Osborne v. Fernandez

Second Circuit

Osborne v. Fernandez

414 F. App'x 350

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedFebruary 22, 2011

Docket09-2120-cv

StatusUnpublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 414 F. App'x 350 (Osborne v. Fernandez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Osborne v. Fernandez, 414 F. App'x 350 (2d Cir. 2011).

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Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellants George R. Osborne, pro se, and Patrisha S. Osborne, pro se (jointly, “plaintiffs”), appeal from the judgment of the District Court granting defendants-appellees’ motions for summary judgment and dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, which alleged various constitutional violations in connection with a long-running zoning dispute between plaintiffs and the Town of Stanford Planning Board. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reli-aStar Life Ins. Co. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 570 F.3d 513, 517 (2d Cir.2009). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought,” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (quotation marks omitted), but “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002).

Following a review of the record, we conclude that the District Court properly granted the appellees’ motions for summary judgment, and we thus affirm the District Court’s judgment for substantially the reasons set forth in its thorough opinion, Osborne v. Fernandez, No. 06-CV-4127, 2009 WL 884697, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27409 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009). In particular, the District Court was correct to hold that the Osbornes’ due-process claims are not ripe for review because the Osbornes have not yet received a final decision on their subdivision application. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985).

We have considered all of the arguments raised in the Osbornes’ brief and reply brief and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment *352 of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

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SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellants George R. Osborne, pro se, and Patrisha S. Osborne, pro se (jointly, “plaintiffs”), appeal from the judgment of the District Court granting defendants-appellees’ motions for summary judgment and dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, which alleged various constitutional violations in connection with a long-running zoning dispute between plaintiffs and the Town of Stanford Planning Board. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reli-aStar Life Ins. Co. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 570 F.3d 513, 517 (2d Cir.2009). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought,” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (quotation marks omitted), but “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002).

Following a review of the record, we conclude that the District Court properly granted the appellees’ motions for summary judgment, and we thus affirm the District Court’s judgment for substantially the reasons set forth in its thorough opinion, Osborne v. Fernandez, No. 06-CV-4127, 2009 WL 884697, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27409 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009). In particular, the District Court was correct to hold that the Osbornes’ due-process claims are not ripe for review because the Osbornes have not yet received a final decision on their subdivision application. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985).

We have considered all of the arguments raised in the Osbornes’ brief and reply brief and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment *352 of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

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