Ortiz v. 570156 LLC

19 Misc. 3d 819
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 31, 2008
StatusPublished

This text of 19 Misc. 3d 819 (Ortiz v. 570156 LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ortiz v. 570156 LLC, 19 Misc. 3d 819 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Walter B. Tolub, J.

This motion raises the novel question as to whether an attorney may recover fees and costs under Real Property Law § 234 for successfully prevailing in an action involving Section 8 housing tenants. By this motion, plaintiffs move for an order granting their attorney a total of $15,923.89 in attorneys’ fees and costs,1 to be paid by defendants 570156 LLC (Five Seven Naught), KVEST, LLC, 530 East 22nd Realty LLC, M.R.S. Realty LLC (Realty) and 550 Realty Heights, LLC.2 Plaintiffs claim that, as the prevailing parties to this action, they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under Real Property Law §234.

History

The plaintiffs in this action are all Section 8 rent-stabilized tenants. In 2005, defendant landlords, seeking to opt out of the Section 8 program, began making demands for the balance of the rents which had been subject to federal subsidization. [821]*821Shortly thereafter, each of the plaintiffs were sued in the housing court for nonpayment of rent. In response, this action was commenced seeking to compel the defendant landlords to continue accepting plaintiffs’ respective Section 8 housing vouchers, and further compelling the defendant landlords to provide plaintiffs with renewal leases under Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) § 2522.5 (g).

Plaintiffs initially moved for, and received from this court, a preliminary injunction which acted to stay all of the nonpayment proceedings which had been commenced against them by their respective landlords (see notice of motion, exhibit A, Ortiz v Five Seven Naught, Apr. 18, 2006). Less than six months later, in an unrelated action, the Appellate Division, First Department, issued a decision holding that a landlord accepting Section 8 subsidies from a rent-stabilized tenant could not opt out of the federal program and terminate the tenant’s existing lease (Rosario v Diagonal Realty, LLC, 32 AD3d 739 [1st Dept 2006], affd 8 NY3d 755 [2007], cert denied — US —, 128 S Ct 1069 [2008]). Based on the Appellate Division’s Rosario holding (32 AD3d 739 [2006]), this court, in January of 2007, issued a final order and judgment in the instant case granting complete relief to plaintiffs (see notice of motion, exhibit B). This motion seeking attorneys’ fees followed.

Discussion

As previously noted by this court, the federally created Section 8 program provides landlords with rental subsidies for qualified tenants occupying an approved housing unit (see Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 USC §§ 1437-1440). In New York City, the Section 8 program is administered by the New York City Housing Authority and the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, both of which act as Public Housing Administrators for the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

Landlords, under the federal statute, possess the ability to choose whether they want to continue participating in the Section 8 program (see 42 USC § 1437f [d] [1] [B] [ii]). However, under New York law, once a landlord decides to accept a Section 8 subsidy from a rent-stabilized tenant, the acceptance of the Section 8 subsidy becomes a term and condition of the rent-stabilized lease, thereby mandating the inclusion of the same terms and conditions in all subsequent renewal leases (see Rosario, 8 NY3d 755, 761-762 [2007]; Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] § 2522.5 [g] [1]). Plaintiffs in this case thus argue that [822]*822because the acceptance of a Section 8 subsidy was a term and condition of their leases, the failure of the landlord to honor that subsidy triggered the provisions allowing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees set forth under Real Property Law § 234.3 This court disagrees.

Reciprocal by nature,3 4 recovery of attorneys’ fees under Real Property Law § 234 requires the existence of a valid lease which either provides for the recovery of attorneys’ fees and/or dictates the payment of additional sums to the landlord in the event that the tenant breaches the lease (Real Property Law § 234; see Bunny Realty v Miller, 180 AD2d 460 [1st Dept 1992]). Plaintiffs in this case have not presented any leases which contain the required language. This fact is not changed, as plaintiffs argue, by the service of the nonpayment petitions (notice of motion, exhibit C), which contain statements claiming entitlement to attorneys’ fees. All of the claims in the served nonpayment petitions were made “upon information and belief,” and, therefore, do not constitute a judicial admission upon which plaintiffs may rely (see Scolite Intl. Corp. v Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 68 AD2d 417 [3d Dept 1979]).

Furthermore, unlike a general rent-stabilized or non-rent-stabilized lease, a Section 8 lease requires the inclusion of a [823]*823HUD Housing Assistance Payment contract (HAP contract) tenancy addendum. (See Rosario, 8 NY3d 755, 761-762 [2007]; 24 CFR 982.305 [a] [3]; 982.308 [b] [2].) The tenancy addendum, in very specific language, states that if there is a conflict between the tenancy addendum and any other lease provision, the language of the tenancy addendum controls (see affirmation in opposition of defendant 550 Realty Heights, exhibit B, ¶14 [b]). It is particularly noteworthy that no provision of the HAP contract or the tenancy addendum contains language allowing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees in the event that a Section 8 tenant prevails in an action against its landlord. Under the express language of the HAP contract tenancy addendum, this court, even if it had a lease before it, could not find entitlement to attorneys’ fees where no such entitlement exists. Accordingly, it is ordered that plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

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Related

Rosario v. Diagonal Realty, LLC
872 N.E.2d 860 (New York Court of Appeals, 2007)
Allerand, LLC v. 233 East 18th Street Co.
19 A.D.3d 275 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)
Rosario v. Diagonal Realty, LLC
32 A.D.3d 739 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2006)
Aijaz v. Hillside Place, LLC
37 A.D.3d 501 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2007)
Elkins v. Cinera Realty, Inc.
61 A.D.2d 828 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1978)
Scolite International Corp. v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc.
68 A.D.2d 417 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1979)
Bunny Realty v. Miller
180 A.D.2d 460 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1992)
Aijaz v. Hillside Place, LLC
3 Misc. 3d 754 (Civil Court of the City of New York, 2004)
Aijaz v. Hillside Place, LLC
8 Misc. 3d 73 (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
19 Misc. 3d 819, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ortiz-v-570156-llc-nysupct-2008.