Oriental Tissue Co. v. Louis De Jonge & Co.

235 F. 294, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1367
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 11, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 235 F. 294 (Oriental Tissue Co. v. Louis De Jonge & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oriental Tissue Co. v. Louis De Jonge & Co., 235 F. 294, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).

Opinion

MAYER, District Judge.

[1] In a suit between these same parties, involving this same claim 2, the patent was held valid and infringed. 218 Fed. 170, 134 C. C. A. 50, affirmed 218 Fed. 173, 134 C. C. A. 50. [295]*295The present case involves a new imitation gold leaf. It will be recalled that claim 2 reads:

“A thin lent or fabric composed entirely of soluble cotton and a coloring matter incorporated therein.”

Plaintiff contends: (1) That the patent discloses a meritorious and pioneer invention; (2) that defendant’s leaf infringes, under the doctrines of (a) addition and (b) equivalents. Defendant contends (the previous decree being still interlocutory): (1) That the patent is invalid for lack of invention and for inoperativeness; and (2) not infringed because defendant’s product is not composed entirely of the elements set forth in the claim.

The value of the patent commercially is in its having pointed out how to make an imitation gold leaf which is now extensively used in place of the genuine gold leaf in stamping book covers; but the specification wa.s not limited to this use solely, for Gregory said:

“My invention consists in providing a thin leaf of fabric which is made to imitate metal leaf—such, for instance, as gold leaf, silver, lead, and the like-—which thin leaf or fabric is suitable for use in embossing and decorative purposes generally; it being extremely tenacious and capable of being more easily handled than the gold or other metal leaf itself.”

Therefore the citable prior art will include patents relating to embossing and decorative purposes. The added prior art in this case does not change my conclusion as to validity, for I think now, as I did in the prior case, that Gregory’s product shows invention and is highly meritorious; and, if any one entertained any doubt, the proven commercial utility would resolve the doubt.

True, the Oeser leaf (more fully testified about in this case) has had a considerable commercial use, but only for inferior work, and one need not be an expert to know that the Oeser is not in the same class with either the Oriental or the De Jonge leaves here in controversy. I may also stale, for the information of counsel, that assuming, but not deciding (because unnecessary so to do), that the documentary evidence relating to the applications for patents in foreign countries is admissible, those proceedings, in my opinion, amount to nothing more than an effort to make the best argument possible in foreign jurisdictions to meet points of view, governmental attitude, and departmental interpretations which may be, at least in some respects, different from ours.

The contention as to invalidity because of inoperativeness rests on the proposition that “amyl oil” (which is atuyl alcohol), referred to in the patent as a solvent for soluble cotton, is not such a solvent. Of course, amyl acetate is. This seems highly technical, because I think the skilled man would at once understand that amyl acetate was meant, as is clearly stated by Dr. Mcllhiney on page 681 of the previous record, when he says:

“By ‘amyl oil’ I understand him to mean amyl acetate, one of the most common solvents for soluble cotton, and one which is commonly referred to as amyl oil.”

But while, on the prior art and all that this record contains, the patent must be held valid, yet the scope of the claim cannot be stretch-, ed so as to exclude every third element, when the claim contains only [296]*296two. It is therefore necessary to ascertain what was heretofore decided in respect of claim 2. In the previous case, I supposed that what Gregory had found out was how to produce a self-supporting imitation gold leaf by the combination of two elements: (1) Soluble cotton; and (2) coloring matter. This seemed to me ingenious, comparatively simple and economical, and therefore a real contribution, and in construing the claim I said, and now repeat:

“The most serious question is that of infringement. There is a sharp dispute as to the meaning of the claim; but the claim is stated in simple language and in connection with the context I think its interpretation is plain. ‘Coloring matter’ means, of course, coloring matter which will produce the imitation leaf desired. ‘Entirely’ means the absence of any ingredient which is foreign either to soluble cotton or the appropriate coloring matter.”

On the evidence in that case I found as a fact that commercial soluble cotton, bought in the regular course of trade, contained, among other things, “gums and resins with the properties of gum sondrac, gum mastic, and common resin among the solids,” and therefore I concluded that the per cent, found in plaintiff’s leaf was natural and to be expected in soluble cotton after it was subjected to the process described in the patent. I was also impressed with the testimony of Dr. Carmichael, plaintiff’s expert, that only a fraction of 1 per cent of gum mastic was' found in defendant’s leaf, and that this third element was merely an addition, introduced for specious purposes to avoid the patent. The Circuit Court- of Appeals seems to have adopted my views, and, in any event, my conclusion, adding:

“Claim 2, taken literally, would cover products made by these earlier patents, and referring to Berard, Abel and Stevens, and Lefferts, and, so construed, would be invalid as too broad. It is, however, to be construed in connection with the specifications, and with what the patentee describes to be, and what we find actually was, his invention, viz. a thin metallic leaf, an article which is not,shown to have been anticipated.”

'It is therefore apparent that the word “entirely” is of much importance, and especially on the evidence in this case. An examination of the file wrapper shows claims which at one stage read:

“2. A thin leaf or fabric comprising soluble cotton and a coloring matter.”
“4. A thin leaf or fabric comprising soluble cotton and bronze.”

These claims were rejected; the examiner stating that it would not involve invention over the disclosure of the prior art to color the leaf. Thereupon the claims were canceled, applicant stating:

“Applicant has canceled the claims against which the Eichengrun et al. patent was cited, and has substituted therefor a new claim 2, calling particular attention to the fact that applicant’s thin leaf or fabric is composed entirely of soluble cotton and a coloring matter incorporated therein.”

“Composed entirely,” of course, does not mean “comprising” or “consisting of.” See any dictionary.

[2] The principle of construction and interpretation here to be applied is concisely stated by Judge Townsend in Victor Talking Machine Co. v. American Graphophone, 151 Fed. 601, at page 604, 81 C. C. A. 145, at page 148:

“The applicant for a patent is entitled to specify and claim in his application the subject-matter of which he believes himself to be the original inventor, and to persist in his assertions and claims until final action thereon [297]*297by the Patent Office. But when his claims are rejected on references cited agahist them, he is called upon to exercise his election between insistence and appeal or desistance and acquiescence.

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Related

Oriental Tissue Co. v. Dejonge
250 F. 627 (Second Circuit, 1918)
Wilson & Willard Mfg. Co. v. Union Tool Co.
249 F. 729 (Ninth Circuit, 1918)
A. B. Dick Co. v. Underwood Typewriter Co.
235 F. 300 (S.D. New York, 1916)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
235 F. 294, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1367, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oriental-tissue-co-v-louis-de-jonge-co-nysd-1916.