Orton v. Orton

123 N.W. 1103, 159 Mich. 236, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 826

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: December 30, 1909
• Docket: Docket No. 71
• Status: Published

Opinions

Montgomery, J.

This is a suit for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty on the part of the defendant. The proofs were taken in open court, and the bill dismissed ; the complainant refusing to accept a decree for a limited divorce. The circuit judge found the extreme cruelty established by the proof, a conclusion in which we ’fully concur. It appears that the complainant had been twice married before. Her first marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce upon a bill filed by her. The second marriage was dissolved on a bill filed by her husband. To that suit no defense was made, and a decree was entered granting an absolute divorce on August 19, 1907. Some four months later she married the defendant. The only question presented is whether, where a just cause for divorce is shown, the fact that the party applying for the divorce has been previously married and divorced, the former divorce having been on the ground of plaintiff’s own fault, is to bar her from a divorce from the second marriage.

We assume that the first decree of divorce determined that she was not in fault and that her husband was. The second decree of divorce determined that she was in fault; but there were no restrictions placed upon her remarrying. Her status was fixed by that divorce as that of a single woman. We think it cannot be said that in a subsequent marriage she occupies a different relation than does any other married woman. It is true that the court might well scrutinize carefully her application for the purpose of determining whether a real ground of divorce' has been made out. That, it appears, the circuit judge did to his own satisfaction, and became satisfied that she was entitled to relief, but seems to have proceeded upon the view that, because she had been unfortunate in previous matrimonial alliances, or had been guilty of fault herself in her second venture, she has debarred herself from the remedies which are open to other people. We think, on the contrary, that her second divorce fixed her.status, and she had the same legal right to marry as though she had never been previously married, and she is entitled to equal protection in that marriage relation as though this were her first venture.. If the case were less clear, the fact that she had had these experiences might be taken into account in determining whether a case had been made out; but there seems to be no question made that she has established a case entitling her to divorce if she is to be treated as is any other married woman.

The decree should be reversed, and the decree of divorce granted.

Blair, O. J.s and Ostrander, Hooker, Moore, Mc-Alvay, and Brooke, JJ., concurred.