Osborne v. Smith

18 F. 126
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota
DecidedOctober 15, 1883
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 18 F. 126 (Osborne v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Osborne v. Smith, 18 F. 126 (circtdmn 1883).

Opinion

NelsoN, J.,

(charging jury.) This suit is brought by D. M. Osborne & Co., a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, against the, defendant, Smith, who was one of its agents. The suit is brought upon the guaranty of Smith upon 29 notes, and is also brought to recover upon his individual promissory note, which was given to this company for the purchase of certain machines. This corporation was engaged in the manufacture of mowers and reapers, and the manufactured articles were sent broadcast to agents throughout the western states. Smith was appointed an agent under a contract which he made with the company for Jackson county, the county of Cottonwood, and portions of Nobles county, in this state, December 3, 1879. This contract ran for the season, which ended on the first day of August, 1880, and most of the obligations upon which he is sued as guarantor were made during the year 1880.

It is necessary, gentlemen, for the plaintiff in this case, before it can recover, in the first place to prove the contract of guaranty; next, to prove that the defendant, Smith, is in default. It is claimed that the contract of guaranty in these cases was contemporaneous with the original trade; that is, that when the principal debtor entered into his contract with the company, Smith, by virtue of his contract with the company, became contemporaneously responsible as guarantor for the payment of the debt — the principal debt. I might here call your attention to this contract of 1879, which was entered into, terminating, as I said, on the first of August, 1880. It is a very stringent contract, gentlemen, and a valuable one. It is a contract of agency for the sale of these machines, but certainly it is presumed to have been of considerable value to the defendant, for he subsequently renewed it, and we have here in evidence another contract which was entered into on the twentieth of December, 1881. Although it contained very stringent terms, as far as the agent was 'concerned, still it was signed and entered into by this agent with his eyes open. It is in print, and evidently must have been well understood by the defendant in this case when he entered into it. In order to sustain the first position which I stated to you, it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove this contract of 1879, which contains this provision: “All machines received from the said party of the first part [that is, the corporation] shall be sold by the said party of the second part, either for cash or such good and approved notes as are hereinafter described, and all such machines shall be and remain the property of the said D. M. Osborne & Co. until so sold or are otherwise settled for as herein provided.”

As between the agent and themselves it was a sort of conditional sale; that is, the machines that were shipped to him were conditionally sold to him, provided he complied with the terms of the contract itself. “When sold for cash, either in whole or in part, the moneys received, to the amount of the price of such machine as above specified, shall be received by said party of the second part as the moneys of and for the said D. M. Osborne & Co.”

[128]*128- It is very stringent, gentlemen, and provisions, as you will see, are put in evidently with the intention to hold,4he party to the agreement liable to indictment in case he appropriated the funds that he received in payment for these machines: “And be transmitted by said party of the second part to said party of the first part, by express or draft, without delay. ” Now, here is the provision that shows the character of the guaranty: “And when not wholly paid for in cash, notes of the firm, furnished by the party of the first part, shall be taken for the unpaid balance of the hereinbefore specified price, as the case may be, signed by the purchaser, and payable to the order of the said party of the first part, [this Osborne & Co.,] and shall be indorsed, and the collection thereof guarantied, by the said party of the second part, waiving demand, protest, and notice of non-payment thereof, and be made payable at some bank or express-office located in the county which is the residence of the purchaser.” That explains the character of the guaranty which the defendant in this case entered into when he signed this contract of 1879.

Now, the plaintiff has offered in evidence, in addition, various notes which were received by the defendant, Smith, on the sale of these machines which were sent to him. These notes are all of the same character, although some of therp. have attached to them, and forming a part of them, a statement as to the amount of real estate that the party purchasing is possessed of. We have very little to do at present with the face of the notes. It is the contract of the defendant here upon the back which is important in this case. On the back of this note which I hold in my hand — the note of Langer — is the guaranty of Smith, by which he complies with the contract in the manner in which he bound himself- to comply when he signed it. All of these notes which have been offered in evidence here, in order to show what Smith engaged to do, are of similar character, except in some instances there appears to be more than Smith’s guaranty. Other persons appear upon the note as joint and several guarantors with him. Now, what was Smith’s contract? That is, what was the legal import of Smith’s contract when he, in pursuance of the original contract for the sale of these machines, put his name on the back of this note ? Smith’s contract is this: He agrees that if Osborne & Co. shall not be able to collect by due course of law these several obligations which have been signed by various parties here who bought these machines, that he, the defendant, — that is, he, Smith, — would consider himself responsible for the same, without requiring any demand or notice of the non-payment of the note itself. That is his contract of guaranty, and that is the legal effect of placing his name upon the back of these various notes as he has done.

Now, if the plaintiff has performed on its part all it was required to do under and by the terms of this guaranty, and the 'guarantor has all the rights which he as a guarantor was entitled to in law, why, then, he cannot escape the liability that is fixed upon him by [129]*129law in signing this note as be has done. As I said, it is necessary for the plaintiff in this case to go still further, and to show that Smith was in default, before he can recover; the contract of Smith being that ho is only responsible in case the notes cannot be collected by due course of law. Ordinarily it would be necessary for the creditor to commence legal proceedings, and obtain judgment and issue execution, and the execution be returned “no property found,” before a creditor could collect the amount of the obligation from the guarantor. Now, it appears here in this case, without contradiction, that in some instances judgments were obtained against the principal debtor, I would call your attention to judgments that were obtained against Molas, for whom Smith became a guarantor, and also three judgments against Mary Stevenson for various sums. It has been urged by counsel on behalf of Mr. Smith that inasmuch as these judgments were obtained in justice court, and wore noi recorded in the district court, which is a court of record, which was necessary in order that they become a lien upon .real estate, that they are not evidence of duo diligence on the part of the creditor. They are prima facie evidence, gentlemen, of duo diligence.

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Bluebook (online)
18 F. 126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/osborne-v-smith-circtdmn-1883.