Osborne-Talan v. Talan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Osborne-Talan v. Talan

276 A.D.2d 397, 715 N.Y.S.2d 837, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10741

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 24, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 276 A.D.2d 397 (Osborne-Talan v. Talan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Osborne-Talan v. Talan, 276 A.D.2d 397, 715 N.Y.S.2d 837, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10741 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jacqueline Silbermann, J.), entered July 14, 1999, [398]*398which, inter alia, denied plaintiffs motion to set aside the parties’ separation agreement, incorporated but not merged into their judgment of divorce, and/or upwardly modify its maintenance provisions, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Relief in the nature of setting aside the parties’ separation agreement was properly denied since the agreement is not manifestly unfair to plaintiff, and no evidence was adduced tending to show that it was the result of fraud or other inequitable conduct by defendant (see, Luftig v Luftig, 239 AD2d 225, 227). Nor does plaintiff adduce any evidence of “extreme hardship” such as might warrant an upward modification of the maintenance amounts of the agreement (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]; see, id., at 227-228). We have considered and rejected plaintiffs other arguments. Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Nardelli, Rubin, Saxe and Friedman, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jacqueline Silbermann, J.), entered July 14, 1999, [398]*398which, inter alia, denied plaintiffs motion to set aside the parties’ separation agreement, incorporated but not merged into their judgment of divorce, and/or upwardly modify its maintenance provisions, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Relief in the nature of setting aside the parties’ separation agreement was properly denied since the agreement is not manifestly unfair to plaintiff, and no evidence was adduced tending to show that it was the result of fraud or other inequitable conduct by defendant (see, Luftig v Luftig, 239 AD2d 225, 227). Nor does plaintiff adduce any evidence of “extreme hardship” such as might warrant an upward modification of the maintenance amounts of the agreement (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]; see, id., at 227-228). We have considered and rejected plaintiffs other arguments. Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Nardelli, Rubin, Saxe and Friedman, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

276 A.D.2d 397, 715 N.Y.S.2d 837, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10741, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/osborne-talan-v-talan-nyappdiv-2000.

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