Oscar Gerardo Solano Morillo v. Sergio Albarran, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 15, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01533
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OSCAR GERARDO SOLANO No. 1:25-cv-01533-DJC-AC MORILLO, 12

13 Plaintiff, ORDER 14 v. 15 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 Petitioner is a 70-year-old noncitizen, who entered the United States in 2006. 18 On November 7, 2025, Petitioner appeared for an adjustment of status interview, and 19 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers detained him, 20 purportedly pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Petitioner is presently in ICE custody. 21 On November 11, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 22 along with a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, arguing that he cannot lawfully 23 be detained pursuant to this statute and that his present detention violates his due 24 process rights and the Administrative Procedure Act. 25 In the numerous cases, district courts in this Circuit have applied a similar 26 approach. Based on the substantial weight of this authority and for the reasons stated 27 below, the Court grants Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The 28 1 Court orders Petitioner released and will set a further briefing scheduled on a Motion 2 for Preliminary Injunction. 3 BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner is a 70-year-old man from Peru who entered the United States in 5 2006. (Pet (ECF No. 4) ¶ 18.) For 19 years, Petitioner has lived in San Pablo near his 6 92-year-old father, ex-partner, son, daughter, and five grandchildren. (Reply (ECF No. 7 11) at 2.) During the time Petitioner has lived here, he has never been convicted of a 8 crime nor had criminal charges filed against him. (Pet. ¶ 5.) Petitioner has worked as 9 a metal recycler and paid his taxes. (Id. ¶ 2.) 10 In 2023, Petitioner’s son became a U.S. citizen and filed an immediate relative 11 petition (I-130) for Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 4). This petition was approved on November 7, 12 2025. (Id. ¶ 25.) On the same date, Petitioner appeared for his adjustment of status 13 interview. (Id. ¶ 28.) The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) Officer 14 conducting the interview stated that Petitioner’s status would have been approved but 15 for one technical issue: Petitioner’s adjustment medical exam (I-163) was invalid 16 because the doctor who signed this exam did not qualify as a “civil surgeon” when she 17 signed the form.1 (Id. ¶ 6.) The USCIS Officer then contacted ICE officers, who 18 immediately arrived at the interview and detained Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 35.) On this date, 19 a Notice to Appear was issued to Petitioner, stating that he is removable under INA 20 § 212(a)(6) because he is present in the United States without admission or parole. 21 (Id. ¶ 31.) To date, Petitioner has not been provided an opportunity to generate a new 22 medical examination form and remains detained in California City, California. (Id. 23 ¶¶ 36–37.) 24 Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Motion for 25 Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF Nos. 4–5.) Briefing on the Motion for Temporary 26

27 1 Although the Officer denied Petitioner’s adjustment of status on this basis, Petitioner’s counsel has identified that the USCIS website lists this doctor as a civil surgeon qualified to sign medical 28 examination forms. (Pet. ¶ 6.) 1 Restraining Order is now complete. (Mot. (ECF No. 5); Opp’n (ECF No. 9); Reply (ECF 2 No. 11).) The Court heard argument on Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining 3 Order on November 14, 2025. Mary Bosworth appeared for Petitioner and Audrey 4 Hemesath appeared for Respondents. At the close of oral argument, the Motion was 5 taken under submission. 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 8 injunction are “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 9 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, 10 Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable 11 harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his 12 favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 13 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious 14 questions going to the merits’ — a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 15 merits — then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 16 sharply in the plaintiff's favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. for 17 the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The 18 Ninth Circuit employs a sliding scale approach to the Winter factors, under which a 19 strong showing on the balance of hardships may compensate for a lesser showing of 20 likelihood of success. See Where Do We Go Berkeley v. California Dep't of Transp., 32 21 F.4th 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2022). 22 DISCUSSION 23 I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 24 Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he has been 25 unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and is instead subject to 8 U.S.C § 1226. 26 Respondents assert Petitioner has been detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2) and, 27 therefore, “must be detained” and is not entitled to a bond hearing. (Opp’n at 2). 28 1 Petitioner counters that he is not subject to Section 1225 but rather is subject to 2 Section 1226, which entitles him to a bond hearing. 3 Sections 1225 and 1226 both govern the detention and removal of noncitizens 4 from the United States. However, Section 1225 provides for mandatory detention of 5 certain individuals, while Section 1226 establishes a discretionary detention scheme. 6 Section 1225 provides that a noncitizen “who is an applicant for admission . . . shall be 7 detained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In contrast, under Section 1226’s discretionary 8 scheme, a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether 9 the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C § 1226(a). Pending 10 this decision, the Attorney General may continue to detain the arrested individual or 11 may release the individual on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B). 12 Section 1226(a) affords noncitizens a statutory right to a bond hearing before an 13 immigration judge. Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 14 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)); see also Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 15 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that under “§ 1226(a) and its implementing 16 regulations, a detainee may request a bond hearing before an IJ at any time before a 17 removal order becomes final”). “At that hearing, the noncitizen may present evidence 18 of their ties to the United States, lack of criminal history, and other factors that show 19 they are not a flight risk or danger to the community.” Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 20 1256. 21 Though discretionary detention is the “default rule” under Section 1226, there 22 are exceptions to Section 1226’s discretionary scheme. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 23 U.S. 281, 288 (2018). Section 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of [noncitizens] 24 who may not be released under § 1226(a).” Id. at 289. Under Section 1226(c), the 25 “Attorney General shall take into custody any [noncitizen] who falls into one of several 26 enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist activities.” Id. (citing 8 27 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 28 1 This Court agrees with Petitioner that he is likely subject to Section 1226(a)’s 2 discretionary detention scheme rather than Section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention 3 scheme and, therefore, is entitled to a bond hearing. Respondents argue Petitioner is 4 an “applicant for admission” within the meaning of Section 1225. (Opp’n at 2.) This 5 argument reflects a recent executive branch policy change directing federal 6 immigration officials to seek expedited removal of a larger swath of noncitizens by 7 classifying all noncitizens present in the United States as “applicant[s] for admission” 8 under Section 1225. C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01395-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 9 3059549, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (quoting Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV- 10 06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *1–4 (N.D. Cal. Sept 12, 2025), describing this 11 policy change). 12 This Court rejects Respondents’ argument and finds that the applicability of 13 these provisions is governed by when and where a noncitizen encounters immigration 14 enforcement officials. Courts in this Circuit have found that Section 1225 applies to 15 those apprehended upon arrival to the United States while Section 1226 applies to 16 those already living within the United States. See, e.g., Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 17 1257 (finding petitioner likely to succeed on merits of argument that 1225(b)(2)(A) 18 “should be read to narrow mandatory detention under that subsection to noncitizens 19 who are apprehended while seeking to enter the country, and that noncitizens already 20 residing in the United States, including those who are charged with inadmissibility, 21 continue to fall under the discretionary detention scheme in Section 1226”) (internal 22 quotation marks omitted); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO-HC, 2025 23 WL 3013328, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025). This interpretation of these provisions 24 is further supported by the canon against surplusage, a recent Supreme Court 25 decision, and longstanding agency practice. 26 First, this interpretation is supported by the canon against surplusage. As 27 explained above, Section 1226(c) creates a class of exceptions to Section 1226(a)’s 28 “default” rule of discretionary detention. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. Under 1 Section 1226(c), those who have committed certain offenses are subject to mandatory 2 detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). For example, Section 1226(c) requires detention of 3 a noncitizen who is inadmissible, that is “present in the United States without being 4 admitted or paroled,” and “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits 5 having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements 6 of” specified criminal offenses. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Section 7 1225 requires detention of “applicant[s] for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a). If the 8 government is correct that the term “applicants for admission” extends to all 9 inadmissible noncitizens there would be no reason for Section 1226 to require 10 detention of particular classes of inadmissible noncitizens. Therefore, the 11 government’s argument would render the whole of Section 1226(c) surplusage. 12 Respondents’ interpretation of these provisions would similarly render recent 13 amendments to this statute surplusage. As Petitioner highlights, in 2025 Congress 14 enacted the Laken Riley Act, which added additional categories of individuals to those 15 subject to mandatory detention under Section 1226(c). (Reply at 4.) It would make 16 little sense for Congress to enact these amendments subjecting new individuals to 17 mandatory detention if they were already subject to such detention pursuant to 18 Section 1225. See Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at 19 *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (explaining that “assuming any inadmissible noncitizen is 20 an ‘applicant for admission’ who is ‘seeking admission’ (and, therefore, subject to 21 mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)), would render the Riley Laken Act 22 unnecessary”). At a minimum, Congress’ enactment of the Laken Riley Act, which 23 clearly contemplated that § 1226 applies generally to undocumented individuals who 24 have been living in the United States, would constitute Congressional acquiescence in 25 that longstanding interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226. See, e.g., United States v. 26 Mays, 430 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2005). 27 Second, this interpretation of the statute is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 28 recent description of these provisions in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). 1 In Jennings, the Supreme Court explained that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the 2 Government to detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country under 3 §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain 4 [noncitizens] already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings 5 under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Id. at 289. The Supreme Court described proceedings 6 under Section 1225 as a process that “generally begins at the Nation’s borders and 7 ports of entry, where the government must determine whether a [noncitizen] seeking 8 to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. “Then, when discussing 9 Section 1226, Jennings describes it as governing ‘the process of arresting and 10 detaining’ noncitizens who are living ‘inside the United States’ but ‘may still be 11 removed,’ including noncitizens ‘who were inadmissible at the time of entry.’” 12 Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288). 13 Third, this interpretation is consistent with longstanding agency practice. Until 14 recently, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) consistently treated 15 noncitizens apprehended while living in the United States as detained under Section 16 1226(a). See Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258, 1260–61; C.A.R.V., 2025 WL 3059549, 17 at *5. Executive Branch regulations implementing these provisions issued just six 18 months after their enactment provide that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, 19 [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly 20 referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond 21 and bond determination.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). As this 22 interpretation “was issued roughly contemporaneously with the enactment of the 23 statute and remained consistent over time,” this “longstanding practice of the 24 government—like any other interpretive aid —can inform a court’s determination of 25 what the law is.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024) (cleaned 26 up). 27 As Petitioner has been present in the United States for 19 years (Reply at 2), he 28 is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he is unlawfully detained under 1 Section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention provision. See J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, 2 at *7 (holding petitioner was likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that they 3 were not subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A) under similar 4 circumstances); Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1261 (same). Therefore, Petitioner is likely 5 to succeed on the merits of his claim that he is subject to the procedures laid out by 6 and entitled to the rights afforded under Section 1226(a), most notably, a bond 7 hearing. 8 II. Irreparable Harm 9 Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary restraining 10 order. Petitioner is an insulin-dependent diabetic, who takes medication for his 11 diabetes, hypertension, and a heart condition, for which he recently underwent a heart 12 bypass operation. (Pet ¶ 9.) “Petitioner is currently suffering severe medical 13 consequences in the facility, because he is not receiving the medication prescribed for 14 his many ailments in the proper dose.” (Reply at 6.) The Ninth Circuit has recognized 15 the irreparable harm inflicted by the “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE 16 detention facilities.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). 17 More broadly, Petitioner “suffers potentially irreparable harm every day that he 18 remains in custody without a hearing, which could ultimately result in his release from 19 detention.” Cortez v. Sessions, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The 20 Ninth Circuit has acknowledged the “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to 21 immigration detention” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and 22 their families as a result of detention.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Petitioner has 23 thus established irreparable harm. 24 III. Balance of the Harms & the Public Interest 25 The final two Winter factors merge when the government is the nonmoving 26 party. Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023). “[I]n addition to the 27 potential hardships facing [Petitioner] in the absence of an injunction,” the court may 28 consider “the indirect hardship to their friends and family members.” Hernandez, 872 1 F.3d at 996 (quoting Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 2 1112, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008)). 3 Here, the interests of equity and the public weigh in favor of Petitioner. 4 Petitioner’s father, son, daughter, and grandchildren are all harmed by his continued 5 detention. A temporary restraining order also inflicts minimal harm to the 6 government. Though Respondents have an interest in enforcing immigration laws, 7 they have no interest in erroneously enforcing the wrong law, as they have done here. 8 This Order instead furthers that interest through application of the correct law. Finally, 9 this relief benefits the public. “[N]either equity nor the public’s interest are furthered 10 by allowing violations of federal law to continue.” Galvez v. Jaddou, 52 F.4th 821, 832 11 (9th Cir. 2022). There also appears to be no dispute as to Petitioner’s risk of flight or 12 danger to the community. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the equities 13 and public interest weigh in favor of Petitioner. 14 IV. Bond 15 “The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order 16 only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay 17 the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully 18 enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The Court has “discretion as to the 19 amount of security required, if any,” and it “may dispense with the filing of a bond 20 when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from 21 enjoining his or her conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 22 2003). Because the “the [Government] cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in 23 any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations,” 24 Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983), the Court finds that no security 25 is required here. 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 CONCLUSION 2 In accordance with the above, IT |S HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 5) is 4 GRANTED; 5 2. Petitioner Oscar Gerardo Solano Morillo shall be released immediately 6 from Respondents’ custody. Respondents shall not impose any 7 additional restrictions on him, such as electronic monitoring, unless that 8 is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody 9 hearing. 10 3. Ifthe government seeks to re-detain Petitioner, it must provide no less 11 than seven (7) days’ notice to Petitioner and must hold a pre-deprivation 12 bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to section 1226(a) and its 13 implementing regulations, at which petitioner's eligibility for bond must 14 be considered. 15 4. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE on or before November 16 21,2025, as to why this Court should not issue a preliminary injunction 17 on the same terms as this Order. On or before November 26, Petitioner 18 may file an opposition. On or before December 1, Respondents shall file 19 a reply, if any, to Petitioner's opposition. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 | Dated: _ November 15, 2025 Donel J bnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 | DJC7 - SolanoMorillo25ev015336.tro 26 27 28

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