WELLS, Judge.
Luis Felipe Ospina Garrido and Ospina Garrido e Hijos (collectively Ospina), appeal from an order denying their motion for an award of attorney’s fees
incurred for successfully defending a forfeiture action brought by the Miami-Dade Police Department (“MDPD”). For the following reasons, we reverse in part and remand with instructions.
On January 25, 2012, Ospina, a Colombian national, traveled from Bogota, Colombia to Miami, Florida. During the flight, Ospina filled out a U.S. Customs Declaration form declaring under oath that he was traveling on business and that he was carrying currency valued at more than $10,000.00. Upon arrival at Miami International Airport, Ospina was asked by a U.S. Customs official to declare the amount of currency he was carrying. Os-pina declared 100,000.00. Ospina was then provided with another more detailed U.S. Customs form so that he could declare the value in dollars of the currency that he was carrying. Ospina completed the form declaring under oath that the 100,000.00 had a value of approximately $129,000.00; he also declared that he was bringing the currency into the country for the purpose of purchasing cellular telephones for resale in Colombia by his cellular telephone company, Ospina e Hijos. Ospina was asked to produce and then produced the money which was secured in five Cambios Cen-tauros envelopes, each containing forty 500 notes. On further questioning, Ospina advised agents that the money he carried, initially in the form of pesos, had come from several sources including a safe located in his home and different bank accounts at Bancolombia titled in his, his wife’s, and his company’s names. Ospina said that he had exchanged the pesos secured from these sources for euros at Cambios Cen-tauros, a money exchange in Colombia. After several hours of questioning, the United States Attorney’s office was contacted to determine whether the United States would investigate Ospina or take action against him. The United States Attorney’s office declined. However, on the advice of its attorney, MDPD seized Ospina’s funds.
The day after the funds were seized, agents visited Amistar Telecom Inc., one of the two entities identified by Ospina as one of his suppliers of cellular telephones. Amistar, an entity that bought and sold telephones, confirmed that Ospina in the past had purchased merchandise from Am-
istar on a monthly basis. It also provided invoices confirming Ospina’s purchases and established that for the most part his purchases had been with cash. That same day, agents visited CT-Miami, the other business that Ospina had identified as one of his suppliers of cellular phones. As with Amistar, Ospina’s statements regarding his frequent purchases of cellular telephones and equipment were confirmed with supporting documents provided. Two days later, two Homeland Security agents inspected Ospina’s business in Colombia and interviewed Ospina; they reported no illegal activity.
On February 2, 2012, almost a week after the investigation into Ospina was completed — an investigation which bore out Ospina’s statements about the source and use of his funds — MDPD filed a verified forfeiture complaint. After citing to little more than the denomination of the euros at issue as purportedly supporting a belief that Ospina’s funds were being brought into the country as either part of a drug trafficking or money laundering scheme,
the complaint asserted a single claim of bank fraud premised on Ospina’s failure to make a declaration in Colombia that he was taking funds out of that country.
After reiterating the factors relating to drug trafficking and money laundering at the subsequently held adversarial preliminary hearing before Judge Marcia Caballero, MDPD convinced the trial court, contrary to the law, to exclude Ospi-na’s evidence that would demonstrate that he was engaged in a legitimate business transaction and that no probable cause existed for the continued seizure of his funds, arguing that such evidence could not be considered at this stage of the proceedings
:
MR. BERRIO [COUNSEL FOR OS-PINA]: She objected to me introducing these documents.
MS. DIXON [FOR MDPD]: Because it would go to the ultimate issue of fact, Your Honor. As you know and you are aware that under the law that at a probable cause hearing all the Judge is to do is to establish whether or not we have probable cause.
If that document is taken into consideration ... it would then go to the ultimate issue of fact, which is not to be determined at the probable cause hearing. It is to be determined at the second stage, Your Honor.
On the resulting lopsided presentation, on March 2, 2012, probable cause to continue to hold Ospina’s funds was found to exist. That same day Ospina filed his motion to dismiss. Sixty days later he filed a motion for summary judgment. On July 26, 2012, the two motions were heard, and on October 5, 2012, after MDPD had held the funds at issue for over eight months, summary judgment was granted on a finding that no illegality had been demonstrated to exist.
No appeal was prosecuted from this determination, and Ospina’s funds were returned to him nineteen days later. Ospina thereafter moved for an award of damages which was granted in part
by a successor judge.
He also moved for an award of attorneys’ fees under both section 932.704(10)
and section 57.105
,
of the
Florida Statutes. The motion was denied on both grounds chiefly because the trial court found that Ospina had “an opportunity to present evidence, and an opportunity to examine witnesses” at the preliminary adversarial hearing following which Judge Caballero had found probable cause existed to seize Ospina’s funds. .
A probable cause determination following a first stage adversarial preliminary hearing does not, however, preclude an attorney’s fee award following a second stage summary judgment or trial determination.
This is so because a probable cause determination during a first stage proceeding is required before a second stage- may proceed, and as section 932.704(10) makes clear, attorney’s fees may be awarded when it has been shown that “the seizing agency has not proceeded
at any stage
of the proceedings in good faith or that the seizing agency’s action which precipitated the forfeiture proceedings was a gross abuse of the agency’s discretion.” (emphasis added);
see Cobb v. Langworthy,
909 So.2d 416, 417 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (affirming an award of attorney’s fees to a successful property owner following a stage two judgment which necessarily was preceded by a stage one finding of probable cause);
see also In re Forfeiture of: 1997 Jeep Cherokee,
898 So.2d 223, 224-25 (Fla.
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WELLS, Judge.
Luis Felipe Ospina Garrido and Ospina Garrido e Hijos (collectively Ospina), appeal from an order denying their motion for an award of attorney’s fees
incurred for successfully defending a forfeiture action brought by the Miami-Dade Police Department (“MDPD”). For the following reasons, we reverse in part and remand with instructions.
On January 25, 2012, Ospina, a Colombian national, traveled from Bogota, Colombia to Miami, Florida. During the flight, Ospina filled out a U.S. Customs Declaration form declaring under oath that he was traveling on business and that he was carrying currency valued at more than $10,000.00. Upon arrival at Miami International Airport, Ospina was asked by a U.S. Customs official to declare the amount of currency he was carrying. Os-pina declared 100,000.00. Ospina was then provided with another more detailed U.S. Customs form so that he could declare the value in dollars of the currency that he was carrying. Ospina completed the form declaring under oath that the 100,000.00 had a value of approximately $129,000.00; he also declared that he was bringing the currency into the country for the purpose of purchasing cellular telephones for resale in Colombia by his cellular telephone company, Ospina e Hijos. Ospina was asked to produce and then produced the money which was secured in five Cambios Cen-tauros envelopes, each containing forty 500 notes. On further questioning, Ospina advised agents that the money he carried, initially in the form of pesos, had come from several sources including a safe located in his home and different bank accounts at Bancolombia titled in his, his wife’s, and his company’s names. Ospina said that he had exchanged the pesos secured from these sources for euros at Cambios Cen-tauros, a money exchange in Colombia. After several hours of questioning, the United States Attorney’s office was contacted to determine whether the United States would investigate Ospina or take action against him. The United States Attorney’s office declined. However, on the advice of its attorney, MDPD seized Ospina’s funds.
The day after the funds were seized, agents visited Amistar Telecom Inc., one of the two entities identified by Ospina as one of his suppliers of cellular telephones. Amistar, an entity that bought and sold telephones, confirmed that Ospina in the past had purchased merchandise from Am-
istar on a monthly basis. It also provided invoices confirming Ospina’s purchases and established that for the most part his purchases had been with cash. That same day, agents visited CT-Miami, the other business that Ospina had identified as one of his suppliers of cellular phones. As with Amistar, Ospina’s statements regarding his frequent purchases of cellular telephones and equipment were confirmed with supporting documents provided. Two days later, two Homeland Security agents inspected Ospina’s business in Colombia and interviewed Ospina; they reported no illegal activity.
On February 2, 2012, almost a week after the investigation into Ospina was completed — an investigation which bore out Ospina’s statements about the source and use of his funds — MDPD filed a verified forfeiture complaint. After citing to little more than the denomination of the euros at issue as purportedly supporting a belief that Ospina’s funds were being brought into the country as either part of a drug trafficking or money laundering scheme,
the complaint asserted a single claim of bank fraud premised on Ospina’s failure to make a declaration in Colombia that he was taking funds out of that country.
After reiterating the factors relating to drug trafficking and money laundering at the subsequently held adversarial preliminary hearing before Judge Marcia Caballero, MDPD convinced the trial court, contrary to the law, to exclude Ospi-na’s evidence that would demonstrate that he was engaged in a legitimate business transaction and that no probable cause existed for the continued seizure of his funds, arguing that such evidence could not be considered at this stage of the proceedings
:
MR. BERRIO [COUNSEL FOR OS-PINA]: She objected to me introducing these documents.
MS. DIXON [FOR MDPD]: Because it would go to the ultimate issue of fact, Your Honor. As you know and you are aware that under the law that at a probable cause hearing all the Judge is to do is to establish whether or not we have probable cause.
If that document is taken into consideration ... it would then go to the ultimate issue of fact, which is not to be determined at the probable cause hearing. It is to be determined at the second stage, Your Honor.
On the resulting lopsided presentation, on March 2, 2012, probable cause to continue to hold Ospina’s funds was found to exist. That same day Ospina filed his motion to dismiss. Sixty days later he filed a motion for summary judgment. On July 26, 2012, the two motions were heard, and on October 5, 2012, after MDPD had held the funds at issue for over eight months, summary judgment was granted on a finding that no illegality had been demonstrated to exist.
No appeal was prosecuted from this determination, and Ospina’s funds were returned to him nineteen days later. Ospina thereafter moved for an award of damages which was granted in part
by a successor judge.
He also moved for an award of attorneys’ fees under both section 932.704(10)
and section 57.105
,
of the
Florida Statutes. The motion was denied on both grounds chiefly because the trial court found that Ospina had “an opportunity to present evidence, and an opportunity to examine witnesses” at the preliminary adversarial hearing following which Judge Caballero had found probable cause existed to seize Ospina’s funds. .
A probable cause determination following a first stage adversarial preliminary hearing does not, however, preclude an attorney’s fee award following a second stage summary judgment or trial determination.
This is so because a probable cause determination during a first stage proceeding is required before a second stage- may proceed, and as section 932.704(10) makes clear, attorney’s fees may be awarded when it has been shown that “the seizing agency has not proceeded
at any stage
of the proceedings in good faith or that the seizing agency’s action which precipitated the forfeiture proceedings was a gross abuse of the agency’s discretion.” (emphasis added);
see Cobb v. Langworthy,
909 So.2d 416, 417 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (affirming an award of attorney’s fees to a successful property owner following a stage two judgment which necessarily was preceded by a stage one finding of probable cause);
see also In re Forfeiture of: 1997 Jeep Cherokee,
898 So.2d 223, 224-25 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (addressing a claim for attorney’s fees under section 932.704(10) following a stage one probable cause determination and an agency dismissal during stage two proceedings).
Here, neither the fact that Judge Caballero found probable cause nor the factors on which she relied to reach that determination support a conclusion that MDPD acted in good faith in these pro
ceedings. This is so not only because Os-pina was not accorded the opportunity to present evidence, and in fact was stymied in doing so by MDPD at the preliminary hearing, but also because MDPD knew before the forfeiture petition was filed that Ospina’s account of his actions and intentions was unrefuted and that no “sufficient probability [existed] to warrant a reasonable belief that [the] currency was connected to criminal activity.”
In re Forfeiture of One Hundred Seventy-One Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($171,900) in U.S. Currency,
711 So.2d 1269, 1274 n. 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
On this record a lack of good faith that would support a fee award under section 982.704(10) was demonstrated. So too was entitlement to an award of fees under section 57.105. Addressing Ospina’s claim to a fee award under that provision, the trial court concluded:
This court finds that the summary judgment ... standard is not equivalent to the finding of frivolousness required by Section 57.105 fdr an award of attorney’s fees.
Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
410 So.2d 501, 506 (Fla.1982)
disapproved of by Florida Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe,
472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985). “The statute provides that a party is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees only when the court determines that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue raised by the losing party. Without such a finding, an order assessing attorney’s fees is technically deficient and must be reversed”.
Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
410 So.2d 501, 506 (Fla.1982) disapproved of by
Florida Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe,
472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985).
See Allen v. Estate of Dutton,
394 So.2d 132, 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980);
City of Miami Beach v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands,
380 So.2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980);
but see Autorico, Inc. v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,
398 So.2d 485, 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
The granting of summary judgment does not equal to the frivolousness standard set forth in § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2012). Furthermore, probable cause was found in this case, which would take it outside of any potential frivolousness argument.
The trial judge was correct in concluding that an order granting summary judgment standing alone does not mandate an award of fees pursuant to section 57.105.
See Salazar v. Helicopter Structural & Maintenance, Inc.,
986 So.2d 620, 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“[A] summary judgment does not automatically entitle the prevailing party to an award of section 57.105 fees.
Bowen v. Brewer,
936 So.2d 757, 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006);
Wendy’s of N.E. Fla., Inc. v. Vandergriff,
865 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).”). He was nonetheless wrong in rejecting out of hand the claim for fees under section 57.105,
where as here, neither the facts nor the law supported in any fashion, the forfeiture sought.
See Albritton v. Ferrera,
913 So.2d 5, 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“[0]nce a party learns its claim or defense is not supported by the facts or law, it must drop the claim or defense, or risk imposition of section 57.105 attorney’s fees on the non-meritorious claim or defense.”);
In re Forfeiture of 1997 Jeep Cherokee,
898 So.2d at 224 (awarding 57.105 fees notwithstanding “[a]t the preliminary hearing, the trial court found that probable cause did exist for the continued possession of the vehicle”). As the record in this matter confirms, Ospina satisfied that test entitling him to a fee award under this provision as well.
We therefore affirm the order on appeal except for the denial of an attorney’s fee award, which we reverse and remand for an award of fees. However, we leave it to the court below to determine whether to award fees under section 932.704(10) or section 57.105 in light of the statements made herein.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
We grant Appellant's Motion to Clarify the Record solely to correct two dates in the opinion of this court issued February 25, 2015. It is undisputed that Homeland Security visited Ospina’s business in Colombia February 3, 2012, eight days after visiting the Appellant’s two suppliers in the United States. February 7, 2012, some four days later, MDPD filed its verified forfeiture complaint. The opinion of this court issued February 25, 2015 is unchanged in all other respects.