Ortiz v. County of Trinity

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 6, 2022
• Docket: 2:21-cv-02248
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JESSICA ORTIZ, individually No. 2:21-cv-02248-JAM-AC and as successor in interest 12 to RICARDO ORTIZ, deceased; S.S., a minor, by and through 13 her guardian ad litem, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ JESSICA ORTIZ; and L.O., a MOTION TO DISMISS 14 minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, Jessica 15 Ortiz, 16 Plaintiffs, 17 v. 18 COUNTY OF TRINITY, CALIFORNIA, a local 19 government entity; DEPUTY BEN SPENCER, in his individual 20 capacity; SHERIFF TIM SAXON, in his individual capacity, 21 and DOES 1-40, inclusive, 22 Defendants. 23 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 24 This case involves a property dispute that resulted in the 25 fatal shooting of Ricardo Ortiz. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 89, 26

27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 28 for April 19, 2022. 1 ECF No. 12. On the afternoon of December 10, 2020, Deputy 2 Spencer received a call via dispatch to report to a residential 3 property in Hayfork, California (the “subject property”), due to 4 a dispute between Joseph Nieves and Ortiz. Id. ¶ 19. Upon 5 arrival, Deputy Spencer spoke with Nieves who informed him he was 6 the owner of the subject property and was running a marijuana 7 cultivation operation. Id. ¶ 21. Nieves also conveyed that he 8 had recently terminated Ortiz who was claiming entitlement to a 9 portion of the subject property. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24. Nieves told 10 Deputy Spencer that if Ortiz returned to the subject property and 11 Deputy Spencer was not there it would get violent. Id. ¶ 25. 12 Deputy Spencer agreed to contact Ortiz and left the subject 13 property. Id. ¶ 28. However, before he was able to get in touch 14 with Ortiz, he received word from dispatch that Ortiz had arrived 15 at the subject property. Id. ¶ 29. Deputy Spencer returned to 16 the subject property where he met with Ortiz. Ortiz told Deputy 17 Spencer that Nieves did not in fact live at the subject property 18 but rather, he (Ortiz) had been living there for over a year. 19 Id. ¶¶ 30,31. Deputy Spencer then advised both Nieves and Ortiz 20 that this was a civil issue and Ortiz agreed to leave the subject 21 property and pursue a legal remedy in court. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35. 22 The next morning, Ortiz contacted the Trinity County 23 Sheriff’s Office and requested help removing the items he owned 24 from the subject property. Id. ¶ 45. Shortly thereafter, Deputy 25 Spencer returned Ortiz’s call. Id. ¶ 46. Ortiz explained that 26 Nieves was not allowing him into the subject property to retrieve 27 his possessions and that Nieves had a gun. Id. ¶¶ 47, 49. 28 Deputy Spencer informed Ortiz that if he was a resident of the 1 subject property, he had every right to be there, but advised 2 Ortiz against going to the subject property alone and agreed to 3 perform a civil standby to assist Ortiz in retrieving his 4 possessions. Id. ¶¶ 48, 51, 53. 5 When Deputy Spencer first arrived at the subject property, 6 he explained to Nieves that if Ortiz had been living on the 7 subject property, Nieves could not evict him without an eviction 8 notice. Id. ¶ 63. Nieves, however, insisted he would not open 9 the gate for Ortiz and reiterated things may “get bad.” Id. ¶ 10 67. Deputy Spencer left the subject property and spoke with off- 11 duty Sergeant Cavalli about the situation, who advised him it was 12 a crime for a landlord to lock a resident from a property without 13 an eviction notice. Id. ¶¶ 69, 71, 72. 14 Deputy Spencer returned to the subject property to conduct a 15 civil standby for Ortiz. Id. ¶ 73. Ortiz and Deputy Spencer met 16 at the locked gate of the subject property and shortly 17 thereafter, Nieves arrived. Id. ¶¶ 77, 78. Deputy Spencer again 18 explained to Nieves that he was not allowed to lock Ortiz out of 19 the subject property. Id. ¶ 79. A verbal argument ensued 20 between Nieves and Ortiz, after which, Deputy Spencer warned that 21 if things became physical, someone may go to jail. Id. ¶ 80. 22 Nieves eventually agreed to unlock the gate and Ortiz drove up to 23 the residence to collect his possessions. Id. ¶¶ 82, 83. Once 24 Ortiz made it into the residence, Deputy Spencer left the subject 25 property without telling Ortiz, leaving Nieves unattended. Id. 26 ¶¶ 84-86. With no one securing him at the gate, Nieves drove up 27 to the residence to confront Ortiz. Id. ¶ 88. Less than half an 28 hour later Nieves shot and killed Ortiz. Id. ¶ 89. 1 Decedent’s wife Jessica Ortiz brought this action, 2 individually and as successor in interest to her husband, along 3 with their minor children, L.O. and S.S.2, asserting claims for: 4 (1) wrongful death against Deputy Spencer; (2) wrongful death 5 against Trinity County; (3) a § 1983 claim against Deputy Spencer 6 for violation of Decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights; 7 (4) a Monell claim against Trinity County; (5) a supervisory 8 liability claim against Sheriff Saxon; and (6) a request for 9 punitive damages as to Deputy Spencer and Sheriff Saxon. See 10 generally FAC. 11 The County and Sheriff Saxon now move to dismiss the § 1983 12 claims against them, counts four and five, as well as the request 13 for punitive damages against Sheriff Saxon. Mot. to Dismiss 14 (“Mot.”) at 2, ECF No. 13. Plaintiffs opposed this motion, 15 Opp’n, ECF No. 16, to which Defendants replied. Reply, ECF No. 16 17. For the reasons set forth below this motion is granted. 17 18 II. OPINION 19 A. Legal Standard 20 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the complaint as not 21 alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. Fed. R. 22 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 23 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 24 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible 25 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 26 2 L.O. is the biological child of Decedent. S.S. is the minor 27 daughter of Decedent’s spouse who resided with Decedent for more than 180 days preceding his death and was dependent upon him for 28 at least half of her care and financial support. FAC ¶¶ 6, 7. 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While 2 “detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint 3 must allege more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 4 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” 5 Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, 6 the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences 7 from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim 8 entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 9 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 10 B. Analysis 11 A public entity is subject to liability under § 1983 only 12 when a violation of a federally protected right can be 13 attributed to: (1) an express municipal policy, such as an 14 ordinance, regulation or policy statement, Monell v. New York 15 City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); (2) a 16 “widespread practice that, although not authorized by written 17 law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well 18 settled as to constitute a custom or usage’ with the force of 19 law”, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988), 20 (3) the decision of a person with “final policymaking 21 authority,” id. at 123; or (4) inadequate training that is 22 deliberately indifferent to an individual’s constitutional 23 rights, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 24 Plaintiffs clarify that they are proceeding on a failure to 25 train theory of liability against the County and Sheriff. Opp’n 26 at 6-8, 12-13. Accordingly, the Court does not address 27 Defendants’ arguments as to the other theories of liability. 28 See Mot. at 9-14. The parties agree that a municipality’s 1 failure to train its employees may create § 1983 liability where 2 the “failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the 3 rights of persons with whom the [employee’s] come into contact.” 4 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). “A pattern of 5 similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is 6 ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference 7 for purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 62. However, “in a 8 narrow range of circumstances,” a pattern of similar violations 9 may not be necessary where violations of constitutional rights 10 are patently obvious or the “highly predictable consequence” of 11 a failure to train. Id. at 63. Relatedly, “[a] supervisor can 12 be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action 13 or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 14 subordinates[.]” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 15 1093 (9th Cir. 1998). 16 Defendants argue Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient 17 facts to state a plausible failure to train claim against either 18 the County or Sheriff. Mot. at 11-12, 14-16. The Court agrees. 19 Plaintiffs allege the following facts to support their claims: 20 (1) Deputy Spencer agreed to perform a civil standby for the 21 benefit of Ortiz, FAC ¶ 73; (2) once Ortiz entered the subject 22 property Deputy Spencer left and abandoned the civil standby 23 without telling Ortiz he was leaving, id. ¶¶ 84-86; (3) with no 24 one securing the gate, Neives drove to the residence, confronted 25 Oritz, and shot him, id. ¶¶ 88,89; (4) Deputy Spencer’s actions 26 violated Trinity County Sheriff’s Department policy 428.4.1 27 which requires the deputy performing a civil standby “accompany 28 the person to the location of the property” and prohibits 1 ordering the other party to allow entry or the removal of any 2 items, id. ¶¶ 143, 144; (5) the County and Sherriff Saxon failed 3 to adequately train, monitor, and supervise Deputy Spencer with 4 respect to how to perform civil standbys, id. ¶¶ 127, 142; and 5 (6) the County and Sheriff Saxon were aware of the deficiency in 6 training but failed to correct it, which amounted to deliberate 7 indifference, id. ¶¶ 137, 153. 8 Plaintiffs, relying on City of Canton v. Harris, contend 9 these allegations are sufficient. Opp’n at 6-13. Plaintiffs 10 point out that in City of Canton, the Supreme Court left open 11 that there may be some circumstances in which “‘the need for 12 more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so 13 likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights’ that 14 a factfinder could find deliberate indifference to the need for 15 training without a pattern of previously occurring 16 constitutional violations.” Opp’n at 7 (quoting City of Canton, 17 489 U.S. at 390). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs must still “offer 18 factual support for their allegations of defective training[.]” 19 Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2022). As 20 the Ninth Circuit recently noted, although “deliberate 21 indifference can be inferred from a single incident when the 22 unconstitutional consequences of failing to train are patently 23 obvious an inadequate training policy itself cannot be inferred 24 from a single incident.” Id. at 874-875. But Plaintiffs here 25 ask to the Court to do exactly that – infer from this single 26 incident that the County failed to train on civil standbys. See 27 Opp’n at 12. Plaintiffs allege no facts regarding the training 28 of officers, just the conclusory allegation that Deputy Spencer 1 “was not adequately trained [. . .] with respect to how to 2 perform civil standbys.” FAC ¶¶ 125, 132. This is insufficient 3 to state a claim for failure to train, as “[o]therwise, a 4 plaintiff could effectively shoehorn any single incident with no 5 other facts into a failure-to-train claim against the 6 supervisors and the municipality.” Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875. 7 Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 8 fourth cause of action for Monell liability against the County, 9 the fifth cause of action for supervisory liability against 10 Sheriff Saxon, and the dependent request for punitive damages 11 against Sheriff Saxon without prejudice. See Leadsinger, Inc. 12 v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining 13 leave to amend should be freely given unless there has been 14 undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, 15 it would cause undue prejudice to the opposing or would be 16 futile); Copelan v. Infinity Ins. Co., 359 F.Supp.3d 926, 930 17 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (punitive damages request fails when underlying 18 claims fail). 19 20 III. SANCTIONS 21 Defendants exceeded the Court’s 15-page limit on motion 22 memoranda. See Mot.; see also Order re Filing Requirements 23 (“Order”). Violations of the Court’s standing order require the 24 offending counsel, not the client, to pay $50.00 per page over 25 the page limit to the Clerk of Court. Order at 1. Moreover, the 26 Court will not consider arguments made past the page limit. Id. 27 Defendants’ motion exceeded the page limit by two pages. 28 Accordingly, Defendants’ counsel must send a check payable to the nee nn enn enn nnn I OEE II

1 Clerk for the Eastern District of California for $100.00 no later 2 than seven days from the date of this order. 3 4 IV. ORDER 5 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT 6 | PREJUDICE Defendants’ motion to dismiss. If Plaintiffs elect to 7 amend their complaint, they should file their Second Amended 8 Complaint within twenty days (20) of this Order. Defendants’ 9 responsive pleadings are due within twenty days (20) thereafter. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: June 3, 2022 12 kA 13 teiren staves odermacr 7008 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28