Ortiz Barrientos v. Blanche
This text of Ortiz Barrientos v. Blanche (Ortiz Barrientos v. Blanche) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OSCAR DOMINGO ORTIZ No. 24-6532 BARRIENTOS, Agency No. A216-258-103 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 15, 2026**
Before: RAWLINSON, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Oscar Domingo Ortiz Barrientos, a native and citizen of El
Salvador, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of
his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
1. To be eligible for asylum, Petitioner must establish “that he has suffered
past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution” on account of a
protected ground. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Fear of future persecution must be objectively
reasonable. Id. at 1029. Withholding of removal requires a showing that Petitioner
has suffered past persecution or faces “a clear probability of persecution” in the
future––a “more stringent” standard than for asylum. Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales,
441 F.3d 739, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2006). We review the agency’s findings about past
or future persecution for substantial evidence, reversing only if “any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Urias-Orellana v.
Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 850, 853–54 (2026) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that the threats
Petitioner received did not rise to the level of persecution. “Threats standing
alone … constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when
the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Lim v.
INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Unfulfilled
threats are very rarely sufficient to rise to the level of persecution ….”). Here,
although MS-13 gang members threatened to kill Petitioner or his family if he
2 24-6532 stopped paying them every week, Petitioner, his employee, and his family were
never physically harmed. Petitioner continued to operate his clothing store for five
months after he stopped meeting the gang’s demands without ever being harmed.
Petitioner’s family still lives in the same house, and Petitioner’s former employee
continues to live in the same town, yet none of them have been harmed. The record
therefore does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner’s past experiences rose to
the level of persecution.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner
does not have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution sufficient to meet
the standards for asylum or withholding of removal. The fact that Petitioner’s family
continue to live safely in El Salvador undermines Petitioner’s fear of future
persecution. See Kumar v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n
applicant’s claim of persecution upon return is weakened, even undercut, when
similarly-situated family members continue to live in the country without incident.”
(citation omitted)). Moreover, the record indicates that police in El Salvador
successfully arrested and imprisoned several gang members who harassed
Petitioner’s family. See Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 2004)
(requiring, for withholding of removal, that a petitioner prove that the government
would be “unable or unwilling to control” potential persecutors (citation omitted)).
A government “is not unable or unwilling to control violent nonstate actors when it
3 24-6532 demonstrates efforts to subdue said groups.” Hussain, 985 F.3d at 648 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The record therefore does not compel the
conclusion that the government would be unable or unwilling to protect Petitioner.
2. On appeal, Petitioner does not challenge the agency’s conclusion that he
waived any challenge to the agency’s denial of CAT relief, and he has therefore
forfeited the issue. Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 780 (9th Cir. 2025)
(“[A]rguments … omitted from the opening brief are usually deemed forfeited.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
PETITION DENIED.1
1 Petitioner’s motion to stay removal pending appeal (Dkt. No. 4) is denied.
4 24-6532
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Ortiz Barrientos v. Blanche, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ortiz-barrientos-v-blanche-ca9-2026.