UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CARLOS ORELLANA-ESCOBAR,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 24-1767 (RDM)
JESSE FERNANDEZ, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Carlos Orellana-Escobar, proceeding pro se, brings this case against the District
of Columbia and multiple D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers under both
federal and District law. Orellana-Escobar alleges that Defendants violated his rights during a
March 25, 2024, arrest for public consumption of marijuana—conduct that, he insists, only
constituted a civil violation rather than a criminal offense. Dkt. 16 at 2 (Am. Compl.). The
Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Orellana-Escobar’s original complaint, but it did so
without prejudice and invited Plaintiff to file an amended complaint with more detailed factual
allegations in support of his claims. Min. Entry (Apr. 30, 2025).
Plaintiff has now filed an amended complaint, Dkt. 16 (Am. Compl.), and Defendants
have once again moved to dismiss, Dkt. 17. Defendants argue, among other things, that
Orellana-Escobar has failed plausibly to allege that his arrest was discriminatory, id. at 9–13; that
he has not identified any other basis for a violation of his due process rights, id. at 13–15; that his
arrest was supported by probable cause given his unconcealed, criminal conduct, id. at 16–17;
and that the accompanying search of his vehicle was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 17–19. The Court issued a Fox/Neal Order directing Orellana-Escobar to respond to the
motion, Dkt. 18, and he filed an opposition, Dkt. 20.
Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint suffers from the same deficiencies as his original
complaint, deficiencies that Plaintiff has failed to redress despite the opportunity to do so, the
Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s operative complaint, Dkt. 16
(Am. Compl.), which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of resolving the pending motion
to dismiss.
Orellana-Escobar is a resident of the District of Columbia of Salvadoran origin who
works on construction sites “laying . . . heavy metal rebar in large building foundations.” Id. at
3–4 & 3 n.1 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8). Because of a shoulder injury sustained on the job, he
occasionally uses marijuana as a treatment for chronic pain. Id. at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9). On
the afternoon of March 25, 2024, Orellana-Escobar and another man, Erick Cruz, were smoking
a hand-rolled marijuana cigarette in Orellana-Escobar’s car on 14th Street N.W., near Lyman’s
Tavern. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11). MPD Officer Fernandez approached the car from the driver’s
side, asked Orellana-Escobar (in Spanish) about the marijuana cigarette, and reached through the
open window to grab it. Id. at 4–5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 11). Officer Fernandez then reviewed both
Orellana-Escobar’s and Cruz’s identification information (Orellana-Escobar produced a District
of Columbia driver’s license, while Cruz had an identification card from the Republic of El
Salvador), and his partner ran a check of the car’s license and registration, which came back
clean. Id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 12).
2 Officer Fernandez then asked Orellana-Escobar for permission to search the vehicle. Id
(Am. Compl. ¶ 13). When Orellana-Escobar refused, Officer Fernandez ordered both occupants
to exit the car, handcuffed Orellana-Escobar, and “informed him he was under arrest for ‘Public
Consumption of Marijuana on Public Space.’” Id. Officer Fernandez then searched the vehicle
but found no contraband, and the police allowed Cruz to leave the area. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–
14). Following the search, the MPD officers drove Orellana-Escobar to the Fourth Division
Police Station—without allowing him to lock his car, which contained various tools used for his
work—where he was fingerprinted and photographed before being released with a criminal
citation and an order to appear in D.C. Superior Court on April 18, 2024. Id. (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 15–17). When Orellana-Escobar arrived in Superior Court on that date, he was told that the
charge had been dismissed. Id. at 6 (Am. Compl. ¶ 18).
Proceeding pro se, Orellana-Escobar then filed a complaint in D.C. Superior Court
against Officer Fernandez, both individually and in his official capacity, and against the District
of Columbia. Dkt. 1-1 (Compl.). In that complaint, Orellana-Escobar alleged that Officer
Fernandez “engaged in . . . invidious discriminatory animus” by citing him for public
consumption of marijuana—conduct that, Orellana-Escobar alleged, constituted only a “civil
misdemeanor” in the District of Columbia. Id. at 5 (Compl. ¶ 11) (citation modified). He also
alleged that Officer Fernandez unlawfully searched his car and intentionally caused him
emotional distress and that the District had “failed to properly hire, train, and supervise [Officer]
Fernandez.” Id. at 5–6 (Compl. ¶¶ 12–15).
Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Dkt. 1.
Orellana-Escobar objected to removal, arguing that the case raised only questions of D.C.
cannabis law and did not concern federal law, Dkt. 5 at 1–2, which the Court construed as a
3 motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Min. Order (July 15, 2024). Following
additional briefing, the Court denied that motion to remand because Orellana-Escobar’s
complaint alleged a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Min. Order
(Sep. 1, 2024).
Defendants then moved to dismiss the complaint, Dkt. 9, and Orellana-Escobar opposed
the motion, Dkt. 11. The Court granted the motion on the record at a hearing on April 30, 2025.
Min. Entry (Apr. 30, 2025). The Court explained that the allegations that Officer Fernandez was
motivated by discriminatory animus were wholly conclusory; that Orellana-Escobar’s alleged
treatment did not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress; that the complaint’s allegations suggested that Officer Fernandez
did, in fact, have probable cause to arrest Orellana-Escobar for public consumption of marijuana,
a criminal misdemeanor; that the complaint failed to include sufficient factual allegations in
support of the claim that Officer Fernandez’s search of Plaintiff’s car violated the Fourth
Amendment; and that Orellana-Escobar did not appear to have given the District of Columbia
adequate notice of the suit. Apr. 30, 2025 Hrg. Tr. (Rough at 12–20). The Court, however,
dismissed the complaint without prejudice and permitted Orellana-Escobar to file an amended
complaint with additional factional allegations. Min. Entry (Apr. 30, 2025).
Orellana-Escobar filed an amended complaint, Dkt. 16 (Am. Compl.), naming as
defendants Officer Fernandez, Officer Fernandez’s unidentified police partner, and Officer
Mario A. Amador, the MPD officer who processed Plaintiff’s arrest at the Fourth Division Police
Station, in both their personal and official capacities, as well as the District of Columbia, id. at 3
4 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–6).1 Although his pleadings are difficult to parse, Orellana-Escobar appears
to raise the following claims:
First, he alleges that Officer Fernandez’s decision to arrest him, but not Cruz, constituted
intentional discrimination in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act
(“DCHRA”) and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 7 (Am. Compl.
¶ 28). Plaintiff also alleges that his arrest was unlawfully discriminatory given Officer
Fernandez’s failure to arrest other persons who had allegedly been observed smoking marijuana
in public “in and around Lyman’s Tavern and other similar establishments” in the District. Id. at
8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 29). More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Fernandez intended to
target him because of Plaintiff’s Salvadoran national origin. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30).
Second, Plaintiff alleges that the subsequent processing of his arrest at the Fourth
Division police station and the issuance of a criminal citation violated his rights to due process
and equal protection under the DCHRA and the U.S. Constitution. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30).2
Third, he alleges that the District of Columbia has “promulgated conflicting official
notices, regulations, statutes, codes and modes of punishments” that “variously hold[] that
smoking marijuana in a public space is a civil misdemeanor, a criminal misdemeanor, not
punishable by either a fine or jail time, to punishment including a jail sentence of up to 60 days,
a mandatory order to appear in court, and a criminal arrest record.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31).
Plaintiff does not cite to any statute or constitutional provision, other than the D.C. cannabis
regulations themselves, that he believes is implicated by this claim. Id.
1 The Court will dismiss the official-capacity suits against the relevant MPD officers as duplicative of the claims against the District itself. See Jones v. Quintana, 658 F. Supp. 2d 183, 195 (D.D.C. 2009). 2 Plaintiff’s complaint includes two paragraphs numbered “30.” Dkt. 16 at 8 (Am. Compl.).
5 Notably, unlike his original complaint in this case, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does
not include an allegation under the header “LEGAL CLAIMS” asserting that the search of his
car was unlawful. Id. at 7–8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–31); cf. Dkt. 1-1 at 5 (Compl. ¶ 12) (“[Officer]
Fernandez violated Orellana-Escobar’s right to be free from illegal search when [Officer]
Fernandez conducted a thorough search of Orellana-Escobar’s car after Orellana-Escobar denied
his verbal request to a consensual search.”). The amended complaint also omits the allegations
from the original complaint asserting that “[Officer] Fernandez, with malice aforethought,
caused Orellana-Escobar intentional emotional distress;” that “[Officer] Fernandez knowingly
placed Orellana-Escobar under false arrest;” and that the District “failed to properly hire, train,
and supervise [Officer] Fernandez.” Compare Dkt. 1-1 at 5–6 (Compl. ¶¶ 13–15), with Dkt. 16
at 7–8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–31).
Plaintiff requests, among other relief, a declaration that the District’s cannabis regulations
“lead to absurd results and ad hoc arrest decisions in the field” and cause officers to “criminalize
what was always intended . . . to be a civil offense” and “have led to various modes of capricious
enforcement . . . purposefully designed to impede individuals like Orellana-Escobar[] to their
legal access to medical cannabis consumption;” a declaration that his arrest violated his right to
due process and equal protection; and damages. Id. at 9 (Am. Compl.).
In response, Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. Dkt. 17. The Court issued a Fox/Neal order, Dkt. 18, and Plaintiff opposed
Defendants’ motion, Dkt. 20. After the motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Plaintiff filed a
“Notice and Declaration” on September 15, 2025, asserting that Cruz had been arrested in
August 2025 by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. Dkt. 23 at 1.
Plaintiff asked the Court to order Defendants to return Cruz to the District of Columbia given
6 Cruz’s status as a witness in this case. Id. at 1, 3. Following Defendants’ representation that the
District of Columbia had no involvement in Cruz’s alleged arrest, Dkt. 24 at 1, and noting that
Plaintiff’s own filings claimed that Cruz was detained by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, which is not a party to this case, the Court found no basis for any judicial action
concerning Cruz’s arrest or detention. Min. Order (Oct. 10, 2025); Min. Order (Dec. 5, 2025).
Defendants’ second motion to dismiss is now before the Court.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”3 Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). A court must consider the whole complaint,
accepting factual allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). But a court “need not accept as
true ‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’ nor inferences that are unsupported by
the facts set out in the complaint.” Laughlin v. Holder, 923 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (D.D.C. 2013)
(quoting Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The Court may dismiss a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) with or without prejudice, but “[t]he standard for dismissing a
complaint with prejudice is high,” Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 131 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (citation modified), and should be granted “only when a trial court determines that the
3 Because the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court need not address Defendants’ alternative motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
7 allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the
deficiency,” Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
In applying these standards, moreover, courts must be mindful that pro se filings are “to
be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (citation modified).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Probable Cause for Arrest
The Court first addresses a foundational, erroneous premise that underpins Plaintiff’s
complaint and briefing. Plaintiff repeatedly argues that his undisputed conduct, the public
consumption of marijuana, constituted only a civil violation and did not justify a lawful arrest.
Dkt. 16 at 4, 8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 30); Dkt. 20 at 6–7. As the Court explained at the prior
hearing in this case, Apr. 30, 2025 Hrg. Tr. (Rough at 15), Plaintiff is mistaken.
D.C. law provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other District law, it is unlawful for any
person to smoke or otherwise consume marijuana in or upon a public space,” which includes in
“[a] vehicle in or upon any street, alley, park, or parking area,” and that a person who violates
that statute “shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a
fine . . . or imprisoned for not more than 60 days.” D.C. Code § 48-911.01; see also The Facts
on DC Marijuana Laws, Metro. Police Dep’t D.C., https://perma.cc/V8F6-TE4B. Although
other provisions of D.C. law permit adults to use and to possess two ounces or less of marijuana
and to grow marijuana plants in their own homes, D.C. Code § 48-904.01(a)(1)(A)–(D), it is
apparent that Plaintiff’s own admitted conduct, smoking marijuana in a car parked on a public
street, Dkt. 16 at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 11), constituted a criminal offense. The Court does not doubt
that the prohibition on the public consumption of marijuana often goes unenforced in the 8 District, and the Court is prepared to assume, for present purposes, that Plaintiff was legitimately
confused about whether the public consumption of marijuana in the District constituted a crime.
As a legal matter, however, it is clear that Orellana-Escobar’s conduct violated the D.C. criminal
code and that, because he committed a misdemeanor in plain view of an MPD officer, his arrest
was lawful. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in
his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”).
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff’s amended complaint can be construed to re-
assert the claim for false arrest that Plaintiff included in his original complaint, Dkt. 1-1 at 5
(Compl. ¶ 14), that claim fails as a matter of law, see Harris v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 776
F.3d 907, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The existence of probable cause for arrest defeats claims for
false arrest and imprisonment.”); see also Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (“Constitutional and common law claims of false arrest are generally analyzed as
though they comprise a single cause of action.”). Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff’s
amended complaint alleges that his arrest for conduct that, he believed, constituted only a civil
infraction violated Plaintiff’s due process rights, that claim also fails as a matter of law. See
United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Generally . . . ignorance of the
law does not serve as an excuse for criminal conduct.”). The Court will, therefore, dismiss both
such claims.
The Court will also dismiss any claim alleging that the District of Columbia’s criminal
prohibition on the public consumption of marijuana is void for vagueness. “A law is vague when
‘it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that
it invites arbitrary enforcement.’” United States v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101, 1106 (D.C. Cir.
9 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015)). The
District’s express prohibition on “smok[ing] or otherwise consum[ing] marijuana in or upon a
public space,” including in “[a] vehicle in or upon any street, alley, park, or parking area,” D.C.
Code § 48-911.01(a), is not void for vagueness, even when considered alongside other provisions
of D.C. law that otherwise permit the possession of small quantities of marijuana.
B. Discriminatory Arrest
The Court turns next to Plaintiff’s claim that his discriminatory arrest, based on his
Salvadoran national origin, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.4 Dkt.
16 at 7–8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–30). The D.C. Circuit has identified “at least three ways a plaintiff
can plead an equal protection violation.” Rothe Dev., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 57, 63
(D.C. Cir. 2016). First, a plaintiff might “allege that the government has expressly classified
individuals based on their [national origin].” Id. Second, a plaintiff might allege “that the
government has applied facially neutral laws or policies in an intentionally discriminatory
manner.” Id. Third, a plaintiff might allege “that facially neutral laws or policies ‘result in
[national-origin-based] disproportionate impact and are motivated by a [nationality-based]
discriminatory purpose.’” Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 213
(1995)). The first possibility, express classification based on national origin, is not at issue in
this case; for obvious reasons, Plaintiff does not allege that the D.C. law is facially
discriminatory. See generally Dkt. 16 (Am. Compl.); see also D.C. Code § 48-911.01(a)
4 Plaintiff’s amended complaint raises equal protection (and due process) claims under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Dkt. 16 at 7–8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–30). Because the District of Columbia is not a state, the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are inapplicable to this case. United States v. Jackson, 553 F.2d 109, 119 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 645 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Court, accordingly, addresses his constitutional claims only under the Fifth Amendment.
10 (providing that “it is unlawful for any person to smoke or otherwise consume marijuana in or
upon a public space,” with no express national origin classification). Nor does Plaintiff allege,
let alone support with sufficient, specific factual allegations, that the District’s facially neutral
marijuana regulations were enacted with a purpose of discriminating against Salvadoran
nationals. The Court, accordingly, will construe Plaintiff’s amended complaint as seeking to
proceed under the second theory, alleging that the MPD officers enforced the District’s
marijuana laws against him in an intentionally discriminatory manner based on his Salvadoran
national origin. See Dkt. 16 at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 30) (alleging that “after [Officer] Fernandez and
his police partner determined that Orellana-Escobar was a Salvadoran,” they “selected Orellana-
Escobar for a particular incident of intentional discrimination based on nationality”).
Plaintiff has failed plausibly to allege that Officer Fernandez targeted him based on his
Salvadoran nationality. Insofar as the amended complaint simply alleges that Officer
Fernandez’s action “was a purposeful incident of invidious discrimination,” Dkt. 16 at 8 (Am.
Compl. ¶ 30), that allegation is wholly conclusory and, thus, is “not entitled to be assumed true”
for purposes of resolving the pending motion to dismiss, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. Plaintiff has
failed to plead any facts that might “give rise to a plausible inference that [his] arrest was the
result of unconstitutional discrimination.” Id. at 682. In both his complaint and his brief in
opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff suggests, at most, that Officer Fernandez
might have been aware of his Salvadoran national origin. Plaintiff claims, for example, that
“[Officer] Fernandez was speaking a dialect of Dominican Spanish,” and he suggests that,
because native Spanish speakers can identify a fellow Spanish speaker’s “country of origin from
the manner of speech,” Officer Fernandez would have known of Plaintiff’s Salvadoran national
origin from their conversation prior to the arrest. Dkt. 20 at 5–6.
11 But even assuming that Officer Fernandez knew (or inferred) that Orellana-Escobar was
Salvadoran, that knowledge would not, standing alone, support a plausible inference that Officer
Fernandez arrested Orellana-Escobar based on an anti-Salvadoran prejudice—just as, for
example, the fact that Officer Fernandez (presumably) knew that Orellana-Escobar was male
would not by itself support a plausible claim that the arrest was attributable to gender
discrimination. Plaintiff acknowledges, moreover, that the MPD officers allowed Cruz to leave
the scene without arrest despite knowing (or inferring) that Cruz was also Salvadoran. Dkt. 20 at
6. Although Plaintiff, confusingly, suggests that Officer Fernandez’s failure to arrest Cruz for
the same offense implies that Plaintiff’s own arrest was motivated by nationality-based animus,
id., the fact that the MPD officers did not act against another Salvadoran present at the scene is at
odds with Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants’ conduct was attributable to anti-Salvadoran animus.
Plaintiff also appears to allege that Officer Fernandez’s decision to arrest Plaintiff, but
not any of the other individuals who routinely smoke marijuana in public around Lyman’s
Tavern and other locations in the District, violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
Dkt. 16 at 7–8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29). To the degree that this claim is distinguishable from the
claim of anti-Salvadoran animus discussed above, it would present a “class of one” equal
protection claim. “A ‘class of one’ equal protection claim may be maintained ‘where the
plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” XP Vehicles, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, 118 F. Supp. 3d 38, 75 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)). Courts accord deference to the government when
resolving such claims. The plaintiff must both identify others similarly situated and, in light of
the presumption of rationality that applies to government action on the posture of rational basis
12 review, “negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to clear that high hurdle,
even at this early stage of the litigation. The amended complaint alleges that “marijuana is
regularly consumed by some of the patrons who frequent Lyman’s Tavern, and several other
restaurants in the area,” and it alleges in conclusory terms that Officer Fernandez “arrested
Orellana-Escobar, while ignoring other people who were and are smoking cannabis in [his]
presence and/or jurisdiction.” Dkt. 16 at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 27). For at least two reasons, those
allegations do not suffice. First, Plaintiff does not allege with any factual specificity that he was
similarly situated to other individuals whom MPD has permitted to consume marijuana in public
in the District. He does not allege that he was arrested while smoking in the smoking area of
Lyman’s Tavern or any other restaurant and does not allege that any of the other, unnamed
individuals who avoided arrest were smoking marijuana in a car on a public street. Second,
Plaintiff does not allege in a non-conclusory fashion that Officer Fernandez, or any other MPD
officer, witnessed any other individual smoking marijuana in public but declined to arrest that
individual. The complaint alleges, for example, that Cruz and Orellana-Escobar were smoking a
cannabis cigarette prior to the arrest, Dkt. 16 at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 11), and that Officer Fernandez,
approaching the car from the driver’s side (where, presumably, Orellana-Escobar, the owner of
the car, was sitting) seized the cigarette through that window. But it does not allege that Officer
Fernandez witnessed Cruz smoking at the time he approached the car or that Cruz was not also
Salvadoran, id. In any event, there is certainly a rational basis (assuming that Plaintiff does not
contend that the MPD discriminated in favor of Cruz and against Plaintiff based on anti-
13 Salvadoran animus) to distinguish between someone sitting in the driver’s seat of a car under the
influence and others who pose a less obvious risk of driving under the influence.
Plaintiff’s “class of one” claim thus reduces to a general complaint that other individuals
routinely succeed in violating the law that Plaintiff was arrested for breaking. Because it is
inevitable that law enforcement will not arrest everyone who commits a criminal offense, that
cannot be enough, by itself, to allege a plausible equal protection violation.
Finally, Plaintiff makes similar allegations of a violation of his equal protection rights
under the DCHRA. It is unclear that the DCHRA’s language, which provides that the District
may not “limit or refuse to provide any facility, service, program, or benefit to any individual on
the basis of an individual’s . . . national origin,” D.C. Code. § 2-1402.73, applies to a claim for
discriminatory arrest. The Court is unaware of any case applying the DCHRA—which generally
concerns employment, housing, public accommodations, and education, see id. § 2-1402.01 et
seq.—to a claim of police misconduct of this type, and Plaintiff does not identify any such case
in his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In any event, the Court need not reach the
question of whether the DCHRA would prohibit Plaintiff’s arrest on the basis of his national
origin because, for the reasons explained above, Plaintiff has failed plausibly to allege that such
discriminatory intent motivated his arrest in this case. See Morris v. District of Columbia, 313
A.3d 545, 551 (D.C. 2024) (DCHRA requires alleging “discriminatory animus or a culture of
discrimination”).
C. Additional Claims
1. Unlawful Search
At the hearing on Defendants’ previous motion to dismiss, the Court suggested that
Plaintiff’s unlawful search claim “presents the closest and most difficult question,” Apr. 30, 2025
Hrg. Tr. (Rough at 17), but ultimately concluded that the claim lacked sufficient detail or support
14 to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court invited Plaintiff, however, to file an
amended complaint with more detailed factual allegations identifying which portions of the car
were searched, sufficient to allow the Court to determine whether Plaintiff had plausibly alleged
that Officer Fernandez had exceeded Fourth Amendment restrictions on vehicle searches
incident to arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (“Police may search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.”).
Plaintiff apparently declined this invitation. Rather than supplement his allegations, the
“LEGAL CLAIMS” portion of Plaintiff’s amended complaint omits entirely his previous claim
that Defendants “violated Orellana-Escobar’s right to be free from illegal search.” Compare
Dkt. 1-1 at 5 (Compl. ¶ 12), with Dkt. 16 at 7–8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–31). Instead, Plaintiff
merely alleges, in a conclusory fashion in the introductory statement of his amended complaint,
that MPD officers “engaged Orellana-Escobar in an illegal search.” Dkt. 16 at 2 (Am. Compl.).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint can thus be read as abandoning the Fourth Amendment unlawful
search claim, which appeared in his original complaint. But even if the claim were not
abandoned, Plaintiff has failed to include the additional, specific factual allegations that the
Court explained were necessary plausibly to allege a Fourth Amendment violation in light of his
lawful arrest for public consumption of marijuana in his car. The amended complaint avers only
that Officer Fernandez “returned to Orellana-Escobar’s vehicle and searched it” following the
arrest. Id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 13). Without more detail, the Court must once again conclude
that Plaintiff has failed plausibly to allege that the search of his car exceeded the lawful,
15 warrantless search of the portions of the vehicle that Officer Fernandez would have reasonably
believed contained evidence of the offense. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 339.
2. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision
Plaintiff’s original complaint also alleged that “[t]he District of Columbia, as a
municipality, failed to properly hire, train, and supervise [Officer] Fernandez” and that this
failure “resulted in Orellana-Escobar being cited for a criminal felony when [Officer] Fernandez
knew or should have known that no criminal act had occurred.” Dkt. 1-1 at 5–6 (Compl. ¶ 15).
As with the claim for unlawful search discussed above, this claim does not appear in the
amended complaint, aside from a conclusory statement in the introduction that “[c]laims are
asserted against the District of Columbia for the negligent hiring, training, and supervising of
[Officer] Fernandez, his police partner, and Mario A[.] Amador, the arrest processing officer
who un-cuffed, finger-printed, photographed, and issued a criminal citation for an offense that is
civil, not criminal.” Dkt. 16 at 2 (Am. Compl.).
To the extent that the claim has not been abandoned, and does not independently fail
given its reliance on Plaintiff’s erroneous belief that the public consumption of marijuana does
not constitute a criminal offense in the District of Columbia, the claim must be dismissed
because Plaintiff does not plausibly allege any “dangerous or otherwise incompetent” conduct by
any MPD officer, let alone that the District, as employer, “knew or should have known” of such
behavior. Spiller v. District of Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 240, 254 (D.D.C 2025) (quoting Giles
v. Shell Oil Corp., 487 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1985)). Nor does Plaintiff offer any non-conclusory
allegations regarding how the hiring of any of the officers involved was negligent.
16 3. Preliminary Injunction
Finally, Plaintiff requests for the first time in his opposition that the Court issue a
preliminary injunction. Dkt. 20 at 13–14. The precise scope of the requested preliminary
injunction is unclear, but Plaintiff appears to ask that the Court enjoin the District from enforcing
the cannabis regulations that, Orellana-Escobar believes, are self-contradictory. Id.
The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. First, Plaintiff’s
request is procedurally improper because it seeks relief that was not requested in the operative
complaint and was not made in a separate motion. See LCvR 65.1(c) (“An application for a
preliminary injunction shall be made in a document separate from the complaint.”). Second,
Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits of any
of his claims, for the reasons the Court explained above. See Greater New Orleans Fair Hous.
Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 639 F.3d 1078, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[w]hen a
plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, there is no need to consider the
remaining factors” for a preliminary injunction).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 17, is hereby
GRANTED. Moreover, because Plaintiff has twice failed to plead facts sufficient to support his
claims and, after receiving guidance from the Court regarding the deficiencies in his complaint,
has failed to overcome the fundamental legal flaws in his case, the Court will dismiss the
amended complaint with prejudice.
A separate order will issue.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge Date: January 21, 2026