Osvaldo Sancho Martinez v. Warden of Florida Soft Side South Detention Center, in His/Her Official Capacity; United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

OSVALDO SANCHO MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:26-cv-849-KCD-NPM

v.

WARDEN OF FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH DETENTION CENTER, IN HIS/HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

Defendants. /

ORDER Petitioner Osvaldo Sancho Martinez has filed a pro se habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement. (Doc. 1.)1 As best the Court can tell, he claims that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at 7-8.) Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 13.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. I. Background Sancho Martinez illegally entered the United States in 2021 and was

released due to a lack of bed space. (Doc. 13-1 at 2.) Over the years, he picked up several criminal charges. (Id. at 2-3.) In 2025, an order of removal was entered against Sancho Martinez, but since he failed to appear before an immigration judge, ICE could not immediately detain him. ICE subsequently

found him and took him into custody on January 23, 2026, where he has been ever since. II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to

issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

III. Discussion The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the

noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems,

the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 659. And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is

presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v.

Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Applied here, Sancho Martinez cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. ICE took him into custody on January 23, 2026. (Doc. 13-1 at 2.) Because he has been detained for just three months, he remains within the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. Seemingly

recognizing this, his petition jumps to the burden-shifting framework, arguing that his removal to Cuba is not likely. (Doc. 1 at 7.) This argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim

is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES,

2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”). Sancho Martinez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so

the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment

accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 17, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek United States District Judge