Orlando Scott Martin, Jr. v. Washoe County Sheriff’s Office, et al.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided December 18, 2025·No. 3:25-cv-00361·Unknown

Opinion

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ORLANDO SCOTT MARTIN, JR., Case No. 3:25-CV-00361-ART-CLB

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE1 v.

et al., Defendants. On July 16, 2025, proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se, Plaintiff Orlando Scott Martin, Jr. (“Martin”) initiated this action against Defendants Washoe County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”), Washoe County District Attorney’s Office (“WCDA”), and the Reno Police Department (“RPD”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) for alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1-1.) This Court screened the complaint, (ECF Nos. 7, 8), and dismissed Martin’s claims without prejudice and with leave to amend because Martin failed to properly allege Monell liability against WCSO and RPD, and failed to properly assert claims for false arrest and false imprisonment.2 Martin was expressly put on notice of the deficiencies of his complaint and given the opportunity to amend his complaint to properly assert his claims. Martin filed a first amended pro se civil rights complaint that suffered from the same deficiencies as his original complaint. (ECF No. 10.) The Court therefore recommended, again, that Martin’s complaint be dismissed with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies now twice identified by the Court. (ECF No. 11.) However, before the District

1 This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Anne R. Traum, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and LR IB 1-4. 2 The Court also dismissed the Second Judicial Courthouse, which was named as Judge ruled on the Court’s recommendation Martin filed a second amended pro se civil rights complaint. (ECF No. 12.) In the interest of judicial efficiency, the Court withdrew its previous recommendation, (ECF No. 13), so Martin’s second amended complaint could be screened. The Court now screens Martin’s second amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Prior to ordering service on any defendant, the Court is required to screen an in forma pauperis complaint to determine whether dismissal is appropriate under certain circumstances. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the in forma pauperis statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint for the enumerated reasons). Such screening is required before a litigation proceeding in forma pauperis may proceed to serve a pleading. Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 2015). “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – (A) the allegations of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks that language. When reviewing the adequacy of a complaint under this statute, the court applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. The Court must accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). Allegations in pro se complaints are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions,” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading must contain something more. . . than. . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). At a minimum, a plaintiff should include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A dismissal should not be without leave to amend unless it is clear from the face of the complaint the action is frivolous and could not be amended to state a federal claim, or the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). In his second amended complaint (“SAC”), Martin sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF No. 12.) Martin alleges that sometime in 2022, he was arrested for battery on a pregnant person without probable cause and that RPD officers searched him without his consent. (Id. at 6.) Martin further alleges that based on his arrest he served about five days in jail at the WCSO where he was strip searched without legal justification, and that he was improperly put on court ordered supervision by the WCDA’s office. (Id. at 5.) Based on these allegations, Martin asserts claims for violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 3.) Martin is seeking monetary A. WCSO and RPD as Defendants Martin’s SAC suffers from the same deficiencies as his first amended complaint and his original complaint. In this case, it appears Martin intends to name WCSO and RPD in connection with the alleged illegal imprisonment/arrest claim. The United States Supreme Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York that a municipal entity lik

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Orlando Scott Martin, Jr. v. Washoe County Sheriff’s Office, et al., (D. Nev. 2025).

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