Otto v. Western Pennsylvania Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund

127 F. App'x 17
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedFebruary 11, 2005
DocketNo. 04-2307
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 127 F. App'x 17 (Otto v. Western Pennsylvania Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Otto v. Western Pennsylvania Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund, 127 F. App'x 17 (3d Cir. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.

Invoking ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., Appellants challenge the calculation of their pension benefits by the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund (“the Fund”). The Magistrate Judge held the Fund’s calculation of benefits was proper and granted summary judgment in its favor.1 We will affirm.

I.

Because we write only for the parties, an abbreviated recitation of the facts will suffice. Appellants James Otto and Fred P. Grove are retired participants in the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund. Their wives, also Appellants, are beneficiaries entitled to survivor benefits under the plan. Over the course of their respective teamster careers, Otto and Grove worked for several employers under several different labor contracts, resulting in a complex matrix of pension fund contributions. Specifically, Mr. Otto is credited with twenty-six years of service at fourteen different employer contribution rates. Mr. Grove is credited with over nineteen years of service at ten different contribution rates.

The Fund itself, in existence since 1958, is a pension trust administered by a ten-member board of trustees. The board is comprised of five members appointed by contributing employers and five members appointed by local teamster unions. The trustees are fiduciaries under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) and are required to discharge their duties solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the Fund. Operation of the Fund is governed by a trust agreement and by the terms and conditions of the corresponding pension plan — both of which are summarized for participants in a summary plan description. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (requiring that participants receive a summary plan description). According to the trust agreement, the trustees have “full and exclusive [19]*19authority” to resolve controversies arising under the plan and to construe the terms and conditions of the plan.

Upon their retirement, in 1999 and 2001 respectively, Otto and Grove applied for a pension. The Fund actuary determined that Mr. Otto was entitled to a monthly benefit of $1,080.65 and that Mr. Grove was entitled to $535.50.2 In both cases, the Fund calculated the monthly benefit according to a “unit multiplier” formula, under which the applicant’s years of teamster service are multiplied by a factor corresponding to the employer contribution rates for the relevant period of service. In other words, the Fund multiplied Otto and Grove’s years of service at a given employer contribution rate by the “unit multiplier” corresponding to that rate. Mr. Otto’s monthly pension was based on fourteen different multipliers, while Mr. Grove’s was based on ten different multipliers.

Mr. Otto and Mr. Grove disagreed with the Fund’s calculation and, as authorized under the plan, appealed to the trustees. After hearings on the matter, a trustee sub-committee submitted a report to the trustees recommending the appeals be denied. The trustees, at their October 9, 2002 meeting, adopted the sub-committee recommendations and unanimously denied the appeals. Otto and Grove were informed of the decision by letter, and were subsequently provided with a written explanation from the Fund’s counsel of the basis for the trustees’ action.

Having exhausted all remedies under the trust agreement, Otto and Grove filed suit under ERISA § 502(a) in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (providing federal cause of action “to recover benefits due” under an employee benefit plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)-(f) (conferring federal jurisdiction). By consent of the parties, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the case was assigned to a Magistrate Judge, who on cross-motions for summary judgment entered judgment in favor of the Fund. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 1291. Our review is plenary. Stratton v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 363 F.3d 250, 253 (3d Cir.2004).

II.

The issue is whether the Fund’s method of calculating pension benefits is contrary to the terms of the pension plan and/or contrary to ERISA See Smith v. Contini, 205 F.3d 597, 602 (3d Cir.2000) (‘We are required to enforce the plan as written unless we can find a provision of ERISA that contains a contrary directive.”) (citations omitted). Appellants challenge the Fund’s pension formula, contending the plan requires a calculation based solely on the unit multiplier corresponding to the contribution rate of the applicant’s last employer. For Mr. Otto, this alternate methodology would increase his monthly Western Pennsylvania Fund benefit (without adjustment for survivor benefits) from $1,080.65 to $3,003.21. Mr. Grove’s monthly benefit (without survivor adjustment) would increase from $535.50 to $1,206.33.3

A.

Absent evidence of a structural conflict of interest on the part of the plan adminis[20]*20trator, see Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.2000), we apply “the deferential ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard” in reviewing the discretionary decisions of an ERISA plan administrator. McElroy v. SmithKline Beecham Health & Welfare Benefits Trust Plan, 340 F.3d 139, 141 (3d Cir.2003). Here, the plan expressly vests the trustees with “full and exclusive authority” to interpret the plan and to resolve controversies arising under it. There is no evidence of a conflict of interest. The board, which in this case voted unanimously, is jointly comprised of employer and teamster trustees with a fiduciary duty to manage the trust for the benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries. Trustee decisions under this framework — which is far removed from the structural conflict we observed in Pinto — warrant deferential arbitrary and capricious review. Bill Gray Enters., Inc. Employee Health and Welfare Plan v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 216 (3d Cir.2001) (absent “specific evidence of bias or bad-faith,” discretionary plan decisions are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard).4

B.

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Bluebook (online)
127 F. App'x 17, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/otto-v-western-pennsylvania-teamsters-employers-pension-fund-ca3-2005.