Osborne v. Ramsay

191 F. 114, 111 C.C.A. 594, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4915
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 2, 1911
DocketNo. 1,980
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 191 F. 114 (Osborne v. Ramsay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Osborne v. Ramsay, 191 F. 114, 111 C.C.A. 594, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4915 (9th Cir. 1911).

Opinion

WOLVERTON, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The testimony submitted at the former trial was clearly analyzed by the opinion heretofore rendered, and it was found that the plaintiffs had not established the kinship alleged to exist between James Osborne, deceased, and themselves. The question then presented, and now again presented, was and is whether James Osborne was a half-brother, by a second marriage of Abraham P. Osborne, to Lewis K., Solomon E., Clark H., Horace, and Caroline Osborne. It is not disputed that these last named are the children of Abraham by a lawful marriage, and that James is not their whole brother. The sole contest is whether he is their half-brother by a subsequent lawful marriage of Abraham. When the case was here before, the court said:

“We know nothing whatever of the second wife. Her name is not given, and Hiere is no information concerning her marriage to Abraham Osborne, nor is Hiere any evidence of cohabitation or a reputation in the community where they resided or had their home that they were husband and wife, or that they were generally recognized and received as such by their neighbors and acquaintances. What there is at most is a mere tradition that Abraham Osborne was married a second time, and that by this second marriage there was issue, a boy named James.”

It is now urged on the part of plaintiffs that the additional testimony adduced at the present trial supplements the former, and that its effect is to establish a case wherein the former came short. That is to say, in the present case that a second marriage of Abraham has been established, and that James was an issue of that marriage; or, rather, that the newly adduced testimony, taken in connection with the old, is effective to show those facts.

Before proceeding to a further analysis of the testimony and a consideration of its probative effect and bearing, we will, in view of the discussion of counsel, determine the legal principles deemed applicable.

[1] Tt is a well-established exception to the general rule that hearsay testimony of a certain type is admissible to establish lineage and pedigree. This is because of the necessity of the case. In previous conditions of society and the family relations, records have not always been kept of marriages, births, and deaths, and in order to establish relationship, when a generation or more had passed away, it has been necessary to resort to family history and tradition, and to learn of those who have talked and spoken as circumstance and occasion suggested, though not under oath, of the family ties and kinship as they were supposed to exist within the knowledge or memory of the person speaking. It is perhaps not the best evidence; but where record is silent. or there is none, it is the only available evidence, and resort must be had to it to establish ancestry, line of descent, and pedigree. Cuddy v. Brown et al., 78 Ill. 415. It is a rule, which has the approval of the Supreme Court, that hearsay evidence of the kind respecting ¡pedigree and lineage is limited to members of the family, who may be supposed, and are the most likely, to have known the relationships which in reality existed in its different branches. Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 10 L. Ed. 129. See, to the same purpose, In re Hurlburt’s Estate, 68 Vt. 366, 35 Atl. 77, 35 L. R. A. 794. The broader statement [120]*120of the rule is that statements respecting lineage, in order to be admissible, must proceed from persons “who from living in habits of intimacy with the family or from other peculiar circumstances are likely to have known the facts concerning which their declarations are. offered.” Westfield v. Warren, 8 N. J. Law, 249, 250.

Such declarations must also have been made ante litem motam, and not in anticipation of litigation or contest depending upon the family relationship.

[2] A presumption does not arise in nebula, but must be predicated upon some real or substantial basis. A ¡presumption of marriage, therefore, must be based upon facts proven. Thus, as stated in Cargile et al. v. Wood et al., 63 Mo. 501, 512:

“Where parties have cohabited together and held themselves out as man and wife, and there are circumstances from which a present contract may be inferred, the law, out of charity and in favor of innocence and good morals, will presume matrimony. The law in general presumes against vice and immorality, and on this ground holds acknowledgment, cohabitation, and reputation presumptive evidence of marriage.”
“But upon doubtful facts,” says the court in Peet v. Peet, 52 Mich. 464, 467, 18 N. W. 220, 221, “the court ought to presume a lawful marriage rather than a notorious act of immorality.”

This, it must be observed, where the parties have been living as if in lawful wedlock. • !

Thus is substantiated or established the fact of marriage, or rather thus proceeds the presumption of the fact, from general reputation or répute of marriage, which in its application to the fact of marriage is even more than hearsay. It involves and is made up of social conduct and recognition, giving character to an admitted and unconcealed cohabitation. Badger v. Badger et al., 88 N. Y. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 263.

So it is necessary, unless it be that the fact of marriage is otherwise proven, that there .be evidence both of cohabitation and reputation before such a marriage can be presumed. Proof of one alone is not sufficient to sustain the presumption. Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 Pac. 1049, 1050; Smith v. Fuller (Iowa) 108 N. W. 765.

• The facts of marriage, birth, and death may also be proven by family history or tradition incident to the establishment of lineage or pedigree. 2 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1605. As is said in Westfield v. Warren, supra:

“One of these (exceptions to the general rule) is found in questions of pedigree. There, declarations of deceased members of a family as to marriages, as well as births and deaths, are admitted. The evidence of the marriage, however, is in such case but incidental to the proof of pedigree. And to such extent only, to the admission of such evidence for such purpose merely, is the exception limited.”

And again it is said by Lord Mansfield, in the Berkeley Peerage Case, 4 Camp. 401:

“In matters of pedigree, it being impossible to prove by living witnesses the relationships of past generations, the declarations of deceased members ■ of the family are admitted; but here, as the reputation must proceed on particular facts, such as marriages, births, and the like, from the necessity of [121]*121the thing, the hearsay of the family as to these particular facte is not excluded.”

See, also, In re Hurlburt’s Estate, 68 Vt. 366, 35 Atl. 77, 35 L. R. A. 794, from which the above quotation from Lord Mansfield is made.

[ 3] Authorities are to be found extending the rule of repute or tradition as to marriages, births, and deaths beyond the family relationships ; but as to their soundness upon principle we are not called upon to determine at this time. So it must be with the presumption that a child is born in lawful wedlock. There must be a substantial basis upon which to predicate the presumption. There must be a marriage of a man with a woman, either actual, reputed, or traditional, with the offspring proceeding from such marriage.

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191 F. 114, 111 C.C.A. 594, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4915, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/osborne-v-ramsay-ca9-1911.