Orr v. Des Moines Electric Light Co.

238 N.W. 604, 213 Iowa 127
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedOctober 27, 1931
DocketNo. 40462.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 238 N.W. 604 (Orr v. Des Moines Electric Light Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Orr v. Des Moines Electric Light Co., 238 N.W. 604, 213 Iowa 127 (iowa 1931).

Opinion

*128 Morling, J.

This ease was before this Court on a former appeal. Orr v. Des Moines Electric Company, 207 Iowa 1149. Judgment in favor of the plaintiff was there reversed because plaintiff in her petition specified the particular acts of negligence on which she relied and was thereby precluded from availing herself of the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. On remand she struck out of her petition the specifications of negligence and went to trial on her general allegations. Defendant’s first contention is that the amendment set up a new cause of action, which was barred by the statute of limitations.

The petition alleged that defendant conducted into the town and about the streets a high' and dangerous current of electricity of about 2300 volts.

“Par. 6. That the defendant, Des Moines Electric Light Company, and the defendant, C. K. G-unnar, negligently permitted the transformers, poles, wires and insulation on the wires to become defective, and -the insulation on said wires to become worn and defective, so that on June 11, 1926, a high and dangerous current of electricity was conducted from the wires of said company which carried a high and dangerous current, to the wires which should have supplied the home of said Harold Bone with electric current of such strength as was necessary for lighting only.”
“Par. 8. That in the performance of his (intestate’s) duties * * * it was necessary for him to use the light current furnished to the .house * * * which light current is harmless to human life. That when he was using said current of electricity so furnished by the defendants, the defendants negligently permitted and allowed a high and dangerous current of electricity to be conducted over the wires leading into the house of said Harold Bone and into said house, which high and dangerous current of electricity killed said Clarence Orr. ’ ’

By the amendment plaintiff merely struck from her petition Paragraph six.

The cause of action was negligence in permitting a high and dangerous current of electricity to be conducted to the consumer’s wires. By Paragraph 6 plaintiff undertook to specify wherein defendant was negligent in permitting the excessive charge or current. Because she set out the particulars of the *129 alleged negligence which she claimed, she could not assert that she did not know them and that defendant was in position to know the facts and she was not. Unless she was uninformed she was not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa. That is the reason why under the specific allegations she was precluded from taking advantage of that doctrine. Orcutt v. Century Building Company, 99 S. W. 1062, 201 Mo. 424, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 929; Byland v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Company, 144 Pac. 251, 282, L. R. A. 1915F 1000, 93 Kans. 288.

By the petition defendant was fully notified of the cause of action set up, which was negligence in permitting excessive charge. By the amendment the identity of the cause of action was not changed. At most the amendment merely operated to expand or amplify what was alleged. The amendment did not set up a new cause of action. Lammars v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., 187 Iowa 1277; Plantz v. Kreutzer, 192 Iowa 333; Blake v. City of Bedford, 170 Iowa 128; Knight v. Railway Co., 160 Iowa 160; Hueston v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 184 Iowa 408; New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 67 L. Ed. 294.

II. Plaintiff in the circumstances of this case in order ' to recover had the burden of proving:

1.That the death of decedent was caused by electric shock. 2.That the fatal charge was caused by defendant. 3. That death was caused not by the ordinary and reasonable lighting voltage of 110 to 120 volts (for defendant would rightfully charge its customers’ wires with such voltage) but by a greater and excessive voltage. 4. That the fatal excess charge was attributable to defendant’s negligence.

1. Defendant in argument properly concedes “that a jury might find that death was due to an electric shock, ’ ’ and again “It may reasonably be inferred from the evidence that his (intestate’s) death was due to an electric shock.”

2. It is not disputed that if death resulted from electric shock the current causing death was produced by defendant.

3. Defendant’s main contention is that the fatal shock, if such was the cause of death, might have resulted from the ordinary voltage of 110 to 120, and that it is not shown that such voltage would not produce death, but on the contrary it appears that death might be so produced.

*130 4. Furthermore, defendant contends that on the evidence it was impossible that the consumer’s wire could have been overcharged and defendant was not negligent.

We will- consider three and four together.

Decedent was found by the witness Bowers prostrate on the unexcavated ground beneath the floor of the Bone residence where he had been working on a plumbing job. In his hands and under his body was an electric light bulb and socket protected by a screen and connected with the wiring of the residence, the current for which was furnished by defendant and was on. The weather had been hot and dry for a long time. When Bowers first touched the body he felt no shock. Then, as he says, he “took hold of his bare arm and then I got an electric shock. I got enough of a shock to make me want to let loose. * * * No apparent effect afterwards. * * * The lamp * * * was held in the region of his heart. The inside of his right hand was severely burned. The left hand was slightly burned. * * * The light bulb was pressed tightly against his body.”

A physician was called. The physician testified:

“Rigor mortis had set in very strong in the arms. # # * An electrical charge would produce it. * * * His clothing was wet,his pupils dilated, he had a livid dark color, his lips were more or less swollen, right where his heart would be there was an area of his body that had a baked appearance, whitish like the breast of a chicken that had been thoroughly cooked. The hands * * * showed burns at the edge of the skin in places and the outer edge had commenced to slough a little. He had been dead for an hour or so. # * * Q. Were those burns such as to show it could have been caused by only a voltage of 110 in your opinion? A. I do not think that would, just a single connection. You want a continuous' passage. * * * I would not want to qualify as to the effect of 110 volts for a long time — have had no observation.”

The Doctor thought that it was 10 or 10:30 when he saw the body.

A professor of electrical engineering in the State University testified:

“The principal factors which determine electrical power *131 are voltage and current. * * * You may have electrical voltage without current. The common voltage used in house lighting and operating washing machines and toasters and things of that kind is 110 to 120 volts.

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Bluebook (online)
238 N.W. 604, 213 Iowa 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/orr-v-des-moines-electric-light-co-iowa-1931.