Oscar Benjamin Loya v. Tim Garrett, et al.

D. Nevada

Oscar Benjamin Loya v. Tim Garrett, et al.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided April 27, 2026·No. 3:22-cv-00309·Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * *

6 OSCAR BENJAMIN LOYA, Case No. 3:22-cv-00309-MMD-CLB

7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8 TIM GARRETT, et al., 9 Respondents. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Petitioner Oscar Benjamin Loya, a Nevada state prisoner, filed an Amended 13 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 34.) This 14 habeas matter is before the Court on Loya’s Motion for Leave to File Document (ECF No. 15 82 (“Motion”)). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Loya’s Motion. 16 II. BACKGROUND 17 Loya challenges a 2019 judgment of conviction imposed by the Eighth Judicial 18 District Court for Clark County. The state district court entered a judgment of conviction 19 pursuant to a jury verdict for trafficking in a controlled substance as well as a judgment of 20 conviction pursuant to a guilty plea for possession of a stolen vehicle, failure to stop upon 21 the signal of a police officer, burglary, and possession of burglary tools. The Nevada Court 22 of Appeals affirmed the judgement of conviction. 23 Loya filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Nevada Court of Appeals 24 affirmed the state court’s denial of relief. Loya initiated this federal habeas corpus 25 proceeding pro se. (ECF No. 1.) Following the appointment of counsel, he filed his first 26 amended petition raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (ECF No. 34.) In its 27 order granting, in part, and denying, in part, Respondents’ motion to dismiss, the Court 28 deferred ruling on whether Loya can demonstrate cause and prejudice under Martinez v. 1 Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), to overcome the procedural default of Claim 1(A) until full merits 2 briefing. (ECF No. 70 at 10.) 3 Loya now moves for leave to file his declaration, Exhibit 12, in support of Claim 4 1(A). Respondents argue that the Court should not consider the declaration because Loya 5 was not diligent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2). They assert that the factual 6 arguments in the declaration were never properly developed in state court in accordance 7 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 378 (2022). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 Generally, the merits of claims raised in a federal habeas corpus petition are 10 decided on the record that was before the state court when it adjudicated a claim. See 11 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 12 Penalty Act restricts a federal habeas court's authorization to hold an evidentiary hearing 13 where an applicant failed to develop a factual basis for a claim in state court proceedings: 14 (2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 15 claim unless the applicant shows that— 16 (A) the claim relies on— (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases 17 on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 18 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 19 (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by 20 clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 21 underlying offense. 22 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B). The Supreme Court has held that although § 2254(e)(2) 23 refers only to evidentiary hearings, its provisions apply to a federal habeas court's 24 consideration of evidence. See McLaughlin v. Oliver, 95 F.4th 1239, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 25 2024) (acknowledging Shinn “reaffirmed that [2254(e)(2)]’s restrictions not only apply to 26 evidentiary hearings, but also “when a prisoner seeks relief based on new evidence 27 without an evidentiary hearing”) (citing Shinn, 596 U.S. at 389; quoting Holland v. 28 Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004)). 1 For purposes of determining whether a petitioner must first meet the prerequisites 2 of § 2254(e)(2), the term “fail” means “the prisoner must be ‘at fault’ for the undeveloped 3 record in state court.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (“[A] failure to develop the 4 factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater 5 fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel.”); see also Shinn, 596 U.S. at 6 382 (affirming the prerequisites in § 2254(e)(2) apply only “when a prisoner ‘has failed to 7 develop the factual basis of a claim’”). “Diligence for purposes of [§ 2254(e)(2)’s] opening 8 clause depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the 9 information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court; it does 10 not depend ... upon whether those efforts could have been successful.” Williams, 529 11 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). “Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, 12 at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by 13 state law.” Id. at 437 (emphasis added); see also Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 14 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying evidentiary hearing because petitioner did not comply with state 15 law that required petitioner to come forward with affidavits or other evidence to the extent 16 his claim relied on evidence outside the record). 17 Loya must meet the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) before the Court may, in 18 considering Martinez or the merits, grant an evidentiary hearing or consider his 19 declaration. See Shinn, 596 U.S. at 382, 385, 389; Williams, 529 U.S. at 439-40; Holland, 20 542 U.S. at 653. Loya relies on Rodney v. Garrett, 116 F.4th 947 (9th Cir. 2024). In 21 Rodney, the Ninth Circuit found that the petitioner did not fail to develop the state court 22 record within the meaning of the statute precluding an evidentiary hearing where the 23 petitioner had requested appointment of post-conviction counsel during the initial review 24 collateral proceeding and had argued that counsel was necessary for purposes of 25 investigation and discovery. 26 Loya argues that he was diligent in his post-conviction proceedings because he 27 requested the appointment of counsel, but the state district court denied Loya’s motion 28 for appointment of counsel and denied his state habeas petition without an evidentiary 1 || hearing. Similar to the petitioner in Rodney, Loya was not at fault for not developing the 2 || factual basis of his claims in his state habeas proceeding, and was diligent in attempting 3 || to do so, and therefore did not fail to do so within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2). He meets 4 || the minimum threshold for diligence. Accordingly, the Court is permitted to consider 5 || Loya’s declaration and grants Loya’s Motion. 6 || IV. MOTION TO EXTEND 7 Respondents seek an extension of time to file their answer. (ECF No. 89.) The 8 || Court finds that the request is made in good faith and not solely for the purpose of delay, 9 || and therefore, good cause exists to grant the motion. Respondents have until May 25, 10 || 2026, to file their Answer. 11 || V.

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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * *

6 OSCAR BENJAMIN LOYA, Case No. 3:22-cv-00309-MMD-CLB

7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8 TIM GARRETT, et al., 9 Respondents. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Petitioner Oscar Benjamin Loya, a Nevada state prisoner, filed an Amended 13 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 34.) This 14 habeas matter is before the Court on Loya’s Motion for Leave to File Document (ECF No. 15 82 (“Motion”)). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Loya’s Motion. 16 II. BACKGROUND 17 Loya challenges a 2019 judgment of conviction imposed by the Eighth Judicial 18 District Court for Clark County. The state district court entered a judgment of conviction 19 pursuant to a jury verdict for trafficking in a controlled substance as well as a judgment of 20 conviction pursuant to a guilty plea for possession of a stolen vehicle, failure to stop upon 21 the signal of a police officer, burglary, and possession of burglary tools. The Nevada Court 22 of Appeals affirmed the judgement of conviction. 23 Loya filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Nevada Court of Appeals 24 affirmed the state court’s denial of relief. Loya initiated this federal habeas corpus 25 proceeding pro se. (ECF No. 1.) Following the appointment of counsel, he filed his first 26 amended petition raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (ECF No. 34.) In its 27 order granting, in part, and denying, in part, Respondents’ motion to dismiss, the Court 28 deferred ruling on whether Loya can demonstrate cause and prejudice under Martinez v. 1 Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), to overcome the procedural default of Claim 1(A) until full merits 2 briefing. (ECF No. 70 at 10.) 3 Loya now moves for leave to file his declaration, Exhibit 12, in support of Claim 4 1(A). Respondents argue that the Court should not consider the declaration because Loya 5 was not diligent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2). They assert that the factual 6 arguments in the declaration were never properly developed in state court in accordance 7 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 378 (2022). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 Generally, the merits of claims raised in a federal habeas corpus petition are 10 decided on the record that was before the state court when it adjudicated a claim. See 11 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 12 Penalty Act restricts a federal habeas court's authorization to hold an evidentiary hearing 13 where an applicant failed to develop a factual basis for a claim in state court proceedings: 14 (2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 15 claim unless the applicant shows that— 16 (A) the claim relies on— (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases 17 on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 18 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 19 (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by 20 clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 21 underlying offense. 22 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B). The Supreme Court has held that although § 2254(e)(2) 23 refers only to evidentiary hearings, its provisions apply to a federal habeas court's 24 consideration of evidence. See McLaughlin v. Oliver, 95 F.4th 1239, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 25 2024) (acknowledging Shinn “reaffirmed that [2254(e)(2)]’s restrictions not only apply to 26 evidentiary hearings, but also “when a prisoner seeks relief based on new evidence 27 without an evidentiary hearing”) (citing Shinn, 596 U.S. at 389; quoting Holland v. 28 Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004)). 1 For purposes of determining whether a petitioner must first meet the prerequisites 2 of § 2254(e)(2), the term “fail” means “the prisoner must be ‘at fault’ for the undeveloped 3 record in state court.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (“[A] failure to develop the 4 factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater 5 fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel.”); see also Shinn, 596 U.S. at 6 382 (affirming the prerequisites in § 2254(e)(2) apply only “when a prisoner ‘has failed to 7 develop the factual basis of a claim’”). “Diligence for purposes of [§ 2254(e)(2)’s] opening 8 clause depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the 9 information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court; it does 10 not depend ... upon whether those efforts could have been successful.” Williams, 529 11 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). “Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, 12 at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by 13 state law.” Id. at 437 (emphasis added); see also Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 14 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying evidentiary hearing because petitioner did not comply with state 15 law that required petitioner to come forward with affidavits or other evidence to the extent 16 his claim relied on evidence outside the record). 17 Loya must meet the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) before the Court may, in 18 considering Martinez or the merits, grant an evidentiary hearing or consider his 19 declaration. See Shinn, 596 U.S. at 382, 385, 389; Williams, 529 U.S. at 439-40; Holland, 20 542 U.S. at 653. Loya relies on Rodney v. Garrett, 116 F.4th 947 (9th Cir. 2024). In 21 Rodney, the Ninth Circuit found that the petitioner did not fail to develop the state court 22 record within the meaning of the statute precluding an evidentiary hearing where the 23 petitioner had requested appointment of post-conviction counsel during the initial review 24 collateral proceeding and had argued that counsel was necessary for purposes of 25 investigation and discovery. 26 Loya argues that he was diligent in his post-conviction proceedings because he 27 requested the appointment of counsel, but the state district court denied Loya’s motion 28 for appointment of counsel and denied his state habeas petition without an evidentiary 1 || hearing. Similar to the petitioner in Rodney, Loya was not at fault for not developing the 2 || factual basis of his claims in his state habeas proceeding, and was diligent in attempting 3 || to do so, and therefore did not fail to do so within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2). He meets 4 || the minimum threshold for diligence. Accordingly, the Court is permitted to consider 5 || Loya’s declaration and grants Loya’s Motion. 6 || IV. MOTION TO EXTEND 7 Respondents seek an extension of time to file their answer. (ECF No. 89.) The 8 || Court finds that the request is made in good faith and not solely for the purpose of delay, 9 || and therefore, good cause exists to grant the motion. Respondents have until May 25, 10 || 2026, to file their Answer. 11 || V. CONCLUSION 12 It is therefore ordered that Petitioner Oscar Benjamin Loya’s Motion for Leave to 13 || File Document (ECF No. 82) is granted. 14 It is further ordered that Respondents’ second unopposed motion to extend (ECF 15 || No. 89) is granted. Respondents have until May 25, 2026, to file their Answer. 16 DATED THIS 27" Day of April 2026.

18 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Oscar Benjamin Loya v. Tim Garrett, et al., (D. Nev. 2026).

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