Orleans Parish School Board v. the City of New Orleans and Norman White, in His Capacity as Chief Financial Officer for the City of New Orleans

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 19, 2025
• Docket: 2025-C-0247
• Status: Published

Opinion

ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL * NO. 2025-C-0247 BOARD * COURT OF APPEAL VERSUS * FOURTH CIRCUIT THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND NORMAN WHITE, IN HIS * STATE OF LOUISIANA CAPACITY AS CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER FOR * THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS * *******

JCL LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH REASONS.

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur with the majority’s

conclusion that the Orleans Parish School Board (“School Board”) is entitled to the

$10 million appropriation included in the 2025 Budget Ordinance. However, I

dissent from the majority’s refusal to enforce the full $20 million immediate

payment obligation.

The record demonstrates that this financial obligation, which was structured

into two equal installments, was presented as a defined and immediate

commitment, formally accepted by the School Board, and partially executed by the

City through appropriation, public affirmation, and performance. The first

installment of the $20 million obligation was duly enacted by the City Council,

signed by the Mayor, and clearly designated as a payment to the School Board, as

per the Home Rule Charter. This $20 million obligation, though initially

negotiated as part of the broader settlement framework, was integrated into the

School Board’s and City’s budgetary process and treated as a separate, immediate

financial commitment.

While the School Board seeks enforcement of the broader settlement

agreement, I agree with the majority that the lack of a fully executed writing or

appropriation precludes enforcement of that agreement under La. C.C. art. 3072. My dissent is limited to the enforceability of a specific $20 million payment

obligation negotiated within that broader agreement.

The record indicates that the $20 million obligation was treated by both

parties as an immediate financial commitment. It was formally accepted by the

School Board, incorporated into the City’s budget process, publicly affirmed by

City officials, and the first installment was appropriated and performed. These

actions constituted a valid obligation and/or ratification under La. C.C. art. 1843.

For purposes of enforcement, the $20 million obligation is properly

understood as indivisible as it was structured as two equal installments forming a

unified obligation owed in full within the 2024-2025 fiscal year in which the first

payment was due on December 31, 2024 and the second payment was due on April

1, 2025. However, as to the broader settlement framework, this initial obligation

is legally and functionally divisible. The record supports a clear distinction

between the immediate $20 million payment and the more complex, longer-term

policy provisions, such as multi-year programmatic funding and administrative fee

reforms, which were reserved for further documentation.

Accordingly, I would enforce the $20 million obligation as a ratified and

indivisible initial payment commitment, but divisible from the broader terms of the

settlement agreement. This holding is grounded in the following statutory

provisions and established Louisiana jurisprudence.

The enforceability of the $20 million obligation must rest on the following

two distinct but complementary legal grounds: (1) divisibility and indivisibility

under La. C.C. art. 1815 and (2) ratification under La. C.C. art. 1843.

First, while Civil Code article 1815 provides that an obligation is divisible

“when the object of the performance is susceptible of division,” the article makes

clear that the obligation is indivisible “when the object of the performance, because

of its nature or because of the intent of the parties, is not susceptible of division.” La. C.C. art. 1815. Although a sum of money is typically considered divisible by

nature, a monetary obligation may be treated as indivisible by the parties’ intent

(ex voluntate) when structured as a unified, non-fragmented commitment. See

Berlier v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 01-1530, p. 14 (La. 4/3/02), 815 So.2d 39, 48

(La. 2002) (holding that a lump-sum monetary settlement was indivisible where

the parties had clearly conditioned payment of the entire amount on the execution

of a global release, and had not allocated partial obligations to individual

defendants). See also Saul Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations in the Louisiana

Jurisprudence 599 (1979).

In the case sub judice, the $20 million obligation was treated by both the

School Board and the City as a single, cohesive initial two-installment

commitment. One installment was fully performed and the second was scheduled

within the same 2024-2025 fiscal year and never repudiated. This structure and

performance confirm that the parties understood the obligation to be indivisible as

between its two installments, even if distinct from other, longer-term elements of

the broader settlement. The obligation was not conditional, speculative, or subject

to further negotiation. It was immediate, defined, and ratified in part through

formal appropriation and execution.

At the same time, this $20 million obligation is divisible from the broader

settlement terms, which addressed ongoing programmatic funding, revenue

allocations, and policy changes. Unlike in Berlier, where the parties expressly

conditioned a single lump-sum payment on a global release, the record here

reflects a deliberate structural separation. Refusing to enforce the $20 million

obligation would improperly conflate a clearly staged financial arrangement with

the broader, unexecuted settlement framework, contrary to both the parties’

conduct and the governing principles of budgetary performance in public law. Second, under Civil Code article 1843, a contract made by a person having

no authority to bind the principal for whom he purports to act may be ratified by

the purported principal. Ratification may be express or tacit. La. C.C. art. 1843. In

the case sub judice, the City’s conduct, including the appropriation of the first $10

million installment of an indivisible $20 million obligation, public affirmation of

the financial terms, and joint implementation efforts with the School Board,

constitutes ratification of the full $20 million obligation. Louisiana courts have

recognized that a governmental entity may ratify an unauthorized contract through

the subsequent action or inaction of the governing authority upon being appraised

of the facts. See Louisiana Consumer’s League, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 431

So.2d 35 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (holding that the mayor’s execution of an

operating contract for a corporation, without the requisite authorization from the

city-parish council, was ratified by the council’s failure to immediately repudiate

the contract and its adoption of a resolution permitting the corporation to continue

business for two months). Whether the City Attorney reviewed or objected to the

agreement has no bearing on the legal effect of the City’s formal acts of

appropriation, performance, and public acknowledgment of this discrete obligation.

The district court rulings send the wrong message to public institutions

entrusted with the delivery of essential services. When a municipality formally

appropriates and begins performance on a defined financial obligation to its school

system, particularly one aimed at core educational operations, those commitments

must be treated as binding. That duty exists not only in the context of litigation, but

as part of a broader constitutional and fiscal responsibility to ensure continuity in

public education. Public confidence in governance depends on the enforceability of

such obligations.

Accordingly, I would affirm the enforceability of the first $10 million

installment and enforce the second $10 million installment as part of a ratified, indivisible obligation that was clearly accepted and initiated for performance. This

conclusion does not preclude the School Board from asserting any remaining

claims in the pending litigation. It simply gives effect to what the law, the facts,

and responsible public administration require.