Oscar Dooly Associates, Inc. v. Mumford

235 So. 2d 305, 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 6372
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMay 12, 1970
DocketNo. 69-793
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 235 So. 2d 305 (Oscar Dooly Associates, Inc. v. Mumford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oscar Dooly Associates, Inc. v. Mumford, 235 So. 2d 305, 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 6372 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970).

Opinion

CARROLL, Judge.

The appellants, registered real estate brokers, filed suit against the sellers of certain real estate for a brokerage commission. On motions of the defendants, the initial complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. An amended complaint met the same fate, and when the plaintiffs elected to stand thereon, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed.

As amended, the complaint alleged that in 1958 the appellees, owners of certain described real estate, engaged the appellant brokers to procure a purchaser therefor, agreeing to pay a commission of $68,000 for sale of all of the property or a proportionate commission for sale of part thereof ; that plaintiffs procured a purchaser, a corporation, which entered into an option agreement with the sellers on December 24, 1958, a copy of which was attached to the complaint. The option granted was to February 15, 1959, with provision for several renewals, upon payment of specified sums, to December 31, 1959. It was provided therein that notice of election to exercise the option should be accompanied by payment of $37,500, whereupon the option would ripen into a contract of sale. The total purchase price stipulated was $750,000, and the terms of payment were set forth. It was provided that the amount or amounts paid for the option or renewals thereof would be credited on the purchase price, upon closing.

Of even date with the option agreement, the sellers and the brokers entered into an agreement for payment of commission. Included therein was a paragraph as follows :

“It is understood between us that, if said option is exercised by the purchaser [306]*306and if the transaction is closed in accordance with the option agreement, you shall pay a commission to us in the sum of $68,000, payable $34,000 out of the cash portion of the purchase price at the time the sale is closed and $34,000 out of the first annual payment required by the mortgage, which will be due and payable one year after the date of closing, said two payments totalling the total commission of $68,000.”

The complaint further alleged that the sellers and the purchaser entered into two additional written agreements by and under which numerous extensions of the option were provided for and made, and that on January 27, 1961, the brokers gave the sellers a letter relating that a purchase of two thirds of the property was expected to be made by the purchaser, within the next few months, under the original option as extended, for which the brokers would become entitled to the proportionate part of their full commission, and referring to a new option which was to be granted to the purchaser on the remaining one third of the property, and providing that the brokers would not receive a commission on any part thereof not sold under such option.1 Appended to that letter was the written agreement thereto, signed by the sellers on January 31, 1961.

It was alleged that (as predicted in that letter) the purchaser exercised the option and purchased two thirds of the property by a sale which was closed on May 10, [307]*3071961, and that the brokers were paid their proportionate commission for that sale.

It was further alleged that (as contemplated in said letter of January 27, 1961) the sellers and the purchaser entered into a written option agreement on April 14, 1961, for a period of two years, to April 30, 1963, covering the unsold one third of the property. As consideration therefor, in addition to a recited $10, the purchaser was required to pay $719 per month to the seller, which it was alleged was done. The price fixed for the unsold one third of the property was $287,256, and as described it consisted of four numbered lots in a certain quarter section of land. That option agreement provided that upon a purchase thereunder credit would be allowed for the monthly payments which had been made pursuant thereto.

The amended complaint further alleged that by mutual oral agreement of the sellers and the purchaser, supported by consideration, said option agreement of April 14, 1961 was extended, and that the period for which it was extended continued to and beyond the date of March 5, 1968, on which the purchaser, in exercise of said option as extended, purchased one of the four lots covered thereby, and paid therefor the sum of $75,600. It was based on that sale that the plaintiff brokers sought recovery of a commission, for a proportionate amount of the total commission corresponding to the portion of all of the property which that sale represented.

Neither the final judgment nor the two orders granting defendants’ motions to dismiss stated the ground or reasons upon which the trial court concluded the complaint or amended complaint failed to state a cause of action. However, from the motions to dismiss, and the briefs and arguments here, it is shown that the cause was rejected by the trial court on the theory that where the purchaser did not exercise the option during the original period thereof, but did so during the period to which the option was extended (by mutual agreement of the sellers and the purchaser, for consideration), no commission was payable to the brokers on such sale.

In support of that proposition, the appel-lees argue that in order for the brokers to be entitled to a commission in such circumstance, it would be necessary for their commission contract to include an express provision to pay a commission on a sale made during a period for which the option was extended. The appellants argue that an agreement to pay commission for a sale made upon exercise of an option which is granted to a purchaser, necessarily entitles the brokers to a commission if the sale is not made during the initial option period granted, but is made based on election by the purchaser to exercise the option during a period for which the option is effectively extended.

Upon weighing those arguments of the parties we hold the former, asserted by the appellee sellers, is unsound, and that the latter, advanced by the appellant brokers, is correct. To hold otherwise would appear not only to be contrary to law, but unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. This is so because prior to the purchase of two thirds of the property in May of 1961, the parties had entered into several successive written agreements relating to the option under which approximately a dozen extensions of the original option period were provided for and made, yet when a sale was made of two thirds of the property in May of 1961, under the original option agreement as so extended, the sellers readily recognized the brokers’ right to a proportionate commission for sale of that part of the property, and paid the commission. Additionally, it is alleged that the brokers continued to work on the project and performed advisory services to the sellers. Also, it is indicated the sellers and the purchaser considered the option as remaining in effect at the time of the sale of March 5, 1968, first by the sellers acknowledging and accepting the purchaser’s election, and selling a portion of the remaining property to the purchaser at that time, and [308]*308secondly by their subsequent mutual agreement, on March 8, 1968, to cancel the April 14, 1961, option as extended, as it related to the then unsold remainder of the one third of the property which had been covered by that option.

' In support of their position the appellees cite and rely on two Florida decisions, neither of which justifies their reliance. Plumbing Industry Program, Inc. v.

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235 So. 2d 305, 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 6372, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oscar-dooly-associates-inc-v-mumford-fladistctapp-1970.