Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Noad, No. 055390 (Mar. 4, 1992)
This text of 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 2032 (Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Noad, No. 055390 (Mar. 4, 1992)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In count two of the complaint Orix claims that Cindy Noad personally guaranteed all obligations under the note and, despite demands for payment, she has refused to make payment on the balance due and owing. On February 6, 1992, the defendants filed an answer to the complaint. On February 10, 1992, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability only, attaching thereto a supporting memorandum. The defendants have not filed any opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is a means of eliminating the "delay and expense of CT Page 2033 litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven,
The plaintiff, in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, contends that the defendants have admitted the execution of the note; the grant of the security interest; that the note is in default; and that they have neglected and refused to make payment of the balance due on demand. Therefore, the plaintiff claims that summary judgment should be granted as to liability only pursuant to Practice Book Section 385 which states, in pertinent part, that summary judgment:
[I]nterlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone, although there is a genuine issue as to damages. In such case the court shall order an immediate hearing before a referee, before the court, or before a jury, whichever may be proper, to determine the amount of the damages.
Practice Book 385.
The defendants, in their answer to the complaint, admitted the execution of the note and the granting of the security interest in the Hitachi excavator. Noad d/b/a also admitted paragraph seven of the first count of the complaint, which states:
Although the note is in default and demand was made upon the defendant, said defendant has neglected and refused to make payment.
However, Noad d/b/a denied paragraph eight of count one of the complaint, which alleges:
The defendant, R. Vincent Noad, has defaulted under the terms of the Note and, after demand, continues to be in default under the same.
Cindy Noad, essentially, admitted the allegations against her.
Summary judgment should be denied, even where the adverse party fails to respond to the movant's properly filed motion, if the "movant's [motion and affidavits] do not affirmatively show that there is no genuine issue of fact as to all the relevant issues of the case." Mattei v. Bodden,
Defendant Noad d/b/a's answers to paragraphs seven and eight of the complaint constitute a contradiction giving rise to a question of material fact, specifically, whether or not he defaulted. Additionally, the plaintiff has not attached any supporting affidavits to its motion for summary judgment. Consequently, because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Noad d/b/a did, in fact, default under the terms of the note, the motion for summary judgment is denied as to Noad d/b/a.
Although these apparent contradictions do not exist in Cindy Noad's answers, it is necessary to determine whether Noad d/b/a defaulted prior to entering judgment against Cindy Noad as guarantor. Thus, the motion for summary judgment, as it pertains to Cindy Noad is also denied.
PICKETT, JUDGE
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1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 2032, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/orix-credit-alliance-inc-v-noad-no-055390-mar-4-1992-connsuperct-1992.