Ospina v. United States

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedAugust 24, 1993
Docket92-2394
StatusPublished

This text of Ospina v. United States (Ospina v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ospina v. United States, (1st Cir. 1993).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


August 24, 1993
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
___________________

No. 92-2394

MOISES DIEGO OSPINA,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent, Appellee.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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___________________

Moises Diego Ospina on brief pro se.
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A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Paula J.
___________________ ________
DeGiacomo, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for
_________
appellee.

__________________

__________________

Per Curiam. Appellant, Moises Diego Ospina, pled
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guilty to four counts of conspiring to distribute and

distributing cocaine. He was sentenced to 63 months'

imprisonment on December 18, 1990. Appellant did not appeal

the sentence, but in May, 1992 filed a motion pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct sentence. The

district court dismissed the petition. We affirm.

Appellant raised three issues in his 2255 motion.

First, he argued that the sentence was imposed in violation

of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1)(A) because the district court

failed to determine that appellant had had an opportunity to

read his Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR"). Second, appellant

contended the district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(c)(3)(D) by failing to give him an opportunity to contest

factual inaccuracies in his PSR. Finally, appellant argued

that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment because it was

disproportionate to the sentence imposed upon his co-

defendant. We address each of appellant's contentions in

turn.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1)(A)
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Rule 32(a)(1)(A) provides that at the sentencing

hearing, and before imposing sentence, the district court

shall "determine that the defendant and defendant's counsel

have had the opportunity to read and discuss the [PSR]." At

-2-

appellant's sentencing hearing, the following exchange

occurred between appellant's attorney, William A. Brown, and

the sentencing judge regarding the PSR:

THE COURT: Mr. Brown, have you and your client

had an opportunity to review the presentence

report?

MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. for the record,

it was sent to him several weeks ago in Danbury.

He advised me this morning that he had not received

it. I don't know why the mail hadn't got through

to him in prison, but apparently it hadn't.

THE COURT: Well, has he had an adequate

opportunity now to review the presentence report?

MR. BROWN: He has had an opportunity to review

the report. And it is my understanding that there

are no additions or corrections thereto as to any

factual matters set forth therein.

THE COURT: All right. . . .

The court, after hearing from appellant's counsel, asked

appellant directly if he had anything further to say.

Appellant spoke, through an interpreter, about the influences

on the street that had led him into criminal conduct and his

regrets over that conduct. He did not object that he had not

seen the PSR.

-3-

Appellant contends on appeal, as he did for the

first time in his 2255 motion, that he did not see the PSR

prior to or at his sentencing hearing. He argues that the

district court erred by failing to ask appellant himself if
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he had reviewed the PSR and whether he had any objections

thereto. "However, binding precedent in this circuit has

directed that if it is abundantly clear from the sentencing

hearing that both defendant and his counsel are familiar with

the report, a new sentencing hearing will not be mandated,

even if the court failed to directly inquire whether the
_____________________________________________________________

defendant had an opportunity to review the report." United
__________________________________________________ ______

States v. Manrique, 959 F.2d 1155, 1157 (1st Cir. 1992)
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(emphasis added). See United States v. Cortez, 841 F.2d 456,
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460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1058 (1988) (holding
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that it is not necessary for the district court to personally

question the defendant as to whether he has read the PSR).

In this case, appellant's attorney specifically

stated that he and his client had had an opportunity to

review the PSR. "All that is required by Rule 32(a)(1)(A) is

that the court determine that the defendant and his counsel

have had the opportunity to read and discuss the report."

United States v.

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