Orkin, LLC v. Morse

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: June 28, 2017
• Docket: CUMbcd-cv-17-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBElli,AND, ss BCD-CV-2017-22 .j

OR.KIN, LLC,

Plaintiff

v. ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER and FOR PRELIMINARY IN.ITJNCTION

DOUGLAS MORSE,

Defendant

Before the Cowi is Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and

Prelimina1y Injunction against the Defendant. The Complaint filed by Plaintiff alleges

breach of contract (Count I) and misappropriation of trade secrets (Count II). Plaintiff is

seeking to enforce a non-competition clause in two employment agreements that it claims

are binding upon the Defendant. Plaintiff Orkin, LLC ('{Orkin") is represented by

Attorney Timothy O'Brien, and the Defendant Douglas Morse ("Mr, Morse") is

represented by Attorneys Daniel Nuzzi and Connor Beatty. Oral argument on the motion . '

was held on May 31, 2017. The Court has reviewed the parties' filings, the last ofwlrich

was received June 16, 2017, and issues the following ol'der granting the motion in pait on

Count I. STANDARD OF REVmw

In order to obtain preliminruy injunctive relief a Plaintiff must establish four

factors: 1) Plaintiff has a likelihood of success on the merits; 2) Plaintiffwlll suffer

irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; 3) such injury outweighs any harm

which granting the injunction would inflict upon the Defendant; and (iv) the public

interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction. Ingraham v. Univ. of

Maine at Orono, 441 A.2d 691,693 (Me. 1982).

In Maine, non-competition agreements are "contraL"y to public policy and will be

enforced only to the extent that they are reasonable .. .>' Lord v. Lord, 454 A.2d 830, 834

(Me. 1983). In order to be enforceable, a non-compete provision in an employment

contract must be limited in scope, and whether the agreement is reasonable is a question

of law for the Court. Chapman v. Drake, 545 A.2d 645, 647, 648 (Me. 1988). The length

of time that the provision is in effect must also be reasonable. Brignull v. Alber/, 666

A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995).

FINDINGS

Defendant Douglas Morse was employed by Plaintiff Orkin, LLC (Orkin)

beginnlng in February of 2014. He signed an employment agreement dated February 4,

2014 (Exhibit 2 to Defendant's Opposition) which contains a non-competition agreement

which is the subject of this motion and lawsuit. He received training from Orldn and

began training as a "Start Technician" which was a seasonal position. On June 1, 2014 he

was offered and accepted a new, year-round position as a "Route Manager." Plaintiff

claims that at that time Defendant signed a second employment agreement (Exhibit 3 to

2 Def.' s Opp.) but Defendant denies that. The agreement contains a signature that purpol'ts

to be Defendant's but he claims that it must have been forged by someone else,

The pa1ties seem to agree that, while at Orkin, Mr. Morse was an outstanding

employee in terms of sale and performance. Howevel', beginning in 2016 he began to

have some conflict with his supervisor at Orkin, Ron Winslow. He was written up twice

by Mr. Winslow for allegedly being disrespectful toward co-workers. Mr. Morse disputes

all the allegations made about the reasons for his termination by Orkin on January 14,

2017.

Mr. Morse was unemployed for seven weeks until he was hired by Terminix, a

competitor to Orkin. Mr. Morse claims that it is common for employees who leave Orkin

to go to work at Terminix. In early April of 2017 Mr. Morse received two letters from

Orkin stating that he was violating tl1e terms of his employment agreement.

The parties agree that while employed by Orkin he serviced customers in

approximately 44 municipalities. Accprding to Orldn, he had 171 accounts in this service

area. Orkin also claims that he has been working for Terminix in this same service area,

and that during a two-week period Orkin received 41 cancellations of service from the

171 accounts Mr. Morse previously serviced. Orldn also claims that Mt'. Morse must be

using an Orkin customer list to solicit and/or to perform services for former Orkin

customers. Mr. Morse states that he was never given a comprehensive customer list by

Orkin, and denies that he ever provided any Orkin customer list to Tenninix. He also

denies that he ever gave Terminix any Orkin pricing information, much less any "trade

secrets."

3 The parties agree that Terminix and Orkin offer similar products and services and

are in direct competition with each other. Mr. Morse claims that the prices charged his

Orkin customers during his employment there were set by the company, and that any

member of the public could easily leam the prices charged. He admits that he had some

discretion to give discounts but had to do so within a range dictated by Orkin. Mr.

Morse's position is that he has not reached out to his former Orkin customers, but

concedes that if a former customer reaches out to him he tells them he now works for

Tenninix. He denies disparaging Orkin in any way or that he tries to convince them to

switch to Terminix. He states that Orkin has been losing customers to Terminix

thrnughout Maine in recent months, and not just in his former service area. His pay at

Terminix is almost exclusively based on commissions, and he claims that he will lose

significant compensation if he is barred from providing services throughout Maine,

including in his fonner service area.

Orkin seems to concede that barring Mr. Morse from working in this industry

anywhere in Maine would be unreasonable, and instead seeks to enforce the agreement

only in his former service area.

The language in the two agreements is identical in pe1tinent part. 1 The language~

in-common does not pennit Mr. Morse, for a period of two years immediately following

termination of his employment, to "Call upon any customer or customers of the Company

for the purposes of soliciting, selling or performance any pest control, exterminating,

1 While the Plaintir'f clnlms M1•. Morse Is bou11d by two agreements, as nolcd Mr. Mori;e claims he never signed the second con1rnc!. Plaintiff points out thnl the l11nguegc of the two agrccment-s .are Identical in tcrm·s of tho non­ compctrcion requirements, and refers In its argument to "The Employmen~Agrccmcnt." The Court m11kes no detcrmlnnllon in this Order es to whether the signature on the Augu~t 3, 20 I4 contract belongs to Mr. Morse. Howcvor, it is elcor thnt bo.th agreements stale that the employee is bound ro its terms "during

4 fumigating or termite control service for the eradication or control of, without limitation,

to rats, ~ice, rnaches, bugs, vermin, termites, beetles or other insects, rodents or birds.,,"

The agreements also prohibit Mr. Morse, during that same perjod, from "disclos(ing) to

any person not employed by the Company any information concerning the business of the

Company, its methods, systems, or the names of its customers." (Par. 5 of Employment

Agreements dated February 3, 2014 and August 4, 2014).

The Couti finds that the agreement is not ambiguous, and that the Defendant

agreed to its terms when he signed it. The questions then aJe: whether there have been

violations committed by Mr. Morse; if so, whether the provisions violated are

enforceable uncle!' Maine law; and how findings on these issues affect the availability of

preliminary injunctive relief on the two claims made.2

Misappropriation o(Trade Secrets

The Court agrees with th.e Defendant that the pricing information which Plaintiff

claims was disclosed to Defendant's new employer do not constitute "trade secrets"

under Maine law. 10 M.R.S. 1542(4). Plaintiff's Reply memorandum suggests that it is

not really disputing Mr. Morse's claim that as a factual mattel' any potential customel'

could find out the kind and price of services offered by Orkin, and that no "trade secrets"

were revealed. Instead, Plaintiffs Reply emphasizes that the loss claimed is in the form

of "good will."

The Comt concludes based on the record presented to it that there is no evidence

that Plaintiff misappropriated any "trade secrets" from Orkin. Therefore, Plaintiff is

2 The Court decided lo look first to see lfthcre is sufficient evidence In the record to find a violation of the agreement, and only then to reach the question of enforceability of the provision violaled.

5 unlikely to prevail on the medts of Count II and is not entitled to preliminary injunctive

relief on that Count.

Breach ofContracz

As noted previously, the Court finds that the contract entered into by Mr. Morse is

not ambiguous, and that he agreed to be bound by at least the first agreement. As also

noted previously, Plaintiff seems to concede that the geographic scope in the agreement is

unreasonable, and it is not seeking enforcement of the agreement in "The Entire State of

Maine" as its language plainly states. Plaintiff maintains, however, that under Chapman

& Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645, 647A8 (Me. 1988) the non-competition

agreement is enforceable against Mr. Morse if he took "for his own benefit the good will

his employer paid him to help develop for the employer's business." Id. at 647. That case

also refers to situations where an employee "pursues'' former customers and whose

names were on customer lists. Id. Plaintiff also cites language in Roy-v. Bolduc, 34 A.2d

479 (Me. 1943) that an employer "can prevent an employee from using his trade or

business secrets, and other confidential knowledge gained in the course of his

employment, and from enticing away old customers .... "

Defendant partially concedes that he has been working in violation of the terms of

the agreement in that he has been engaged in pest control, fumigation or termite controls

for former Orkin customers, and that he "did so in his former service area. He insists,

however, that he has not been soliciting customers, and that any former Orki11 customers

who have swi~cbed to Terminix likely did so to obtain the same services for lower prices.

6 The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence in the record before it to

support a finding that Mr. Morse has solicited any former Orkin customers. This finding

might not be completely necessary given statements made during oral argument by Mr.

Morse's counsel that he agreed not to solicit customel's from his former employer.

However, Plalntiff s arguments suggest that they believe Mr. Morse is in fact, or must be,

soliciting customers and so the Court will make findings based on the record before it.

Mr. Winslow claims in his first affidavit that over a two-week period Orkin

received 41 cancellations of service from the 171 accounts previously serviced by Mr.

Morse, but also states that "some" stated that they were going with Tern1inix because of

lower prices. ~30, 32 Affidavit 4/14/17. In his second affidavit dated May 3, 2017 he

states that since the first affidavit an additional 16 customers left Orkin "because of

Defendant and/or Terminix." The Coul't finds that this information is not specific or

sufficient enough to support a conclusion that Mr. Morse is soliciting those customers, or

that he appropriated a "customer lisf' from Orldn ~ particularly given Mr. Winslow 1 s

concession that "some» of them say they left Orkin for price reasons. There is in fact no

evidence in the record that he ever had access to such a list. That makes this case

distinguishable from the Defendant in Chapman and Drake, as well as the Defendant in

Everett Prescott, Inc. v. Ross, 363 F. Supp. 2d 180, 192 (D. Me), amended 390 F. Supp.

2d 44 (D. Me. 2005).

There is, however, sufficient evidence on the record to find that Mr. Morse

violated his employment agreement in that Plaintiff is likely to prevail on its claim that

his departure from Orkin resulted in some customers leaving Orldn to go to Terminix;

that is, that Mr. Morse took "good will his employer paid him to help developn for

7 Orkin's business. Chapman & Drake v. Harrington, 545 A. 2d 645,647 (Me. 1988). The

Court is persuaded by the numbers presented in Mr. Winslow,s affidavit. The Court must

therefore address the question of whether prohibiting Mr. Mol'se from working in the

same industry and in the same service area is reasonable as a matter of law.

After oral argument on the Motion, the Court invited counsel to submit further

briefing on whether the Court should consider as a factor Mr. Morse's involunta1y

separation from Orkin. The parties disagree as to whether his firing was justified, but they

do agree that his work performance was quite good in the sense that Orkin recognized his

strong sales numbel's. The issues seems to be centered on conflict with his supervisor,

Mr. Winslow, who stated in his affidavit that Mr. Morse was unprofessional in his

communications towards coworkers. Plaintiff in its post-argument brief attached certain

discipline records, but it is difficult from them to know if his communication with

employees is faulted because Mi·.-Morse was acting too much like a manager

(insubordination is mentioned) or because he was actually verbally abusive to the

employees. The Comi concludes that Orkin had the right to terminate Mr. Morse for the

reasons stated but agree with Defendant's characterization that it amounted to an issue of

Mr. Morse's temperament impeding what they determined to be Orkin's "legitimate

business interes!s" in spite of his strong sales numbers. (Defendant's 6/16/17

Memorandum pg. 4.)

There is no dispute that this was an involunta1y termination, and that Mr. Morse

was unemployed for a number of weeks before he found work with Termlnix. The issue

is whether those facts should matter to the determination ofunenforceability. The parties'

memoranda on how to consi.der, if at all, the fact of his involuntaiy termination Jay out

8 the four different approaches taken by various jurisdictions. While Plaintiff is conect to

say the Law Court has never relied upon termination as a factor, the District Court of

Maine in OfficeMax Inc. v. Sousa, 773 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Me. 2011) stated, after

reviewing various approaches) that "the safer approach is to consider the circumstances

of the employee>s termination as a factor in balancing !he equities between the patties.,."

(citing OfficeMax Inc. v. County Owick Print, Inc. 751 F. Supp. 2d 221, (D. Me. 2010). 3

The Court concludes that Mr. Morse's involuntary termination under these

circumstances should weigh against enforceability, particularly given the absence of

evidence of solicitation by Mr. Morse, The Cotu1: also would note in this regard Orkin's

concession that some of its customers followed Mr. Morse to Tenninix due to pricing

factol's - in other words, that some likely left as the by-product of competition, and not as

result of effo1ts by Mr. Morse. Maine law has emphasized its disfavor with these clauses

if the only interest being protected is protection against competition. In addition, the Law

Court has repeatedly stated that due to the potential for these clauses to restrict an

employee's ability to make a living, the "covenants violate public policy and will be

enforced only to the extent that they are reasonable and sweep no wider than necessa1y to

protect the business intel'est in issue." Chapman v. Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645,

646-7 (Me, 1988) (quotingLordv. Lord, 454A. 830,834 (Me. 1983)).

The Court concludes further that the territorial non-competition clause is not

reasonable and therefore is unenforceable under the circumstances of Mr, Morse's

termination. Balancing the equities between the parties as suggested by the First Circuit

3 The Defendants made a "policy-based argument that a·termination without cirnse renders a prior noncompele unenfot·ceable" relying upon a Law Review article, "You're Fired fl And Don't Forget Youi·Non-Compete," I DePoul Bus. & Com, L.J. I (2002) for the proposition that the 1m1jodty view is that discharge without cause vitiates an employee's terrilorial noncompete. 173 F. Supp. 2d 190, 208.

9 in OfficeMax, Orkin may legitimately prevent Mr. Morse from soliciting his former

customers to buy services from Terminix, 4 but unduly restricting Mr. Morse from making

a living under the circumstances ofhis termination is not a legitimate business interest.

To be clear, the Court restricts this conclusion to his working in the field of pest control.

The Court's order will not permit Mr. Morse to solicit Orkin's customers from his former

service area; it simply permits him to work for Terrninix in this service area performing

pest control services as described in the agreement.

The entry will be:

1). Orkin's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction on Count II is DENIED.

2). Orkin's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED 5 in Part and

DENIED in Patt on Count I. Defendant Morse is preliminarily prohibited from soliciting

former Orkin customers in his prior service area. Defendant Morse is preliminarily

allowed to sell, or perform any pest control, exterminating, fumigating or termite control

service for the eradication or control of, without limitation, to rats, mice, roaches, bugs,

vermin, termites, beetles or other insects, rndents or birds in his fo1mer service area.

This order is to be incorporated on the docket for this case by reference.

DATE SUPERIOR COURT JU ICE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT

4 As noted previously, counsel fo1· Mr. MOl'so agreed that he would refrain from soliciting Orkin customers. 5 The Cou1t docs nol nddross Derenda nt's other written arguments on why he believes inj unctive relief is unavailable lo Orkin as it is elem· to Che Court that Mr. ~ orse will not be harmed b)' this Order - ho will be permlltcd ro work fo1· Tcrm in ix 11s he claims to have been worki ng, nnmoly in the fie ld of pest control, in the same nrca, but without soliciting_ fo,mer customers.

Entered on the Docket:~/ ~8 /f'7 10 Copies sent via Mail__ElectronicallyV Orkin LLC v. Douglas Morse

BCD-CV-17-22

Orkin, LLC Plaintiff

Counsel: Timothy O'Brien, Esq. Paige Streeter, Esq. 62 Portland Road, Suite 17 Kennebunk, ME 04043

Douglas Morse Defendant

Counsel: Daniel Nuzzi,, Esq. Connor Beatty, Esq. 184 Main Street PO Box 3070 Lewiston, ME 04243-3070