Otuya v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 4, 2026
• Docket: 24-5221
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KINGSLEY OTUYA, No. 24-5221

Petitioner, Agency No. A204-945-187 v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted April 23, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SCARSI, District Judge.**

Kingsley Otuya, a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitions for review of a

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA affirmed the

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying deferral of removal under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) as part of a final order of removal. We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review the agency’s “factual findings for substantial evidence and may

set aside a factual determination only if the record compels a contrary conclusion.”

Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020); see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B)).

1. Otuya argues that the agency erred by failing to give reasoned

consideration to all evidence supporting his risk of future torture if he returns to

Nigeria. Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2018) (“CAT’s

implementing regulations explicitly require the agency to consider ‘all evidence

relevant to the possibility of future torture,’ and we have repeatedly reversed where

the agency has failed to do so.” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3))). To succeed

on such an argument, a petitioner bears a “heavy burden” of overcoming the

presumption that the agency reviewed all relevant evidence. Cruz v. Bondi, 146

F.4th 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2025).

Otuya has not satisfied that burden here. The agency expressly considered

documentary exhibits including declarations, a police report, and general country

conditions evidence, as well as Otuya’s testimony regarding corruption in Nigeria

and an attack on his family in Lagos. Otuya has not demonstrated that the agency

ignored key evidence or materially misstated the record. Id. at 739 (“[I]f nothing

2 24-5221 in the record reveals that the agency did not consider all the evidence, a general

statement that the agency considered all evidence before it shall suffice.”). Even if

the agency drew a different inference from Otuya regarding the motivations behind

the attack on his family, and even if we might not have drawn the same inference if

reviewing the record in the first instance ourselves, that does not establish that the

agency ignored or misstated evidence. See Smith v. Garland, 103 F.4th 663, 672

(9th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he agency’s decision to credit some parts of the record over

others does not mean it ignored relevant evidence.”).

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief.

When a petitioner advances a single theory regarding the risk of torture,1 “but the

torture will come about only if several hypothetical events all occur in sequence,

an applicant must show, at a minimum, that the individual probability of each

event occurring is greater than 50 percent.” Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 49

F.4th 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2022). The BIA concluded that one link in the causal

chain—that Otuya’s former criminal boss would learn of Otuya’s deportation and

find Otuya if he was deported to Nigeria—was too speculative. Nothing in the

record compels an alternative conclusion, so Otuya is unable to establish a

1 Although Otuya briefly testified to a second theory, about a risk of torture from the Nigerian government itself, he did not raise that theory in his opening brief. Otuya has thus forfeited any argument premised on that second theory. See Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020).

3 24-5221 sufficient likelihood of torture. See Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4

(A.G. 2006) (noting that a petitioner “will never be able to show that he faces a

more likely than not chance of torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to

be more likely than not to occur”).

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-5221