Oscar Estevan Valle v. Dr. Richard M. Obler and Officer John Doe

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 OSCAR ESTEVAN VALLE, Case No.: 23-cv-2128-WQH-DEB 11

Plaintiff, 12 REPORT AND v. RECOMMENDATION DENYING 13 DEFENDANT DR. OBLER’S DR. RICHARD M. OBLER and 14 MOTION TO DISMISS OFFICER JOHN DOE,

Defendants. 16 [DKT. NO. 33] 17 This Report and Recommendation on Defendant Dr. Richard M. Obler’s Motion to 18 Dismiss (Dkt. No. 33) is submitted to United States District Judge William Q. Hayes 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(e). For the reasons 20 discussed below, the undersigned recommends DENYING the Motion. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Oscar Estevan Valle, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, alleges Defendants 23 Dr. Richard M. Obler (“Dr. Obler”) and an unknown National City Police Officer violated 24 his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Dkt. No. 14 at 3 25 (Second Am. Compl.). The allegations arise out of Valle’s treatment at Paradise Valley 26 Hospital for chest pain, breathing problems, and a foreign object in his rectum. Valle 27 alleges Dr. Obler conducted a nonconsensual cavity search against Valle’s protests and 28 screams for help. Id. Valle also claims Dr. Obler “made sexual verbal statements [and 1 gestures toward P]laintiff,” and stated he would retrieve the object from Valle’s rectum 2 “by fishing it [out].” Id. Valle further alleges Dr. Obler “grab[bed Valle’s] penis 3 fore[]skin[,] ejaculated him 3 time[s] while licking his lips[,] asking if [Valle] like[d] it[,] 4 reach[ed] for his testicle[,] forcing his finger inside [Valle’s] rectum.” Id. 5 Valle further alleges an unknown National City Police Department officer directed 6 Dr. Obler to “search anything [sic] to get [Valle] to jail faster.” Id.1 7 The Court screened Valle’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and found it 8 plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation against Dr. Obler and the unknown 9 National City Police Department Officer, but the Court dismissed other claims and parties. 10 Dkt. No. 15.2 Dr. Obler now moves to dismiss on the grounds that Valle’s complaint was 11 not timely filed and that he is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 13 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 14 sufficiency of the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6) 15 is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires only “a 16 short and plain statement of the claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum, 18 a complaint must allege enough facts to provide “fair notice” of both the claims asserted 19 and “the grounds upon which [those claims] rest.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 20 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). 21 22 23 24 1 See also Dkt. No. 14 at 3 (“[O]bler ask[ed Officer Doe] if he [could] conduct a search on 25 [Valle]” and “[O]bler follow[ed] [Doe’s lead and orders] to search . . . while [knowing Plaintiff] refuse[d] search, while Plaintiff beg[ged] for any help from any one [sic] . . . .”). 26

27 2 Valle subpoenaed the National City Police Department to identify Officer John Doe. A third amended complaint is due July 31, 2026. Dkt. Nos. 45, 47. 28 1 In deciding a motion to dismiss, all material factual allegations in the complaint are 2 accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill v. 3 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). A court, however, need not 4 accept conclusory allegations as true. Rather it must “examine whether conclusory 5 allegations follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. 6 Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). A motion to dismiss 7 should be granted if a plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim 8 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 9 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 10 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 11 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 12 Because Valle proceeds pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally. See Hebbe 13 v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court, however, cannot “supply essential 14 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 15 Alaska, 673 F.2d 267, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 Dr. Obler moves to dismiss Valle’s SAC because: (1) it is time-barred by the two- 18 year statute of limitations; and (2) Obler was a private actor, not a government actor; 19 therefore, § 1983 does not apply. Dkt. No. 33. Dr. Obler also moves to dismiss Valle’s 20 prayer for punitive damages. Dkt. No. 33.3 The Court discusses each argument in turn. 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 25 26 3 Dr. Obler also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 27 Dkt. No. 33 at 8. The Court, however, has already dismissed those claims in its Screening Order Re Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 15 at 5–7. 28 1 A. Statute of Limitations 2 Valle’s SAC alleges the events at issue occurred on November 8–9, 2021. Dkt. No. 3 13 at 3–4. Dr. Obler argues Valle’s SAC is time-barred because it was filed on 4 November 17, 2023, more than two years after the events at issue. Dkt. No. 33 at 6. 5 Section 1983 does not contain a limitations period. California’s two-year statute of 6 limitations for personal injury torts applies. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 7 1999) (limitations period for filing § 1983 action in California is governed by limitations 8 period for personal injury actions in California); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year 9 limitations period for personal injury claims). 10 A pro se prisoner’s pleading is deemed filed when it is submitted to prison authorities 11 for filing with the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275–76 (1988); Douglas v. 12 Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) (filing of § 1983 complaint occurs “at the time 13 [a pro se prisoner] deliver[s] it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.”). 14 This is because pro se prisoners lack control over delays between prison authorities’ receipt 15 of the pleading and its filing in the district court. Houston, 487 U.S. at 273–74 (“pro se 16 prisoners have no control over delays between the prison authorities’ receipt of the notice 17 and its filing, and their lack of freedom bars them from delivering the notice to the court 18 clerk personally.”); Faile v. Upjohn Co., 988 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 19 “an incarcerated pro se litigant completes ‘service’ under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b) upon 20 submission to prison authorities for forwarding to the party to be served.”). 21 Although Valle’s original Complaint is file-stamped November 17, 2023, it appears 22 Valle signed it (and an attached written statement summarizing his allegations) on 23 November 7, 2023, (Dkt. No. 1 at 7, 25), within the two-year limitations period.4 Valle’s 24 25 26 4 Plaintiff’s handwritten statement is clearly dated “11, 07, 23” (Dkt. No. 1 at 25), while 27 his complaint appears initially dated “11.08.2023” and written over (interlineated) as “11.07.2023” (Dkt. No. 1 at 7), both within the limitations period. 28 1 sealed mailing envelope, attached to the Complaint, is dated “11/7/23,” and the California 2 Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) postage is dated “Nov 10, 2023.” 3 Dkt. No. 1 at 26–27.5 4 For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, Valle’s Complaint complies with the 5 limitations period because the dates on the Complaint, attached written statement, and 6 mailing envelope reflect delivery to prison authorities within the two-year limitations 7 period. The undersigned, therefore, recommends DENYING Dr. Obler’s Motion to 8 Dismiss based on the two-year statute of limitations. Martin v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 9 06-cv-1581-BTM-JMA, 2007 WL 1660738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 2007) (denying 10 motion to dismiss pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint because it was “entirely possible” 11 plaintiff gave his complaint to prison authorities on or before the limitation period 12 expired).6 13 B. State Actor 14 Dr. Obler next argues Valle’s § 1983 claim fails because Obler is a private actor, and 15 the Fourth Amendment “does not protect against intrusive conduct by private individuals 16 acting in a private capacity.” Dkt. No. 33 at 7. 17 “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the 18 defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and 19 made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West 20 v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). Private individuals acting under the color of state law, 21

22 23 5 It is unclear whose signature is affixed to the sealed portion of Valle’s envelope, but there is an illegible name, and an unspecified number (“86360”), next to the 11/7/23 date. 24

25 6 Dr. Obler does not raise a relation-back argument. For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the Court assumes the SAC relates back to the Complaint. See ASARCO, 26 LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To relate back, ‘the original 27 and amended pleadings must share a common core of operative facts so that the adverse party has fair notice of the transaction, occurrence, or conduct called into question.’ The 28 1 however, may be subject to suit in a § 1983 action. See, e.g., Jensen v. Lane County, 222 2 F.3d 570, 575–77 (9th Cir. 2000) (private medical practitioner who evaluated a detainee 3 for civil commitment at the government’s request could be treated as a state actor). A 4 plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing that [a defendant is a] state [actor],” and there is 5 a “presumption that conduct by private actors is not state action.” Florer v. Congregation 6 Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “Whether a 7 private party engaged in state action is a highly factual question.” Brunette v. Humane 8 Soc’y of Ventura Cnty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 There are four situations where a private actor may be deemed to have acted under 10 color of state law. O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1157 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Lugar 11 v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)). Three are relevant here: (1) the public 12 function test; (2) the government compulsion test; and (3) the close nexus test. Id. 13 “Satisfaction of any one test is sufficient to find state action, so long as no countervailing 14 factor exists.” Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2020) 15 (citation omitted). 16 Under the public function test, “when private individuals or groups are endowed by 17 the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or 18 instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 19 326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “[T]he question is whether the 20 function performed has been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’” Rendell- 21 Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982). 22 The second situation in which a private individual may be found to have acted under 23 color of state law exists when government compulsion or “significant encouragement . . . 24 converts a private action into a government action.” Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1094 (citing Sutton 25 v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 836–37 (9th Cir. 1999)). 26 The third situation in which a private individual may act under color of state law 27 exists when “there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that 28 seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood 1 Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal 2 citations and quotation marks omitted); O’Handley, 62 F.4th at 1157–58 (close nexus test 3 “asks whether government officials have exercised coercive power or [have] provided such 4 significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to 5 be that of the State.”) (citation omitted). 6 Valle’s SAC contains sufficient allegations to satisfy the public function test. It 7 describes Dr. Obler as an individual employed “as a doctor [at] [P]aradise [V]alle[y] 8 hospital.” Dkt. No. 14 at 2. It also alleges Dr. Obler was “contracted by National City 9 Police,” to “provid[e] medical services to detainee[s] and [arrestees], accompanied by a 10 National [City] police officer.” Id. Accepting these allegations as true, the SAC plausibly 11 alleges Dr. Obler performed a public function in treating Valle. See Lopez v. Dep’t of 12 Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (finding state action where 13 hospital “contract[ed] with the state . . . to provide medical services to indigent citizens”).7 14 Valle’s SAC also contains sufficient allegations to state a plausible claim under the 15 government compulsion test. It alleges Dr. Obler “followed [the officer’s] lead” and 16 “followed [the officer’s] orders” while “knowing [Valle] refused [a] search.” Dkt. No. 14 17 at 3; see also id. (Dr. Obler asked the police officer’s permission to search Plaintiff for 18 19 7 See also Gibbs v. Webb, No. 2:18-cv-2817-JAM-DB, 2020 WL 2126692, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 20 May 5, 2020) (“Considering notice pleading standards, plaintiff’s allegation that the CFMG 21 is a medical contractor at the jail is sufficient to allow him to bring suit under [§] 1983 against it as if it is a local government unit.”); Long v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. 17-cv- 22 00898-DAD-JLT, 2018 WL 5962499, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018) (plaintiff’s 23 allegations against private nurse were sufficient to state a claim considering public function test because she was employed by the health care provider that contracted “with a public 24 prison system to provide treatment to inmates,”), report and recommendation adopted, 25 2018 WL 6528421 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018); Ayala v. Andreasen, 2:04-0903-JAM-CMK, 2007 WL 1395093, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, 26 2007 WL 4239813 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2007) (allegations in complaint were sufficient to 27 establish that private physician acted under color of law, and “[w]hat matters is that [defendant] performed medical services on an inmate and that he did so pursuant to a 28 1 contraband, and the officer responded yes, “anything to get [Valle] to jail faster,” and “[Dr. 2 Obler] continue[d to] sexually assault [Valle] with [the officer’s permission acting as a[n] 3 accomplice, [knowing] what was going on.”). Those allegations sufficiently allege the 4 police officer exercised coercive power and/or provided such significant encouragement 5 that Dr. Obler was acting under government compulsion. See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 6 590 F.3d 31, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal of prisoner’s Fourth Amendment claim 7 against private doctor where the correctional defendants “strongly encouraged [the doctor] 8 to perform the surgery” on inmate to find contraband; state compulsion test satisfied by 9 “the insistence and pressure exerted by John Doe upon all of the physicians that examined 10 [plaintiff] at the [medical center]”). 11 Finally, the allegations in Valle’s SAC also satisfy the close nexus test. As discussed 12 above, the SAC alleges concerted action between Dr. Obler and that the National City 13 Police Officer to deprive Valle of his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from an 14 unreasonable search. These allegations suffice at the motion to dismiss stage to support a 15 plausible conclusion that Dr. Obler was “heavily involved in the decision[-]making 16 process.” Rawson, 975 F.3d at 754 (private mental hospital and hospital personnel acted 17 under color of state law when they were “heavily involved in the decision[-]making 18 process” regarding plaintiff’s detention, diagnosis, and treatment); Jensen, 222 F.3d at 575 19 (close nexus satisfied where defendant private physician was part of a team of mental health 20 professionals that included individuals acting in their capacity as county employees jointly 21 responsible for making the medical determinations relevant to the duration of the plaintiff’s 22 emergency detention). 23 In sum, Valle’s SAC sufficiently alleges Dr. Obler acted under color of state law 24 when treating Valle. The undersigned, therefore, recommends DENYING Dr. Obler’s 25 Motion to Dismiss on the ground that he did not act under color of state law. 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 C. Punitive Damages 2 Valle’s SAC contains a prayer for punitive damages. Dkt. No. 14. Dr. Obler moves 3 to dismiss the punitive damages claim because Dr. Obler was not a “government 4 employee” subject to liability under § 1983. Dkt. No. 33 at 10. 5 As discussed above, however, Valle’s SAC plausibly alleges Dr. Obler acted under 6 color of state law and, therefore, is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Punitive 7 damages may be recovered in appropriate circumstances under § 1983.” Jackson v. Barnes, 8 749 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 9 745 F.2d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Punitive, as well as compensatory, damages are 10 available against individuals acting under color of state law in [§] 1983 actions.”). The 11 undersigned, therefore, RECOMMENDS DENYING the Dr. Obler’s Motion to Dismiss 12 the prayer for punitive damages. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue 15 an Order as follows: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and 16 (2) DENYING Defendant Obler’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 33. 17 IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 23, 2026, any party to this action may file 18 written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 19 captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 | IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 2 the Court and served on all parties within seven (7) days of the filing of the objections. 3 Il The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 4 || the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 > 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). ° IT IS SO ORDERED. ’ Dated: July 9, 2026 —~ oPaDobon 9 Daniel E. Butcher 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28