11 claims raised in the habeas petition, which were largely focused on forestalling their removal, did 12 not put this Court in a position to offer its own opinion on the broad question of all “due process 13 required by law.” To do so now, especially without amending its order denying all relief, would 14 be tantamount to publishing an advisory opinion—something federal courts “have no jurisdiction
15 to issue[.]” In re Est. of Dela Cruz, 279 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 16 324 U.S. at 125–26 (1945)). Petitioners’ request for “clarification in an enforceable order on 17 what process is required” before they can be re-detained (Dkt. No. 11 at 2 n.1), to the extent it 18 does not seek reconsideration of the Habeas Order, is therefore DENIED. 19 B. Reconsideration of the Court’s Prior Order Is Appropriate in Limited Part 20 Petitioners argue that 21 the scope of relief appropriate to provide relief for a legal violation is a question separate and apart from the legal violation. Here, the 22 legal violation is that ICE threatens to violate Petitioners’ procedural due process rights to notice and a hearing before any re- 23 detention on an OSUP. Petitioners understand the Court to have concluded that the relief requested was too excessive in scope to 24 trigger concerns that the requested injunction would run afoul of 8 1 U.S.C. § 1252. However, Petitioners do not understand the Court to be ruling that Petitioners’ have no procedural due process right 2 to notice and a hearing. But because the Court did not address the merits of Petitioners’ legal claims and only states that it expects 3 ICE to “provide Petitioners with due process in any re-detention procedure,” Petitioners seek clarification in an enforceable order 4 on what process is required. 5 Id. The Court understands this to be an argument that the Court erred in making its jurisdictional 6 finding based entirely on the relief requested, failing to reach the merits of the due process claim, 7 and therefore failing to consider less “excessive relief.” The Court now considers this argument 8 in relation to Petitioners’ two separate substantive requests for relief: that the Court enjoin 9 Respondents from detaining Petitioners “without advance notice of at least six months to one 10 year, a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and a showing that detention is necessary to 11 secure their removal,” and that the Court enjoin respondents from detaining Petitioners at their 12 future ICE check-ins. 13 1. Petitioners’ Request for Specific Re-Detention Procedures 14 In their Motion, Petitioners submit that in distinguishing certain cases, specifically 15 Tesara v. Wamsley, No. C25-1723, 2025 WL 3288295 at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2025), and 16 Yang v. Scott, No. C26-469, 2026 WL 632661 at *2 (W. D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2026), “only on the 17 basis of the extended six-month-to-one-year timeline Petitioners sought,” the Court “implicitly 18 recognize[d] that the narrower relief granted in Tesara and Yang—basic notice and a hearing 19 before re-detention—is required by due process.” Dkt. No. 11 at 2. Petitioners therefore “do not 20 renew their request for an extended notice period” but “seek clarification on what ‘due process’ 21 the Court believes is ‘required by law prior to any future re-detention.’” Id. (quoting Dkt. No. 9 22 at 11). 23 To the extent that this is a request to reconsider the denial of the habeas petition and enter 24 an injunction (or declaratory judgment) outlining exactly what due process requires of 1 Respondents in any potential re-detention of Petitioners, it is denied. The reasons for this denial 2 largely overlap with those discussed supra Section III.A. Petitioners misconstrue the Court’s 3 Order, which distinguished Tesara and Yang without taking any position on the reasoning of 4 those decisions (which are not controlling precedent). See Dkt. No. 9 at 9. The Court was in no
5 position to reach the question presented in those cases, as it found that the particular claim for 6 relief presented in the habeas petition was beyond its jurisdiction. This was not precisely because 7 of the length of the notice period requested, but because Petitioners were “essentially asking the 8 Court to enjoin execution of their lawful removal orders, and . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips the 9 Court of jurisdiction” to rule on such a request. Id. at 5. To be sure, the Court reached this 10 determination partly because of the length on the notice period requested, but also because of the 11 arguments presented by Petitioners. By and large, the Court found that “Petitioners . . . want the 12 Court to make a decision that interferes with when Respondents can decide to execute their 13 removal orders” (id. at 6–7), reasoning: 14 Petitioners do not seek a reasonable runway to be prepared for detention, they seek time to fight their removal. They argue they 15 are “entitled” to “the ability to contact attorneys, file necessary petitions, and pursue legal relief connected to their detention.” Dkt. 16 No. 1 ¶ 82. But Petitioners have attorneys and have filed the petition best-suited to their detention: a petition for habeas corpus. 17 The real purpose of the extended reprieve Petitioners request is to “wrap up their affairs with their families” and “pursue post- 18 conviction legal relief” that could prevent their removal. Id. ¶ 86. But these goals, and the time needed to pursue them, exists 19 independently of the threat of detention. Petitioners do not want and need an injunction because Respondents might detain them, 20 they want and need an injunction because Respondents might be preparing to deport them. If detention were removed from the 21 equation entirely—for example, if Respondents ordered Petitioners to report to the airport and board a deportation flight without ever 22 detaining them—this need would be no less acute. 23 Id. at 7. 24 1 The Court can imagine a different habeas petition Petitioners might have filed, clearly 2 leveling all challenges at their potential detention rather than their potential removal, with well- 3 supported arguments detailing what process Respondents are required to provide before re- 4 detaining Petitioners. But that was not the petition before the Court. Instead, the Court was called
5 on to consider whether re-detention of Petitioners would be unlawful in the absence of the 6 specific procedures Petitioners sought specifically for the purpose of contesting their removal. 7 Based on the record, arguments, and authorities presented, the Court found that Petitioners’ 8 challenge with this request was to their removal, which stripped the Court of jurisdiction either to 9 consider the request on its merits or to fashion some more limited relief in its stead. See id. at 10. 10 Therefore, the Court finds that it did not err either in denying Petitioners’ request to enjoin their 11 removal “without advance notice of at least six months to one year, a hearing before a neutral 12 decisionmaker, and a showing that detention is necessary to secure their removal,” (Dkt. No. 1 at 13 28) or in declining to craft some less expansive injunctive relief for a challenge that was 14 fundamentally beyond its authority to consider.
15 2. Petitioners’ Request to Enjoin Re-Detention at ICE Check-Ins 16 But the Court did err in one respect. While the Habeas Order (and most of the briefing) 17 focused on Petitioners’ request for specific procedures, there was a separate substantive request 18 as well: that the Court enjoin Respondents from arresting Petitioners without notice when they 19 reported, pursuant to the requirements of their orders of supervision, for scheduled check-ins 20 with ICE. See Dkt. No. 1 at 28. The Court treated this request as part and parcel of Respondents’ 21 request for extended notice, ultimately finding that “order that Respondents cannot re-detain 22 Petitioners at their next appointments and must give six months’ to a years’ worth of notice . . . 23 would usurp the executive’s discretion” and was outside the Court’s jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 9 at 10
24 (emphasis added). 1 The Court’s inclusion of the italicized portion of the sentence above was an oversight and 2 an error. While the briefing could have more clearly delineated it, this was a separate request, 3 and it was error for the Court not to consider it independently of the specific procedural 4 protections Petitioners sought. On reconsideration, the Court finds that this relief is within the
5 Court’s jurisdiction and should be granted, for three reasons. 6 First, the Court’s jurisdictional reasoning simply does not apply to this relief. Unlike their 7 more ambitious contention that detention without at least six-months’ notice would violate due 8 process, the claim that detaining Petitioners without notice at their ICE check-ins would violate 9 due process is not, in fact, fundamentally a challenge to “the executive’s discretion as to whether 10 to execute a removal order and when to do it.” Id. If the Court grants the requested injunction, 11 and then Respondents decide to remove Petitioners, the Court’s order will not stand in their way. 12 As the Court previously suggested (see id. at 7), and as the exhibits in one of Petitioners’ 13 supplemental filings confirm (see Dkt. Nos. 12-1, 12-2), it is possible for Respondents to remove 14 Petitioners without detaining them at all. To the extent, if any, that detention is appropriate to
15 execute a removal of Petitioners, enjoining Respondents from misleading and ambushing 16 Petitioners at a required appointment scheduled for another purpose does not prevent them from 17 detaining Petitioners in another, lawful way. 18 Also unlike the other claim, the proposition that surprise “check-in” re-detentions of 19 noncitizens previously released under orders of supervision (as the cited cases demonstrate is 20 occurring) violate due process is consistent with the findings of other courts in this District and 21 Circuit, including findings cited by Petitioners. See Vo v. Scott, No. C26-135, 2026 WL 445046, 22 at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 2026) (cited by Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 77); Nguyen v. Bondi, No. C25-2723, 23 2026 WL 183819, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 2026); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963,
24 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (cited by Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 60) (where Petitioner had not yet been re-detained, 1 granting permanent injunction “unless and until a hearing, with adequate notice, is held in 2 Immigration Court to determine whether his bond should be revoked or altered”); see also Sun v. 3 Santacruz, No. C25-2198, 2025 WL 2730235, at *2, 5–6, 8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025) (cited by 4 Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 60) (finding a “tangible risk” that Petitioner on OSUP would be re-detained at ICE
5 check-in, holding Petitioner was likely to prevail on claim that such re-detention violated due 6 process, only additional pre-detention process can protect against an erroneous deprivation of 7 liberty interest, and enjoining respondents “from arresting, detaining, or removing [petitioner] 8 without notice and without a hearing[.]”).2 The Court agrees with those cases that this practice 9 violates due process and is within this Court’s jurisdiction to enjoin. 10 Respondents cite a single case, Saechao v. Scott, at which an ICE check-in detention was 11 found, after the fact, not to have violated due process because “Respondents . . . did not seek to 12 detain Petitioner without a hearing until they had made concrete arrangements for his removal.” 13 Saechao v. Scott, No. C26-548, 2026 WL 626765, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2026) (cited by 14 Dkt. No. 16 at 3). Respondents cite Saechao primarily as support for the statement that “[some]
15 courts in this District have found that revocations of release pursuant to the applicable 16 regulations for the purposes of execution of a removal order do not violate due process,” while 17 acknowledging that other Courts have found that due process requires notice and a pre-detention 18
19 2 This is not to mention the many cases in which courts, having granted a petition for habeas corpus on any number of bases and ordering release on an OSUP, also holds that future re-detention must be prefaced by notice and a 20 hearing. See, e.g., Monazzami v. Blanche, No. C26-1155, 2026 WL 1453670, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2026); Mai v. Hernandez, No. C26-1337, 2026 WL 1328257, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2026); Nasser v. Blanche, 21 No. C26-1304, 2026 WL 1256153, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 2026); Martynenko v. Bondi, No. C26-626, 2026 WL 787667, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2026); Korotkikh v. Bondi, No. C25-2750, 2026 WL 496794, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2026); Kara v. Bondi, No. C26-105, 2026 WL 322772, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2026). 22 While the Court does not go so far in this Order (for the reasons given supra Section III.B.1), these orders all 23 encompass a determination that surprise re-detention at an ICE check-in is out of bounds. And although Respondents contend that such cases “are distinguishable because the petitioners demonstrated that they had already been subjected to unlawful re-detention based on the facts of their circumstances” (Dkt. No. 16 at 2), they do not 24 explain why this distinction has any legal significance (and the Court sees no reason why it should). 1 hearing. Dkt No. 16 at 3. But the Court issued its prior order without any argument on the issue 2 of the relationship between DHS’s own regulations, specifically 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and 8 C.F.R. 3 § 241.13, and constitutional due process. As such, and because—as Respondents acknowledge— 4 the exact nature of this relationship is not well settled law, the Court finds it irrelevant to the
5 question of whether it erred in its prior order. To the extent that Saechao provides a single 6 example of a detention at an ICE check-in that was not found to be in violation of due process 7 (an argument Respondents did not raise in their return memorandum), it does not assuage the 8 Court’s concern that Petitioners are likely to experience a constitutional violation if re-detained 9 without notice at an ICE check-in. The Saechao court had the benefit of retroactively considering 10 the facts of a detention that already occurred, rather than considering whether the likelihood of a 11 constitutional violation during a future re-detention is sufficient to justify injunctive relief. Here, 12 where Petitioners have a fundamental interest in their liberty, Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 13 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017), where Respondents have little if any cognizable interest in the specific 14 procedure of a surprise re-detention at an appointment Petitioners have been told is for another
15 purpose, and where the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high (as evidenced by the 16 “dozens of habeas cases in this District and hundreds of habeas cases in this Circuit” that have 17 been granted on procedural due process grounds, (Dkt. No. 1 at 63)), the Court finds that 18 Petitioners have met their burden to show by a preponderance of evidence that their potential 19 future detention at an ICE check-in would be unlawful. 20 Third and finally, injunctive relief is appropriate here. A petitioner seeking a permanent 21 injunction against a government party must demonstrate (1) irreparable injury; (2) the 22 insufficiency of other remedies to compensate for that injury; and (3) a balance of hardships, 23 along with a public interest analysis, that favors injunctive relief. See eBay Inc. v.
24 MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 1 (2009) (holding that the third and fourth eBay factors merge where the Defendant is the 2 government). As to the first factor, an injunction is appropriate where the party can demonstrate 3 that “it is likely to suffer irreparable injury[.]” City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 4 F.3d 1225, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018). Petitioners have presented evidence that Respondents persist in
5 re-detaining noncitizens without warning at their ICE check-ins and that Petitioners themselves 6 are at risk of falling prey to being re-detained without warning at their ICE check-in. See Dkt. 7 No. 1 ¶¶ 77–78. They have provided authority, which this Court finds persuasive, finding this 8 practice violates the Due Process requirements of the constitution. See, e.g., id. ¶ 77 (citing Vo, 9 2026 WL 445046). At least one other court in this District reached the same conclusion. See 10 Nguyen v. Bondi, No. C25-2723, 2026 WL 183819, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 2026). The 11 other eBay factors also favor injunctive relief. “Monetary damages are an inadequate remedy 12 for deprivation of liberty; requiring the Government to follow constitutional procedures imposes 13 no undue hardship, and the public interest favors compliance with the law.” Medero v. 14 Hermosillo, No. C26-568, 2026 WL 891355, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2026) (citing Palacios v.
15 Hermosillo, No. C26-491, 2026 WL 686138, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2026)); see also 16 Riley's Am. Heritage Farms v. Elsasser, 32 F.4th 707, 731 (9th Cir. 2022) (As to the public 17 interest factor, “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a 18 party's constitutional rights.” (citation modified)). 19 For these reasons, the Court finds that it erred in failing to separately consider its 20 jurisdiction over Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief preventing Respondents from re- 21 detaining Petitioners at any future ICE check-in, that the Court has jurisdiction to grant this 22 relief, and that an injunction is appropriate. The Motion for Clarification, construed as a motion 23 to reconsider, is GRANTED IN PART as to this specific request. The Habeas Order is amended as
24 1 stated below and GRANTED IN PART and judgment will be re-entered in accordance with this 2 Order. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Petitioners’ Motion for
5 Clarification. Dkt. No. 11. It is hereby ordered: 6 (1) Petitioners’ request that the Court identify in detail what process is required by 7 law prior to any future re-detention is DENIED. 8 (2) To the extent the Motion for Clarification asks for reconsideration of the Habeas 9 Order, it is GRANTED IN PART. The Court finds that it erred in finding that it had no 10 jurisdiction over Petitioners’ request to enjoin Respondents from detaining them 11 at their upcoming ICE check-ins and in denying that relief. The Habeas Order is 12 amended as stated in this Order and GRANTED IN PART, and judgment will be re- 13 entered accordingly. 14 (3) The judgment in this case (Dkt. No. 10) is VACATED.
15 (4) Respondents and all their officers, agents, employees, attorneys, and persons 16 acting on their behalf or in concert with them are hereby ENJOINED from detaining 17 Petitioners at any ICE check-in unless Petitioners have been informed in advance 18 of the planned detention and the reasons for detention. 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 //
24 // 1 (5) Pursuant to Respondents’ representations to the Court, and in absence of any 2 violations by Petitioners’ of their OSUPs, Respondents and all their officers, 3 agents, employees, attorneys, and persons acting on their behalf or in concert with 4 them are FURTHER ENJOINED from detaining Petitioners at any time before travel
5 documents to Laos have been obtained for Petitioners. 6 Dated this 29th day of June, 2026. 7 A 8 Tana Lin United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24