ORTIZ v. SMITH

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedOctober 26, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00162
StatusUnknown

This text of ORTIZ v. SMITH (ORTIZ v. SMITH) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ORTIZ v. SMITH, (S.D. Ind. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

SERGIO ORTIZ, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) No. 2:20-cv-00162-JPH-MJD ) BRIAN SMITH, ) ) Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS HABEAS PETITION

Sergio Ortiz, an inmate of the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC"), has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his prison disciplinary conviction in case number ISF 20-01-177. The respondent has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss, stating that the disciplinary conviction has been vacated, and Mr. Ortiz is no longer "in custody" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. 6, para. 3. IDOC records confirm that the disciplinary conviction was vacated for insufficient evidence following Mr. Ortiz's appeal to the IDOC Final Reviewing Authority. Dkt. 6-1, p. 11. "[I]n all habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the successful petitioner must demonstrate that he 'is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). If the sanctions imposed in a prison disciplinary proceeding do not potentially lengthen a prisoner's custody, then those sanctions cannot be challenged in an action for habeas corpus relief. See Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Typically, this means that in order to be considered "in custody" for the purposes of challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding, the petitioner must have been deprived of good-time credits, id., or credit-earning class, Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001). When such a sanction is not imposed, the prison disciplinary officials are "free to use any procedures it chooses, or no procedures at all." Jd. at 644. A habeas action becomes moot if the Court can no longer "affect the duration of [the petitioner's] custody." White v. Ind. Parole Bd.,266 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2001). Because the disciplinary conviction has been vacated, this habeas action cannot affect the duration of Mr. Ortiz's custody. This action is therefore moot. See Eichwedel v. Curry, 700 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 2012). An action which is mootmustbe dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Diaz v. Duckworth, 143 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998). The motion to dismiss, dkt. [6], is GRANTED. Final Judgment in accordance with this Order shall now issue. SO ORDERED. Date: 10/26/2020 SJamu Patrick banter James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana Distribution: SERGIO ORTIZ 199568 PUTNAMVILLE - CF PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY Inmate Mail/Parcels 1946 West U.S. Hwy 40 Greencastle, IN 46135 Natalie Faye Weiss INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL natalie.weiss @ atg.in.gov

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Related

Brown v. Watters
599 F.3d 602 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Fabio A. Diaz v. Jack R. Duckworth
143 F.3d 345 (Seventh Circuit, 1998)
Phil White v. Indiana Parole Board
266 F.3d 759 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)
Larry Cochran v. Edward Buss, Superintendent
381 F.3d 637 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Paul Eichwedel v. Nedra Chandler
700 F.3d 275 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
ORTIZ v. SMITH, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ortiz-v-smith-insd-2020.