Ortiz v. County of San Joaquin

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 9, 2022
• Docket: 2:20-cv-00217
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MARCO ORTIZ, No. 2:20-cv-00217-JAM-CKD 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 13 COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, a GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN municipal corporation, et PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 14 al., SUMMARY JUDGMENT 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 19 Marco Ortiz (“Plaintiff”) brings this Section 1983 excessive 20 force action against San Joaquin County and San Joaquin Deputy 21 Sheriffs Flores, Mendez, Rodriguez, and Downey (“Defendants”) 22 following injuries he suffered while in Defendants’ custody. See 23 Compl., ECF No. 1. Specifically, on July 16, 2019, Defendants 24 booked Plaintiff at the San Joaquin County Jail after he was 25 arrested for a dispute with his brother at their house. Id. 26 ¶ 16. While Defendants were attempting to take Plaintiff’s photo 27 as part of the booking process, Defendant Mendez used a pain 28 compliance technique on Plaintiff’s neck, causing him pain and 1 difficulty breathing. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Next, Defendants escorted 2 Plaintiff to a safety cell where they conducted a “takedown” 3 after Plaintiff refused to kneel down for his handcuffs to be 4 removed safely. Id. ¶ 19. The takedown included a leg sweep by 5 Downey which broke Plaintiff’s leg. Id. As a result, Plaintiff 6 has undergone three surgeries to repair his broken leg, Plaintiff 7 still cannot walk, and Plaintiff’s leg may need to be amputated. 8 Id. ¶ 20. 9 On January 29, 2020, Plaintiff initiated the present action, 10 asserting the following claims: (1) excessive force in violation 11 of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 12 against Downey, Flores, Mendez, and Rodriguez; (2) excessive 13 force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 14 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Downey, Flores, 15 Mendez, and Rodriguez; (3) Monell claims against the County; 16 (4) violation of the Bane Act against all Defendants; 17 (6)1 battery against all Defendants; and (7) negligence against 18 all Defendants. See generally Compl. 19 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See 20 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 21; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. 21 J. (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 23.2 Plaintiff filed a reply brief 22

23 1 The Court follows the numbering of the complaint itself which does not include a fifth cause of action, instead skipping from 24 the fourth cause of action to the sixth cause of action. See Compl. at 10-12. 25 2 Although Defendants failed to identify their motion as an opposition and a cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 26 failed to demonstrate prejudice would result from construing 27 Defendants’ motion as such. Pl.’s Reply at 2-4. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ request to treat their filing as a 28 cross-motion for summary judgment. Defs.’ Reply at 2. 1 in opposition to Defendants’ motion and in support of his own 2 motion. See Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 27. Defendants also replied. 3 See Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 28. 4 Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his Section 1983 5 excessive force, Monell, and negligence claims against Mendez, 6 Downey, and the County. Pl.’s Reply at 2. Defendants move for 7 summary judgment on all claims. Defs.’ Mot. at 8. For the 8 reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for 9 partial summary judgment and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 10 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.3 11 II. OPINION 12 A. Evidentiary Objections 13 Defendants filed a Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, 14 see Defs.’ SUF, ECF No. 23-2, to which Plaintiff responded, see 15 Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF., ECF No. 27-6. Plaintiff likewise 16 filed a Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, see Pl.’s SUF, 17 ECF No. 21-13, to which Defendants responded and raised 18 evidentiary objections, see Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SUF., ECF No. 19 25. The Court has reviewed these evidentiary objections but 20 declines to rule on them as courts self-police evidentiary 21 issues on motions for summary judgment and a formal ruling is 22 unnecessary to the determination of these motions. See Sandoval 23 v. Cty. Of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing 24 to Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 25 1119) (E.D. Cal. 2006)). 26

27 3 These motions were determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for December 7, 2021. 1 B. Legal Standard 2 Courts must grant a party’s motion for summary judgment “if 3 the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 4 material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a 5 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). The movant bears the 6 initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for 7 its motion, and identifying [the documents] which it believes 8 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact.” 9 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is 10 material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the 11 governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 12 248 (1986). Once the movant makes this initial showing, the 13 burden rests upon the nonmoving party to “set forth specific 14 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. An 15 issue of fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a 16 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 17 Id. 18 C. Analysis 19 1. Second Claim: Fourteenth Amendment 20 Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s second 21 claim for Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violations against 22 Downey, Flores, Mendez, and Rodriguez. Defs.’ Mot. at 16. 23 Citing to Pierce v. Multnomah Cty., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 24 1996), Defendants contend this claim fails as a matter of law 25 because Plaintiff was a pre-arraignment detainee and thus all 26 claims of excessive force are governed by the Fourth Amendment 27 not the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 28 Pierce does clearly instruct: “the Fourth Amendment sets the 1 applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an 2 arrestee.” 76 F.3d at 1043. Plaintiff does not contend 3 otherwise in his reply. See Pl.’s Reply. Accordingly, the Court 4 grants summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s second 5 cause of action. 6 2. First Claim: Section 1983 Excessive Force 7 Both Plaintiff and Defendants seek summary judgment on 8 Plaintiff’s first Section 1983 claim for excessive force in 9 violation of the Fourth Amendment. Pl.’s Mot. at 9-12; Defs.’ 10 Mot. at 8-16. Plaintiff generally claims that Defendants 11 conducted “an unjustified and unprovoked attack on a handcuffed, 12 nonviolent and disabled subject.” Pl.’s Reply at 14. 13 Defendants paint a different picture, namely that Plaintiff “was 14 uncooperative during the booking process and was sexually vile 15 and obscene with the correctional officers responsible for his 16 booking.” Defs. Mot. at 1. As a response to Plaintiff’s 17 uncooperativeness, Defendants contend Mendez used a pain 18 compliance technique for a short duration on Plaintiff’s neck to 19 try to take his booking photo and that Downey performed a leg 20 sweep takedown to try to remove his handcuffs safely. Id. 21 Under the Fourth Amendment, officers may use force that is 22 objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Graham v. 23 Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Determining whether the force 24 used is excessive or reasonable “requires careful attention to 25 the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. at 26 396. The Supreme Court has set forth a non-exhaustive list of 27 factors for courts to consider when assessing a pre-trial 28 detainees’ Section 1983 excessive force claim: “the relationship 1 between the need for the use of force and the amount of force 2 used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by 3 the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the 4 severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably 5 perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively 6 resisting.” Kinglsey v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). 7 Here, Plaintiff identifies two uses of force that he argues 8 were excessive as a matter of law: (1) Mendez’s use of a pain 9 compliance technique on his neck and (2) Downey’s use of a leg- 10 sweep takedown technique which kicked out and broke his leg. 11 Pl.’s Mot. at 10. Plaintiff further seeks to hold Flores and 12 Rodriguez liable as integral participants. Pl.’s Reply at 8-9. 13 Defendants counter that Mendez and Downey’s uses of force were 14 not excessive but rather objectively reasonable as a matter of a 15 law, and that no facts support Plaintiff’s contention that 16 Flores and Rodriguez were integral participants. Defs.’ Reply 17 at 2-8. 18 Beginning with Mendez and Downey’s uses of force, the Court 19 finds numerous genuine disputes of material fact exist thereby 20 precluding summary judgment for either party. See Pl.’s Resp. 21 to Defs.’ SUF. ¶¶ 12-22, 24, 32-34, 36, 38, 40-50, 52, 64, 72- 22 74; Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SUF ¶¶ 1-3, 5, 7-8, 11-17, 19-23, 25, 23 27-28, 31-33, 35-36, 38-44. “Summary judgment is almost never 24 appropriate on an excessive force claim” and must be “granted 25 sparingly” “[b]ecause [the excessive force inquiry] nearly 26 always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual 27 contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom.” Nelson, et al. 28 v. City of Hayward, Case No: 3:16-cv-07222-SK, ECF No. 92 at 9 1 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 2019) (citing to Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 2 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005)). Such is the case here. The 3 parties vigorously dispute the facts surrounding both Mendez’s 4 and Downey’s uses of force. These genuine disputes of material 5 facts preclude the Court from granting summary judgment. 6 Nor does Defendants’ emphasis on the lack of injury 7 resulting from Mendez’s use of the pain compliance technique, 8 see Defs.’ Mot. at 11; Defs.’ Reply at 2-3, change this 9 analysis. None of Defendants’ cited cases support the 10 proposition that injury is a required element of a Section 1983 11 excessive force claim. Rather “the extent of the plaintiff’s 12 injury” is just one factor in evaluating the objective 13 reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. Kinglsey, 576 U.S. 14 at 397. That Plaintiff suffered no lasting injury from Mendez’s 15 use of force, does not, in and of itself, require this Court to 16 grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim. 17 Next, Defendants argue Mendez and Downey are entitled to 18 qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mot. at 12-13, 16. But the same 19 disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on the issue 20 of qualified immunity. See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF. ¶¶ 12-22, 21 24, 32-34, 36, 38, 40-50, 52, 64, 72-74; Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s 22 SUF ¶¶ 1-3, 5, 7-8, 11-17, 19-23, 25, 27-28, 31-33, 35-36, 38- 23 44. To determine whether Mendez and Downey are entitled to 24 qualified immunity, the Court must evaluate (1) whether the 25 officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right, and 26 (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of 27 the incident. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In 28 light of the disputed facts identified above, the Court cannot 1 make a determination as a matter of law on either Saucier prong. 2 Thus, Defendants’ motion as to qualified immunity fails. 3 Defendants additionally move for summary judgment on this 4 claim as to Flores and Rodriguez. Defs.’ Mot. at 8-9. 5 Emphasizing that Flores and Rodriguez did not apply force to 6 Plaintiff, Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot maintain an 7 excessive force claim against them. Defs.’ Mot. at 8-9. 8 However, Plaintiff seeks to hold these two officers liable as 9 integral participants “because they not only stood and watched 10 [Mendez and Downey] but participated in the uses of force.” 11 Pl.’s Reply at 9. 12 In Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 13 2004), the Ninth Circuit articulated the “integral participant” 14 theory of liability for Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. 15 Specifically, the Boyd Court explained that officers may be held 16 liable as integral participants if they stand watch while the 17 excessive force occurs, are aware of it, and do not object. Id. 18 Moreover, “‘integral participation’ does not require that each 19 officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a 20 constitutional violation. For example . . . officers who 21 provided armed backup during an unconstitutional search were 22 ‘integral’ to that search, and were therefore participants 23 rather than mere bystanders.” Id. 24 Here after carefully reviewing the evidentiary record, 25 including the video footage, the Court concludes a reasonable 26 jury could find for Plaintiffs that Flores and Rodriguez were 27 integral participants. That is, a reasonable jury could find 28 that they were more than “mere bystanders”. Boyd, 374 F.3d at 1 780. Accordingly, Flores and Rodriguez are not entitled to 2 summary judgment on the Section 1983 excessive force claim 3 either. 4 3. Third Claim: Monell 5 Both Plaintiff and Defendants also seek summary judgment on 6 Plaintiff’s third Monell cause of action against the County. 7 Pl.’s Mot. at 13-14; Defs.’ Mot. at 16-18. A local government 8 unit may be held civilly liable under Section 1983 where an 9 alleged constitutional violation is the result of policy or 10 custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 11 426 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). To prevail on a Monell claim, a 12 plaintiff must establish: “(1) that he possessed a 13 constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the 14 municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to 15 ‘deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional 16 right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the 17 constitutional violation.’” Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 18 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). 19 Plaintiff’s motion – which seeks to hold the County liable 20 for training officers to use the pain compliance technique that 21 Mendez used, see Pl.’s Mot. at 14; Pl.’s Reply at 8 - fails on 22 the first element because as explained above, he has not 23 established the underlying constitutional violation. Because 24 Plaintiff did not establish as a matter of law that he was 25 deprived of his Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive 26 force, he is not entitled to summary judgment on his Monell 27 claims. 28 In their cross-motion, Defendants advance three arguments. 1 Defs.’ Mot. at 16-18. First, they argue Monell liability cannot 2 attach because Mendez and Downey’s conduct was constitutional. 3 Id. at 17. But as explained above, the Court cannot decide 4 whether or not the underlying conduct was constitutional as a 5 matter of law given the many genuine disputes of material facts. 6 Thus, Defendants’ first argument fails. Second, Defendants 7 contend there is no evidence the County failed to train or 8 supervise Downey in the application of a leg sweep takedown, 9 pointing out “[Plaintiff]’s own expert opined that there was no 10 County policy that allowed for [his] fracture.” Defs.’ Mot. at 11 18. But Plaintiff has brought forward evidence refuting this 12 contention. See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF. ¶ 73 (citing to 13 Roger Clark Rule 26 Report, ECF No. 27-5). Thus, this argument 14 likewise fails to establish Defendants are entitled to summary 15 judgment on the Monell claim. 16 Finally, Defendants argue Mendez’s use of the pain 17 compliance technique was consistent with County training and the 18 County training for the application of the pain compliance 19 technique is itself constitutional. Defs.’ Mot. at 18. 20 However, once again Plaintiff has brought forward evidence to 21 refute this argument. See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF. ¶ 64 22 (citing to Jacques Depo. at 26, ECF No. 27-1). Specifically, in 23 her deposition, San Joaquin Correctional Officer Amber Jacques 24 testified that officers are not trained to use pain compliance 25 techniques against a person for failure to look at a camera 26 during a booking photo. Jacques Depo. at 26. This testimony 27 undercuts the first premise of Defendants’ final argument – that 28 Mendez’s use of pain compliance was consistent with County 1 training. As such, the Court need not reach the second premise 2 – that the County training is itself constitutional and denies 3 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Monell 4 claims. 5 4. Fourth Claim: Bane Act 6 Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fourth 7 claim for violation of the Bane Act. Defs.’ Mot. at 18-19; 8 Defs.’ Reply at 8. They argue this claim “fails for the same 9 reason the federal excessive force claim fails; because Downey 10 and Mendez’s force was objectively reasonable under the 11 circumstances.” Defs.’ Mot. at 18-19. However, as explained 12 above, numerous disputed issues of material fact preclude the 13 Court from finding that Downey and Mendez’s uses of force were 14 reasonable as a matter of law. These same issues thus preclude 15 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim too. 16 Furthermore, the Bane Act imposes an additional requirement 17 beyond a finding of a constitutional violation; it requires that 18 an officer possessed a specific intent to violate plaintiff’s 19 rights. Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th 20 Cir. 2018). To establish this specific intent element, there 21 must be, inter alia, a factual finding that the officer acted 22 with the particular purpose of interfering with the plaintiff’s 23 right. Cornell v. City and Cty. of S.F., 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 24 803-804 (2017). On the present record, a reasonable jury could 25 conclude that Defendants acted with such a purpose. Thus, this 26 question of fact must go to a jury and summary judgment for 27 Defendants on Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is denied. 28 /// 1 5. Sixth Claim: Battery 2 Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s battery 3 claim. Defs.’ Mot. at 19; Defs.’ Reply at 8. Battery claims 4 require a showing that the officer used unreasonable force. 5 Nelson v. City of Davis, 709 F.Supp.2d 978, 992 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 6 Defendants contend this claim fails because any touching of 7 Plaintiff was lawful and therefore Plaintiff cannot demonstrate 8 the application of unreasonable force. Defs.’ Mot. at 19. But 9 as Plaintiff counters, the same issues of material fact discussed 10 with respect to the Section 1983 excessive force claim arise 11 here. Pl.’s Reply at 15; see also Nelson, 709 F.Supp.2d at 992 12 (“Because the same standards apply to both state law assault and 13 battery and Section 1983 claims premised on constitutionally 14 prohibited excessive force, the fact that Plaintiff’s Section 15 1983 claims under the Fourth Amendment survive summary judgment 16 also mandates that the assault and battery claims similarly 17 survive.”) Summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s 18 battery claim is denied. 19 6. Seventh Claim: Negligence 20 Finally, both Plaintiff and Defendants seek summary 21 judgment on Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for negligence. 22 Pl.’s Mot. at 13; Defs.’ Mot. at 19-20. As another Eastern 23 District Court has explained, Plaintiff's negligence claim 24 “requires an assessment of whether the officers used reasonable 25 care in quelling the subject disturbance,” which “is akin to the 26 analysis employed under the Fourth Amendment.” Nelson, 709 27 F.Supp.2d at 992. “The fact that the Court has already 28 determined. . . that unreasonable force for purposes of the ne nnn ene en ne nnn on nn on io nn nnn nn enn ne I I Ome eee

1 Fourth Amendment may have been employed similarly directs a 2 conclusion that Plaintiff's negligence claims survive [summary 3 judgment] as well.” Id. at 992-993. So too here. The same 4 issues of material fact surrounding Mendez and Downey’s uses of 5 force which preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth 6 | Amendment excessive force claim also preclude summary judgment 7 on this claim. Accordingly, the Court denies both parties’ 8 motions as to the negligence claim. 9 Til. ORDER 10 For the reasons set forth above: 11 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; 12 (2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s 13 Second Cause of Action is GRANTED; and 14 (3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s 15 First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action is 16 DENIED. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: February 8, 2022 19 ke Me 20 teiren staves odermacr 7008 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13