Otero v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.

548 So. 2d 686, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1643, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 3731, 1989 WL 73176
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJuly 5, 1989
DocketNo. 88-3083
StatusPublished

This text of 548 So. 2d 686 (Otero v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Otero v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 548 So. 2d 686, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1643, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 3731, 1989 WL 73176 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

On March 23, 1983, the plaintiff Otero was a passenger in a vehicle operated by her adult sister, Gladys Vidiella, when she was seriously injured in a one-car accident caused by the driver’s negligence. Since the vehicle owned by Vidiella was under repair, the car she was driving was a borrowed replacement which was concededly covered by her personal Commercial Union Insurance Company policy. It had limits of $10,000 in liability coverage and $50,000 in uninsured motorist protection. Otero suffered damages in the accident which exceeded $50,000 and made a claim on Com[687]*687mercial Union for $50,000 in benefits.1 Commercial Union tendered instead only the $10,000 in liability limits. Having stipulated to these operative facts in the instant action brought to resolve the conflict, both parties moved for summary judgment in their favor. The trial judge granted the carrier’s motion on the holding that only $10,000 was available. We reverse upon our agreement with Otero that she was entitled to $50,000 in total coverage,

,, . , . our V1®w> this result is mandated by a simple application of the terms of the poli-cy 2 and the applicable statute 3 to the undisputed facts. There is no question that:

[688]*6881. The tortfeasor, Gladys Vidiella, was liable to Otero for her negligence in operating the vehicle and is insured under the liability portion of the Commercial Union policy.4

2. As a passenger occupying the insured vehicle, Otero — again by both policy definition and statutory requirement — was a so-called class II insured under the UM coverage. Ivey v. Chicago Ins. Co., 410 So.2d 494 (Fla.1982); Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla.1971); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Martin, 399 So.2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1981).

3. Since the liability limits, $10,000, under the applicable liability policy are “less than the limits of liability [$50,000] for this [UM] coverage under [the] policy,” the vehicle is an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by the policy itself, see supra note 2, and the statute, see supra note 3 {“[T]he term ‘uninsured, motor vehicle’ shall, subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to include an insured motor vehicle when the liability insurer thereof ... Pijas provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured which are less than the limits applicable to the injured person provided under uninsured motorist’s coverage applicable to the injured person.’’). It thus follows as does the night the day that the plaintiff is entitled to recover under the UM coverage to the extent of the $50,000 limits less the $10,000 available for the tortfeasor’s liability, see § 627.727(1), Fla.Stat. (1983); Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So.2d 1077 (Fla.1978); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 370 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Put another way, Otero is entitled to $40,000 in underin-sured coverage plus the $10,000 in liability. In either event, Commercial Union must pay $50,000 as claimed.5

We see nothing in either the policy, the applicable statute, or the decided cases which, as Commercial Union contends, even indicates, let alone requires a different result. While some of the decided cases have referred to the principle, see supra note 5, that liability and UM coverage cannot be conferred by the same policy, none involves the present unique situation in which the liability limits are less than both the UM limits and the extent of the insured’s damages. To the contrary, as in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McClure, 501 So.2d 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), review denied, 511 So.2d 299 (Fla.1987), and Woodard v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 534 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), review dismissed, 542 So.2d 989 (Fla.1989), the liability and the UM limits were identical. Thus, in those cases, the policy and statutory definitions of an un- or underinsured motor vehicle — which requires UM coverage in excess of liability — simply did not apply ab initio. See generally Morrison v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 543 So.2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (comprehensive discussion of issues presented when liability limits are equal to or greater than UM coverage). Moreover, in those decisions as well, the plaintiff was in effect attempting to stack the UM coverage upon or render it excess to the liability limits. Such a proposed result was contrary to the applicable 1983 statute which did not provide for stacking and which expressly forbade the provisions of “both uninsured and excess underinsured” coverage in the same policy. [689]*689In this case, the plaintiff does not seek and we do not approve the stacking or excess treatment of the two coverages — which would yield $60,000 in benefits. Rather we apply the clear terms of the policy to provide for $50,000.

In sum, the tortfeasor had $10,000 in liability coverage; the injured plaintiff had $50,000 in un-underinsured motorist coverage available and more than $50,000 worth of injuries. In this state of affairs, there is simply no reason to deny the plaintiff the $10,000 plus $40,000 in benefits to which she is entitled simply because the two distinct forms of coverage are provided, as they indubitably are, in the same insuring agreement. There is no need to resort to the usual rules with respect to the treatment of insurance policies, see Stuyvesent Ins. Co. v. Butler, 314 So.2d 567 (Fla.1975); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Spreen, 343 So.2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), to reach the conclusion that, since contracting parties are held to their voluntary undertakings, Natl. Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Bailmar, Inc., 444 So.2d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 453 So.2d 43 (Fla.1984), the plaintiff is entitled to prevail.

Reversed.

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Related

NAT. HEALTH LABORATORIES, INC. v. Bailmar, Inc.
444 So. 2d 1078 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1984)
Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
363 So. 2d 1077 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1978)
Ivey v. Chicago Ins. Co.
410 So. 2d 494 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1982)
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McClure
501 So. 2d 141 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1987)
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin
399 So. 2d 536 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1981)
Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
252 So. 2d 229 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1971)
Woodard v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co.
534 So. 2d 716 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1988)
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Spreen
343 So. 2d 649 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1977)
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jenkins
370 So. 2d 1201 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1979)
Morrison v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.
543 So. 2d 425 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1989)
Stuyvesant Insurance Company v. Butler
314 So. 2d 567 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1975)
Reid v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
352 So. 2d 1172 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1977)
Smith v. Somera
389 So. 2d 1080 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
548 So. 2d 686, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1643, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 3731, 1989 WL 73176, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/otero-v-commercial-union-insurance-co-fladistctapp-1989.