Orest Baidan v. Thomas Kuhnle, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5

6 OREST BAIDAN, Case No. 24-cv-06178-NW 7 Plaintiff, 8 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND v. RECOMMENDATION 9 THOMAS KUHNLE, et al., Re: ECF No. 11 10 Defendants. 11 12

13 The Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge DeMarchi’s Report and Recommendation 14 (“R&R”) to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (“SAC”) in part pursuant to the 15 mandatory screening process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). R&R, ECF No. 11. The Court 16 finds the R&R to be correct, well-reasoned, and thorough, and adopts it in every respect. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 On August 30, 2024, self-represented Plaintiff Orest Baidan sued two state court judicial 19 officers for conduct stemming from presiding over family court proceedings between Plaintiff and 20 his former spouse. Compl., ECF No. 1. It is unclear whether Plaintiff has ongoing cases before 21 either or both state judicial officers, or if Plaintiff is still a litigant in family court. Along with his 22 complaint, Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 3. 23 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Judge Thomas Kuhnle and Commissioner Jon Heaberlin: 24 (1) denied Plaintiff disability-related accommodations; (2) retaliated against Plaintiff for his 25 disability-related requests; and (3) improperly delegated judicial duties to a private attorney. See 26 generally SAC, ECF No. 10. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions worsened his medical 27 conditions and left him homeless and unable to secure legal representation or medical care. Id. 1 He requests declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. 2 Plaintiff’s complaint was assigned to Magistrate Judge DeMarchi for screening pursuant to 3 28 U.S.C. § 915(e)(2). Judge DeMarchi granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP, but 4 provisionally sealed Plaintiff’s original complaint sua sponte and ordered him to re-file his 5 complaint with redactions. ECF No. 5. 6 Plaintiff instead filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) as of right that expanded on his 7 allegations and modified his asserted claims for relief. FAC, ECF No. 7. He also filed a second 8 IFP application, which Judge DeMarchi granted. Judge DeMarchi screened the FAC and 9 concluded that it failed to state a claim for relief. Judge DeMarchi gave Plaintiff leave to file a 10 second amended complaint. ECF No. 9. Judge DeMarchi’s order expressly stated that “Mr. 11 Baidan may not add new claims or parties absent leave of Court.” Id. at 12. 12 On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a SAC, reasserting claims for violations of his civil 13 rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 14 Without requesting leave to assert additional claims, Plaintiff’s SAC also asserted a new claim for 15 “Conspiracy to Deprive Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).” ECF No. 10 at 4. Judge DeMarchi 16 screened the SAC and found that Plaintiff had failed to state a federal claim upon which relief 17 could be granted. ECF No. 11. 18 On July 24, 2025, Judge DeMarchi issued an R&R to refer Plaintiff’s case to the 19 undersigned judge and to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend, with a limited 20 exception. Id. Judge DeMarchi recommended that Plaintiff’s ADA claims may proceed only to 21 the extent that the claims implicate a right of access to the courts. Judge DeMarchi also liberally 22 construed Plaintiff’s addition of the conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) as a request for 23 leave to amend and recommended that request be denied. Plaintiff timely filed objections to the 24 R&R. Pl.’s Objections to R&R (“Objs.”), ECF No. 13. 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 The district court’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth in 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district judge must “make a de 1 novo determination of those portions of the report … to which objection is made,” and “may 2 accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 3 magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). “Only objections that reference specific portions of the 4 report and recommendation will trigger de novo review—general or conclusory objections do not 5 suffice.” Ali v. Grounds, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1249 (S.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 772 F. App’x 580 6 (9th Cir. 2019). The district court need not review de novo those portions of a R&R to which 7 neither party objects. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 8 Courts have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to 9 construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt. Akhtar v. 10 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 Although Plaintiff filed “objections” to the R&R, see Objs., ECF No. 13, none of the 13 objections were sufficiently specific to trigger de novo review. Even construing Plaintiff’s 14 objections liberally, each of Plaintiff’s seven objections either reallege conclusory allegations 15 advanced in the SAC or introduce new information with no apparent relevance. Moreover, 16 Plaintiff mischaracterizes the R&R’s “cornerstone factual premise,” and — while some of 17 Plaintiff’s objections purport to contest specific findings — none of the quoted language Plaintiff 18 attributes to the R&R actually appears in the R&R. Failure to file specific objections is sufficient 19 to permit the Court to adopt the R&R. 20 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s failure to properly object to the R&R, the Court carefully 21 reviewed it. The Court reaches the same conclusions as the R&R and finds no clear error. For the 22 reasons discussed below, the Court: 23 1. Dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without further leave to amend 24 (Claims 1-4). 25 2. Dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and retaliation/coercion under the ADA 26 without further leave to amend, except to the extent the claims are based on allegations 27 concerning Plaintiff’s access to court proceedings and Plaintiff’s request for prospective, 1 non-monetary relief (Claims 5, 6). 2 3. Requires that, should Plaintiff choose to proceed, Plaintiff may only file a third amended 3 complaint consistent with the Court’s findings, namely a complaint that is limited to an 4 ADA discrimination claim and retaliation/coercion claim concerning access to court 5 proceedings for prospective, non-monetary relief. Plaintiff may only file a third amended 6 complaint if Plaintiff has prospective relief available, meaning Plaintiff has ongoing 7 proceedings before either Judge Kuhnle or Commissioner Heaberlin in state court. 8 4. Denies Plaintiff’s request for leave to assert a new claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 9 § 1985(3) (Claim 7). 10 A. § 1983 Claims 11 The R&R found that Plaintiff’s claims for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 12 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 13 are barred by immunity doctrines. The Court agrees. 14 1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 15 The Eleventh Amendment bars retrospective declaratory relief against state court judges 16 sued in their official capacities. See Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2021). 17 Plaintiff did not object to the R&R’s finding that retrospective declaratory relief is barred 18 here. See ECF Nos. 10, 13. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that he “seeks only prospective injunctive 19 and declaratory relief against judicial officers,” despite the SAC’s request for retrospective 20 declaratory relief concerning the lawfulness of Judge Kuhnle’s and Commissioner Heaberlin’s 21 past actions. Objs., ECF No. 13; ECF No. 10. 22 While a § 1983 claim for prospective declaratory relief is “theoretically possible,” 23 “prospective declaratory relief requests are those that seek to resolve ‘prospective’ (i.e., 24 anticipated or future) disputes and ‘should not be sought to correct past wrongs where other 25 remedies exist.’” Weldon v. Kapetan, No. 17-cv-01536-LJO-SKO, 2018 WL 2127060, at *5 (E.D. 26 Cal. May 9, 2018) (citing Kim v. City of Belmont, Case No. 17-cv-02563-JST, 2018 WL 500269, 27 at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018)). The SAC does not identify any anticipated or future violations 1 that would implicate § 1983. ECF No. 10. Moreover, as the R&R notes, “insofar as the SAC 2 indicates Judge Kuhnle is no longer involved in the underlying family court proceedings, [] there 3 are no facts suggesting the possibility of future injury by Judge Kuhnle.” ECF No. 11 (citation 4 omitted). 5 2. § 1983 Judicial Immunity 6 Under § 1983, injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts or omissions taken in the 7 officers’ judicial capacity is barred unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief 8 was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 Plaintiff’s SAC does not allege that his § 1983 claims are based on a declaratory decree or 10 that declaratory relief was not available. See ECF No. 10. However, Plaintiff now asserts the 11 “declaratory decree” clause is satisfied because “Calif. Rule of Court 1.100 guarantee (sic) 12 accommodations; Defendants violated it.” Objs., ECF No. 13. 13 Even if this allegation were true, Plaintiff misunderstands the meaning of “declaratory 14 decree.” In the context of § 1983, “a declaratory decree refers to an order directing a particular 15 judicial officer to take or refrain from taking a particular action in a particular dispute.” Drevaleva 16 v. Pollak, No. 21-cv-01664-EMC, 2021 WL 1671969, at *1 (N.D. Cal. April 22, 2021) (quoting 17 Murphy v. Ross, No. 3:14-cv-870, 2015 WL 1787351 at *3 (E.D. Va. April 14, 2015)). California 18 Rule of Court 1.100 is not a declaratory decree. Rather, it establishes the process for requesting 19 disability accommodations. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100. Without any facts plausibly alleging 20 a violation of a declaratory decree, Judge Kuhnle and Commissioner Heaberlin are immune from 21 suit under § 1983. 22 Plaintiff fails to state a claim for prospective or retrospective injunctive and declaratory 23 relief under § 1983. Accordingly, the Court adopts the reasoning of the R&R and dismisses 24 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims without leave to amend. 25 B. ADA Claims 26 Plaintiff brings two claims under the ADA: (1) disability discrimination,1 and (2) violation 27 1 of the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision. The R&R found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for 2 relief for both claims. However, construing the pleadings liberally, the R&R found that certain 3 allegations in the SAC implicate a right of access to the courts and that those allegations are 4 sufficient to meet “the low threshold for proceeding past the screening stage,” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 5 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012), but only to the extent Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive 6 relief. It is unclear to the Court whether there are ongoing proceedings before either Judge Kuhnle 7 or Commissioner Heaberlin such that prospective injunctive relief would be available. 8 1. Disability Discrimination 9 To state a claim for disability discrimination, Plaintiff must plausibly allege facts 10 suggesting the decisions and orders were made because of his claimed disabilities. See Murray v. 11 Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that “but-for” causation standard 12 applies to disability discrimination claims under ADA Title I); Mehta v. City of Sunnyvale, 721 F. 13 Supp. 3d 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“Murray’s analysis applies with equal force to Title I and Title II 14 of the ADA and provides the Ninth Circuit’s current governing standard as to the causation 15 standard that applies to such claims.”). The R&R concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege facts 16 “suggesting that Judge Kuhnle’s and Commissioner Heaberlin’s decisions and orders . . . would 17 not have occurred but for [Plaintiff’s] claimed disabilities.” ECF No. 11. 18 Plaintiff objects to this finding and claims the but-for causation standard is met because his 19 “financial records demonstrate a two-year income loss flowing directly from ADA denial.” Objs., 20 ECF No. 13. As the R&R notes, the SAC merely “alleges that defendants issued orders and made 21 decisions that affected Mr. Baidan’s income and/or assets, which in turn, affected his ability to 22 access medical care.” ECF No. 11; see also EFC No. 10. The R&R concluded that these 23 allegations are inadequate to plausibly suggest that those decisions and orders were made by 24 reason of Plaintiff’s claimed disabilities. This Court agrees. 25 2. Retaliation and Coercion 26 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants “retaliate[ed] against” and “punish[ed]” him “for 27 1 asserting ADA rights,” ECF No. 10, in violation of the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision, which 2 prohibits discrimination “against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or 3 practice made unlawful by [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To state a claim under the ADA’s 4 anti-retaliation provision, Plaintiff must first allege sufficient facts establishing a plausible claim 5 of discrimination under the ADA. McColm v. San Francisco Housing Auth., No. 02-cv-5810 PJH, 6 2007 WL 1575883, at *13 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) (holding that a claim of discrimination under 7 the ADA “constitutes the predicate for any claim of retaliation and/or interference.”). 8 As noted above and discussed below, the R&R declined to recommend dismissal of the 9 portion of the SAC that alleges Defendants denied Plaintiff’s accommodations and scheduled 10 hearings during surgeries or sedation. However, the R&R found that Plaintiff had otherwise failed 11 to allege facts sufficient to support a disability discrimination claim. Because Plaintiff’s claim for 12 retaliation rests on the same facts as his disability discrimination claim (notwithstanding the 13 limited exception), which is “the predicate for any claim of retaliation and/or interference,” 14 Plaintiff has likewise failed to allege facts to support a claim for retaliation. McColm, 2007 WL 15 1575883, at *13. 16 3. Right of Access to the Courts 17 To the extent Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim is based on allegations that Defendants 18 ignored or “den[ied] [his] accommodations” and “schedul[ed] hearings during surgeries or 19 sedation,” the R&R did not recommend dismissal of that portion of the SAC under 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is representing himself, his pleadings are liberally construed. 21 Judge DeMarchi construed Plaintiff’s ADA claim as implicating a right of access to the courts and 22 found that the SAC’s allegations are sufficient to meet “the low threshold for proceeding past the 23 screening stage,” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123, but only to the extent Plaintiff seeks prospective 24 injunctive relief. The Court agrees with the R&R that this issue would benefit from further 25 briefing. 26 While the SAC requests that this Court “[e]njoin Defendants from further discriminatory 27 or retaliatory conduct” and “[c]ompel Defendants to provide all necessary ADA accommodations 1 in any future court proceedings,” Plaintiff does not indicate whether he actually has any ongoing 2 cases before either Judge Kuhnle or Commissioner Heaberlin such that prospective injunctive 3 relief would be available. ECF No. 10. If Plaintiff does, in fact, have ongoing proceedings before 4 Judge Kuhnle or Commissioner Heaberlin, and prospective injunctive relief is thus available, 5 Plaintiff may only amend his complaint to assert a discrimination claim and retaliation/coercion 6 claim concerning access to court proceedings. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims 7 for discrimination and retaliation/coercion under the ADA without leave to amend, except to the 8 extent his claims are based on allegations concerning Plaintiff’s access to court proceedings and 9 seek prospective, non-monetary relief. The Court adopts the reasoning of the R&R. 10 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Conspiracy 11 Judge DeMarchi liberally construed the SAC as a request for leave to assert a new claim 12 for conspiracy. The R&R found that Plaintiff should not be given leave to assert a claim for 13 violation of § 1985(3) for several reasons: (1) the claim is barred by absolute judicial immunity; 14 (2) Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are highly conclusory; (3) the SAC does not state a 15 cognizable § 1985(3) claim; and (4) at least one court within the Ninth Circuit has concluded that 16 § 1985(3) may not be used as a vehicle to enforce rights under the ADA because the ADA is a 17 comprehensive statute with its own remedial structure. See, e.g., Serris v. Chastaine, No. 2:22-cv- 18 0434-JAM-CKD PS, 2022 WL 2133900, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2022).2 19 Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are highly conclusory and thus insufficient to state a 20 claim. See Steshenko v. Gayrard, 70 F. Supp. 979, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“A mere allegation of 21 conspiracy is insufficient to state a claim.”). Plaintiff does not allege any facts that plausibly 22 support a claim for conspiracy. Instead, Plaintiff essentially alleges that Judge Kuhnle and 23 Commissioner Heaberlin “acted with discriminatory animus based on Plaintiff’s disability” and 24 25 2 See also Steshenko v. Gayrard, 70 F. Supp. 979, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Where a statute both 26 creates a right and provides a remedial structure, a plaintiff may not use § 1985(3) to circumvent the statutory enforcement scheme.”); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002) 27 (holding that the comprehensive remedial scheme of Title II of the ADA barred a claim under 1 that “Judge Kuhnle, Commissioner Heaberlin, and Attorney Diana Romanovska conspired to 2 deprive Plaintiff of equal protection under the law, violating 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).” ECF No. 10. 3 Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy. Accordingly, the 4 Court adopts the R&R’s reasoning and denies Plaintiff’s request for leave to assert an additional 5 claim for conspiracy. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 Consistent with Judge DeMarchi’s R&R, and with this Court’s own review, the Court: 8 1. Dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without further leave to amend 9 (Claims 1-4). 10 2. Dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and retaliation/coercion under the ADA 11 without further leave to amend, except to the extent the claims are based on allegations 12 concerning Plaintiff’s access to court proceedings and seek prospective, non-monetary 13 relief (Claims 5, 6). 14 3. Requires that, should Plaintiff choose to proceed, Plaintiff may only file a third amended 15 complaint consistent with the Court’s findings, namely a complaint that is limited to an 16 ADA discrimination claim and retaliation/coercion claim concerning access to court 17 proceedings for prospective, non-monetary relief. Plaintiff may only file a third amended 18 complaint if Plaintiff has prospective relief available, meaning Plaintiff has ongoing 19 proceedings before either Judge Kuhnle or Commissioner Heaberlin in state court. 20 4. Denies Plaintiff’s request for leave to assert a new claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 21 § 1985(3) (Claim 7). 22 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 1 If Plaintiff has a viable remaining ADA claim, consistent with the terms of this Order, and 2 || he elects to proceed with that limited claim, he must file a third amended complaint by March 18, 3 2026. Plaintiff is not permitted to add new claims or parties without seeking leave of court. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 || Dated: February 25, 2026 ‘ . Noél Wise 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 1] as 12

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