Osceola Fruit Distributors v. Mayo

115 So. 2d 760
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedNovember 25, 1959
DocketNo. 1400
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 115 So. 2d 760 (Osceola Fruit Distributors v. Mayo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Osceola Fruit Distributors v. Mayo, 115 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

KANNER, Judge.

Osceola Fruit Distributors, petitioner, with its main office in Kissimmee, Florida, holds a citrus fruit dealer’s license and certificate of registration for the operation of a packing house, canning plant or concentrating plant, issued under the provisions of the Florida Citrus Code, Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Through certiorari, the petitioner seeks review of an order rendered by the circuit court of Osceola County in a certiorari proceeding wherein was. reviewed proceedings had before the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida. The commissioner had entered an¡ order suspending the certificate of registration and the citrus fruit dealer’s license of petitioner for a period of fourteen days. The order of suspension was issued subsequent to a hearing under a five count complaint filed by the commission. The circuit-court reversed and overruled the commissioner as to counts one, two, and five, sustained him as to counts three and four, quashed the suspension order, and re[761]*761manded the case to the commission for entry of an order as applied to counts three and four of the complaint.

Counts three and four read, respectively, as follows:

“Count 3
“That said Osceola Fruit Distributors, on or about October 20, 1958, violated Section 601.48, Florida Statutes {F.S.A.], and Regulation #19, Section One, Subsection c, of the Rules and Regulations of the Florida Citrus Commission, by adding or placing a substance, towit: water soluble coal tar ■dye, in certain blended orange and grapefruit juice then and there being processed and offered for sale or shipment, and being prepared for sale or shipment, the effect and purpose of ■such additive being to improperly ■change the color of said blended citrus product.
“Count 4
■“That said Osceola Fruit Distributors, on or about October 20, 1958, violated, or aided or abetted in the violation of, Section 601.33, Florida Statutes [F.S.A.], by obstructing, hindering, resisting, interfering with, or attempting to obstruct, hinder, resist or interfere with, an authorized inspector under the Florida Citrus Code, in the discharge of the duty imposed upon and required of him by said Code and the Rules and Regulations of the Florida Citrus Commission, by adding a water soluble coal tar dye in certain blended •orange and grapefruit juice, for purpose of changing the usual or ordinary •color thereof, which said blended citrus product was then and there being processed and offered for sale or shipment, or being prepared for sale or shipment.”

The two questions under which the petitioner seeks review by this court are (1) whether, under the Florida Citrus Code and the applicable regulations adopted thereunder, the supplying of an additive color to blended orange and grapefruit juice constitutes a basis for suspension of a citrus fruit dealer’s license and plant certificate of registration, and (2) whether there was competent substantial evidence upon which the commissioner of agriculture could find that the petitioner had added coloring to a canned blend of orange and grapefruit juice.

As a basic premise, it may be here stated that a certiorari proceeding is restricted in scope. A reviewing court cannot reweigh or revaluate the evidence but can only examine the record to determine whether the lower tribunal or agency had before it competent substantial evidence to support its findings and judgment, and such findings and judgment must be in accord with the essential requirements of law. De Groot v. Sheffield, Fla.1957, 95 So.2d 912, and Townsend Fruit Company v. Mayo, Fla.App.1957, 98 So.2d 345.

The commissioner of agriculture is vested with supervision, direction, and control of the inspection of citrus fruit and products, the certification of grades, and the enforcement of all the provisions of the Florida Citrus Code. Section 601.27, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. He is empowered, after notice and hearing, to revoke or suspend the license of a citrus fruit dealer if he is satisfied that such dealer has violated any of the provisions of the Florida Citrus Code. Section 601.67, Florida Statutes, F. S.A. Fie may instigate and make investigation when he has reason to believe a citrus fruit dealer has violated any law applicable to such a dealer. Section 601.68, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

It is necessary to review the major statutory and regulatory provisions under which counts three and four were sustained by the circuit court. Section 601.48, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., insofar as it applies, provides for the grading of canned or concentrated [762]*762citrus fruit products according to the standards established from time to time by the Florida Citrus Commission.1 Regulation 19, Section One, subsection c, Rules and Regulations of the Florida Citrus Commission, provides that Florida State Grades of canned blend of orange and grapefruit juice shall be identical with those prescribed by the United States Department of Agriculture, that such canned blend shall also possess the minimum qualities stipulated, and that the product must be labeled “Substandard” if it does not fulfill the requirements of section 601.0106, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.2 Section 601.33 makes it unlawful for any person to interfere with any authorized inspector in the discharge of any duty required of him by the provisions of law or by any regulation prescribed by the commission or the commissioner.3 Section 601.03(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., defines an “additive.”4 Section 601.0106 provides standards and labelling requirements applicable to canned blended juice.5

[763]*763Dealing with petitioner’s first question as to whether the addition of color to blended orange and grapefruit juice constitutes a basis for suspension of its dealer’s license and plant certificate of registration, we emphasize that section 601.48 requires canned products of citrus fruit to be graded according to standards established by the Florida Citrus Commission. Testimony given at the hearing by a federal employee, area supervisor of processed food inspection for the Agricultural Marketing Service, shows that the color of canned juices is an important consideration in grading under United States standards adopted by the commission. He stated that on the basis of one hundred points, “you have a set number of points that you score juices for flavor; a set number for color, and whether or not there are defects present.” He further testified that the total score accorded the juice indicates its grade and that the richer or redder colors are “better” and are “top scoring colors.”

Since it is apparent that the color of blended orange and grapefruit juice is a basic attribute for grading the product under methods adopted by the commission through authority of the Florida Citrus Code, it would be contradictory and illogical to hold that application of a color additive to such juices is not precluded under the Florida Citrus Code and the rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto by the Florida Citrus Commission. If a processor through addition of a dye could achieve for the product an artificial color, he could achieve such a hue desired so as to gain for his product the highest number of points allowed for color, and consequently the regulations for grading as they apply to color would be rendered meaningless and futile.

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Bluebook (online)
115 So. 2d 760, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/osceola-fruit-distributors-v-mayo-fladistctapp-1959.