Orlando Garcia v. Peter Beck

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 13, 2023
• Docket: 22-15594
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORLANDO GARCIA, No. 22-15594

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-04575-CRB

v. MEMORANDUM* PETER J. BECK, in individual and representative capacity as Trustee of The Beck Family Trust; et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 9, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellants Peter Beck, Lola Beck, and Lola’s Chicken Shack

(collectively, “Lola’s Chicken Shack”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of

Plaintiff-Appellee Orlando Garcia’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). claim, the denial of their motion to designate Garcia as a “vexatious litigant,” and

the denial of sanctions against Garcia. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we dismiss this appeal in part and affirm in part.

1. Lola’s Chicken Shack first challenges the district court’s dismissal of

Garcia’s ADA claim against it. Lola’s Chicken Shack argues that the district court

should have ruled that Garcia lacked standing to bring an ADA claim as a “serial

tester.” Instead, the district court dismissed Garcia’s ADA claim against Lola’s

Chicken Shack as moot because it found all alleged ADA violations had been

remediated and Garcia was not entitled to any further injunctive relief under the

ADA. In other words, the district court’s order made Lola’s Chicken Shack the

prevailing party on the ADA claim.

In general, “a party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in his favor,

for the purpose of obtaining a review of findings he deems erroneous which are not

necessary to support the decree.” United States v. Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d

487, 488 (1994) (simplified). Although there is an exception to the “prevailing

party” rule when an “adverse ruling can serve as the basis for collateral estoppel in

subsequent litigation,” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 520 (9th Cir.

1999), Lola’s Chicken Shack does not claim the exception applies. “To the extent

that the district court was not favorable to appellants, it does not bind them in

subsequent litigation.” Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d at 489. We thus dismiss

2 Lola’s Chicken Shack’s claim under the ADA.

2. Lola’s Chicken Shack next argues that the district court abused its

discretion by refusing to designate Garcia a “vexatious litigant.” Lola’s Chicken

Shack sought an order requiring Garcia to receive the court’s permission to file

future ADA claims against Alameda, California businesses. See Weissman v. Quail

Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999) (“District courts have the inherent

power to file restrictive pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants with abusive and

lengthy histories of litigation. Such pre-filing orders may enjoin the litigant from

filing further actions or papers unless he or she first meets certain requirements, such

as obtaining leave of the court. . . .” (simplified)). The district court denied the

motion.

Lola’s Chicken Shack lacks Article III standing to appeal this decision. To

having standing to appeal, appellants must have a “direct stake” in the outcome of

their appeal. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705–06 (2013). Since an order

requiring Garcia to seek court permission for future ADA claims would not impact

the instant suit, Lola’s Chicken Shack has no “direct stake” in the outcome of the

appeal. Any injury caused by Garcia’s instant lawsuit and suffered by Lola’s

Chicken Shack has already occurred, and is not redressable by a reversal of the

vexatious litigant order. Instead, the vexatious litigant order would only benefit third

parties from Garcia’s lawsuits.

3 Furthermore, even if Lola’s Chicken Shack had argued that the pre-filing

order could protect it from future suits by Garcia, such an allegation is so speculative

that it would not confer Article III standing here. See Munns v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402,

410 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting standing when a fear of a future injury was “too

speculative to confer standing”). Garcia has never sued Beck before, and the record

does not reflect that Garcia makes a practice of repeatedly suing the same businesses

once ADA violations are remediated. Thus, it would be entirely speculative to

assume that Garcia may sue appellants in the future.

3. Lola’s Chicken Shack lastly contends that the district court abused its

discretion by denying its motion for sanctions against Garcia. It argues that Garcia

should be sanctioned as a vexatious litigant and that it should receive the fees

incurred from litigating the vexatious litigant motion.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lola’s Chicken

Shack’s motion for sanctions. A court’s imposition of sanctions under inherent

power is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Am. Unites for Kids v. Rosseau, 985 F.3d

1075, 1087 (9th Cir. 2021). “[T]he simple fact that a plaintiff has filed a large

number of complaints, standing alone, is not a basis for designating a litigant as

‘vexatious.’” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.

2007). And here, given that Lola’s Chicken Shack remediated the ADA violations

alleged in Garcia’s lawsuit, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding

4 the lack of “meritless, harassing, or improper” conduct to warrant the award of

sanctions against Garcia. We thus affirm the denial of sanctions.

DISMISSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.1

1 Lola’s Chicken Shack asked this court to take judicial notice of court documents purporting to show that Garcia is a vexatious litigant and of the legislative history of the ADA. Given that we do not reach the merits of these issues, we deny the motion.