Otay Mesa Property L.P. v. United States

86 Fed. Cl. 774, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 110, 2009 WL 1262385
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedMay 5, 2009
DocketNo. 06-167L
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 86 Fed. Cl. 774 (Otay Mesa Property L.P. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Otay Mesa Property L.P. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 774, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 110, 2009 WL 1262385 (uscfc 2009).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

WHEELER, Judge.

In this Fifth Amendment takings case, Plaintiffs seek just compensation for the United States Border Patrol’s alleged physical taking of eleven parcels of largely undeveloped land (“the subject property”) located adjacent to the Mexican Border in San Diego County, California. The Border Patrol has monitored the subject property since the 1970s as part of its mission to prevent, detect, and apprehend illegal aliens seeking to enter the United States. In 1992, Plaintiff Rancho Vista del Mar granted the Border Patrol a twenty-foot-wide easement along the Mexican border to conduct surveillance and law enforcement on foot, by vehicle, or on horseback. However, Plaintiffs allege that the Border Patrol dramatically increased its operations on their land in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, such that the Government engaged in a “permanent and exclusive occupation,” entitling them to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906, 123 S.Ct. 1484, 155 L.Ed.2d 226 (2003). The Border Patrol’s activity allegedly consisted of patrolling the subject property outside the boundaries of the easement on foot and in vehicles 24 hours per day, assuming stationary positions at various points on the parcels from which they monitored and responded to illegal alien activity, creating new roads without Plaintiffs’ permission, installing underground motion-detecting sensors, and constructing a permanent tented structure from which agents would wait and respond to radio calls from station headquarters. Based upon this conduct, Plaintiffs filed three takings actions in this Court in 2006.

Defendant has stipulated to partial liability for the physical taking of an easement on five of the eleven parcels due to the use of the seismic sensors, which the Border Patrol admits having installed between 1999 and 2005. [776]*776However, Defendant rejects Plaintiffs’ attempt to expand this stipulation to an admission of a physical taking of the entire subject property. Defendant does not deny that the Border Patrol engaged in most of the other activities alleged by Plaintiffs above, but disagrees that they rose to the level of a physical taking. Alternatively, even if the Border Patrol’s actions did constitute a permanent and physical occupation of Plaintiffs’ property, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006). According to Defendant, Plaintiffs’ takings claims accrued in the mid-to-late 1990s during the height of the Border Patrol’s activities on the subject property. Defendant argues that between 1996 and 1999, the Border Patrol received a massive influx of manpower and resources under an initiative called “Operation Gatekeeper.” Defendant contends that this heightened presence decreased in 1999 as the Border Patrol began temporarily detailing agents to other locations experiencing higher levels of illegal alien activity. Therefore, if a physical taking occurred, then Plaintiffs’ claims accrued by the late 1990s and are beyond the statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs’ theory linking the Border Patrol’s activity to the changed national security landscape after the September 11, 2001 attacks is intuitively attractive, but it lacks any evidentiary basis. Defendant presented evidence at trial supporting the conclusion that the Border Patrol significantly expanded the size and scope of its presence on the subject property in the mid-to-late 1990s and decreased its presence from 1999 to the early 2000s. Plaintiffs’ representatives attempted to refute this evidence by offering anecdotal testimony that they noticed an increase in the number of Border Patrol agents on the property, and that agents began stopping them more frequently after September 11, 2001. The Court found this testimony unconvincing. Accordingly, for the reasons explained more fully below, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims accrued between 1996 and 1999 and are barred by the statute of limitations. However, Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment of partial liability against Defendant for the physical taking of an easement due to the use of motion-detecting sensors on five of the eleven parcels, as stipulated by Defendant.

History of the Litigation

These cases have a unique history before this Court. On March 3, 2006, Plaintiffs Otay Mesa Property L.P., Rancho Vista Del Mar, and Otay International LLC filed a Complaint (“Otay Mesa Complaint” or “Otay Mesa Case”) seeking to recover just compensation for the Border Patrol’s alleged Fifth Amendment taking of their property, and the case was assigned to Judge Lawrence Bas-kir. On December 4, 2006, Plaintiffs in the Otay Mesa Case filed an unopposed motion to amend their pleadings to add Plaintiffs International Industrial Property (“IIP”) and D & D Landholdings (“D & D”) to the action. Judge Baskir denied this motion on December 14, 2006. Accordingly, on December 22, 2006, Plaintiffs HP and D & D filed two separate Complaints (“IIP Complaint” or “IIP Case” and “D & D Complaint” or “D & D Case”), and the cases were assigned to Judges Thomas Wheeler and Margaret Sweeney respectively.

On October 17, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the IIP Complaint, or in the alternative, for partial summary judgment. Defendant argued that Plaintiff HP’s claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations and that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On October 26, 2007, Defendant filed with Judge Sweeney a motion to dismiss the D & D Complaint, or in the alternative, for partial summary judgment. On February 22, 2008, Judge Wheeler denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the IIP Complaint after finding that Plaintiff IIP had offered adequate factual support to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that its claims were not time-barred by the Court’s statute of limitations. Int’l Indus. Park, Inc. v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 522, 528 (2008) (citation omitted). The Court ruled that it had the requisite subject matter jurisdiction but stated that “[i]f going forward, the facts and circumstances relating to the accrual of the cause of action demonstrate that Plaintiffs claims are time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations, the Court may dismiss [777]*777for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at that time.” Id. (citations omitted).

On May 2, 2008, Plaintiffs Otay Mesa Property L.P., Rancho Vista Del Mar, and Otay International LLC and Defendant jointly filed with Judge Baskir a motion to consolidate the Otay Mesa Case with the D & D and IIP Cases for trial. Plaintiff D & D and Defendant filed an identical motion with Judge Sweeney. On May 6, 2008, Judge Baskir granted the motion to consolidate the Otay Mesa Case with the IIP Case in order to “promote docket efficiency and ... assist in the efficient administration of justice.” J. Baskir Op. & Order 1, May 6, 2008. On June 3, 2008, Judge Baskir reassigned the Otay Mesa Case to Judge Wheeler for future proceedings.

On June 25, 2008, Judge Sweeney issued an opinion under seal, which she reissued as a published opinion on June 30, 2008, denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the D & D Case.

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Bluebook (online)
86 Fed. Cl. 774, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 110, 2009 WL 1262385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/otay-mesa-property-lp-v-united-states-uscfc-2009.