Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co. v. Hawley

44 Iowa 57
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedSeptember 20, 1876
StatusPublished
Cited by57 cases

This text of 44 Iowa 57 (Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co. v. Hawley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co. v. Hawley, 44 Iowa 57 (iowa 1876).

Opinion

Rothrook, J.

l. convextenan0©3Ppui' I. At the time of the trial in the court below an examination of the premises and machinery in question was made by the court, and the parties, and an agreement was made as to the situation and manner of attachment of the various parts of the machinery, after which no evidence was taken as to the character of the [59]*59attachment of the machinery in question. This agreement is quite lengthy, and it is not necessary to incorporate it in this opinion in order to properly comprehend the conclusion to which we have arrived.

The court found that the following property was affixed to and passed with the real estate:

1. The steam engine, boiler, whistle, pump, and all its attachments and belts, connecting it directly with the other machinery.

2. The fulling mill and its attachments and belts.

3. The main shaft and the pulleys thereon, and all the belts connecting it with the counter shafting.

4. The counter shafting and the dye kettle. .

5. The counter and shelving in the office.

It was found that all of the other machinery and articles in controversy were personal property and did not pass by the mortgage and sheriff’s deed.

No question is made here as to the finding of the court that the steam engine and other articles above enumerated were fixtures, and passed by the mortgage and sheriff’s deed. It is proper to observe that the boiler was walled about with one layer of brick, and that some of the other articles enumerated above were so constructed and attached to the building and land'as to be peculiarly adapted to that building, rather than to be used in woolen manufactories generally, unless by material changes in construction and adaptation.

The machinery which the court held to be personal property consisted of wool carders, condensers, breakers, spinning jacks, looms, shears, etc. Such of this machinery as was operated by steam power was so operated by means of belting connected with the main shaft or counter -shafting.

The looms are fastened to the floor by screws in the feet, some looms having two screws and some four. The carders are kept in position by their own weight, one weighing about 3,000, and the other about 1,800 pounds. The spinning jacks are fastened and held in position by cleats nailed to the floor, and by iron rod.s running up through the floor above. Other [60]*60of the machinery being ponderous is designed to be kept in position by its own weight.

Counsel for appellant claim that as the mortgage or trust deed conveyed the premises “with the appurtenances,” something more is conveyed than the real estate. This being the usual form of conveyance of real estate, we are unable to see how personal property can be embraced therein. Appurtenances are things belonging to another thing as principal, and which pass as incident to the principal thing. The term as used in conveyances passes nothing but the land and such things as belong thereto, and are part of the realty.

2. fixtures machinery, II. The main question in the case and to which counsel for both parties have principally directed their arguments, is as to the character of the machinery in question, whether it be real or personal property.

Fixtures are a species of property which are the dividing line between real and personal property, and to decide on which side of the line certain property belongs is often a vexatious question. When we compare a thing at the extremity of one class with a thing at the extremity of another the difference is obvious, but when we approach the point of ■division- difficulty arises in discovering where the distinction should be drawn. Hill on Fixtures, 16. On the question whether such machines so situated are fixtures, so that they constitute a part of the real estate, the authorities are so far from being uniform that no rule of universal application can be deduced from them, without conflicting with the doctrines found in some of the decisions upon the subject.

In New York, Ohio, Yermont, and some other States it is held that property of the character in question is personal, and does not pass by a mortgage or conveyance of the real estate. Murdock v. Gifford, 18 N. Y., 28; Walker v. Sherman, 5 Illinois, 527; Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y., 287; Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio State, 511; Corwin v. Cowan, Id., 629; Hill v. Wentworth, 28 Vermont, 428; Bartlett v. Wood, 32 Id., 372; Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass., 352.

In Maine, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and in other States, the courts hold that property of the character in ques[61]*61tion is not personal, and passes by mortgage or deed of tbe real estate. Farrar v. Stackpole, 6 Greenleaf, M., 155; Corliss v. McLogin, 29 Me., 115; Parsons v. Copeland, 38 Id., 537; Burnside v. Fritchell, 43 N. H., 390; Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 Watts & Serg., 116; Harlan v. Harlan, 15 Pa. St., 513.

In all of these cases, and in all tbe others cited in argument wherever the question arises as to the character of a steam engine or water wheel, which is the propelling power of a mill or manufactory, the uniform rule is that they are held to be fixtures, and pass with the real estate. The same may be said of the stones or burrs in a grist mill, the cog wheels, gearing and shafting in a mill or manufactory, they being parts of the motive power. The court below properly held the engine, boiler, shafting, and counter shafting and belting to be fixtures, and that they passed under the mortgage foreclosure, and sheriff’s sale. With the belting or straps which propelled the looms, spinning jacks, etc., the court stopped and in substance decided that here is the dividing line; all beyond are mere chattels. The basis or reason for thus holding seems to be in the thought that there is nothing in the character of the property, or in the manner of its annexation to the building, or in its adaptation thereto indicating that it was intended as a permanent accession to the realty, and that adaptation to the business carried on in the building is not a criterion for determining the question as ■ to whether the machinery be real or personal property.

It is argued that these looms, spinning jacks, etc., are equally well adapted to any other building, that they are manufactured with a view of being used in any woolen mill in which they may be placed; that they are entire and complete machines in and of themselves; that the physical attachments are such that they may readily be removed to any other building, and that there is nothing in the character of the machines or mode of annexation to denote that they were intended as permanent accessions to the realty, and therefore, they are chattels.

In the case of Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 O. St., 511, it is said: “ The true criterion of a fixture is the united application of the following requisites:

[62]*62“ 1. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto.

“2. Application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty with which it is connected is appropriated.

3. The intention of the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the free-hold:”

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Bluebook (online)
44 Iowa 57, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ottumwa-woolen-mill-co-v-hawley-iowa-1876.