Oregon

133 F. 609, 68 C.C.A. 603, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4453
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 7, 1904
DocketNo. 1,031
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 133 F. 609 (Oregon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oregon, 133 F. 609, 68 C.C.A. 603, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4453 (9th Cir. 1904).

Opinions

MORROW, Circuit Judge,

after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The first objection urged by the appellants is directed to the action of the court in making the order allowing the libelants to join in and together prosecute an action in rem against the vessel. The court recited in its order that it appeared from the libels that the claims of each of the libelants were similar in all respects, but the controlling fact was that it was a proceeding in rem. This action of the court is sanctioned by authority. In the case of The Prinz Georg (D. C.) 19 Fed. 653, numerous libelants were steerage passengers on the defendant’s vessel on a voyage from Palermo to the port of New Orleans. These libelants were all joined in one suit to recover the penalty against the vessel provided by the act of August 2, 1884, c. 374, 22 Stat. 186, and for the recovery of further damages. The claimants of the vessel interposed an exception to the libel on the ground of misjoinder of parties. The court, in overruling the exception, said:

“Where a thing is defendant and several persons are asserting rights in it, distinct, but before the same tribunal, the proceedings are, for certain purposes, necessarily to be considered together; i. e., whenever it is necessary to rank the claims or to proportion the proceeds. This would happen whenever the proceeds should be insufficient to pay all the claims in full. Again, when, as in this case, the claims rest upon a charge of a voluntary withholding of provisions, etc., the cases necessarily involve a common question, viz., whether an adequate supply of provisions was originally laden on board. The case is therefore analogous to cases of salvage or collision in this respect, and for this reason the joinder would be permissible. But I think the joinder is allowed even in cases which are in their origin distinct, and have no connection save that they are asserted against a common res. When there is a suit in rem, it is a prerequisite of jurisdiction that there should be a warrant and a seizure. In these cases there must be either the expense of GO seizures, or there must be a joinder that one seizure may arrest for all the claims. Therefore the joinder is allowed. The difficulties of answering and defending are not enhanced, and the expense is reduced. It is for this reason, also, that the statute permits that suits separately commenced may be consolidated by the court when they are ‘of a like nature or relative to the same question.’ Act [616]*616July 22, 1813, c. 14, 3 Stat. 21; Rev. St. § 921 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 685]. Judge Ware, speaking of unconnected claims of materialmen, thus lays down the rule: ‘Being maritime liens, there is no doubt that they may he enforced by process in the admiralty, where all may join and have their rights settled in a single suit, or may intervene for their own interest, after a libel has been filed, and have the whole matter disposed of in or under one proceeding, or one attachment, instead of having as many suits as there are creditors.’ The Hull of a New Ship, 2 Ware (Dav. 199), 203, 205, Fed. Cas. No. 6,859. See, also, Judge Bett’s opinion in The Childe Harold, where the same rule was followed, Olc. 275, Fed. Cas. No. 2,676. The objection is, not that the cause of each libelant is not distinctly and issuably stated, but that they are all stated in one pleading, and are, in their nature, separate causes of action accruing to distinct persons. In other suits the ruling might be very different, but in a proceeding in rem, in the admiralty, this is not irregular or unauthorized, and the exception must be overruled.”

The action of the court in consolidating the numerous libels in this case was so clearly in accordance with established admiralty practice that it should be commended as eminently just and proper for all parties concerned.

Counsel for claimant contend in their last brief that they do not claim that the court was in error in allowing the libelants to join together in one libel, but that the objection was that the libelants had no community of interest, and that the damage sustained by each libelant should have been proven separately; that the court had no right to assume that the libelants who did not testify had suffered any damages whatever. There is nothing in this objection, considered from any point of view. There is no rule of law or procedure requiring libelants in admiralty or plaintiffs in any case to testify in their own behalf, and one case may be submitted upon the testimony taken in another case involving the same facts, as is frequently done. Moreover, the claimants are not in a position to raise this objection, since it was upon their objection that the court on December 7, 1903, entered an order requiring the libelants to cease taking testimony as to individual libelants, on the ground that it would necessarily be cumulative. Furthermore, the objection can only be directed against judgments entered in favor of certain libelants who are not identified or pointed out by the objection or the assignment of errors, except by the statement that a number of libelants did not testify, and a reference to the index of the testimony for the names of those who did testify. If the claimant had such objection to decrees being entered in favor of any particular libelants, he should have named them in his objection, and pointed out the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decrees. We cannot sustain the objection as here presented.

It was next objected that it was error on the part of the court to entertain the libels verified by the proctor. It appears from the record that 155 libelants signed the libel, and severally and separately verified the same, and that the names of 145 libelants (excluding duplicate signatures), whose names appeared in the caption of the libel, were signed by the proctor, and by him verified, under an order of the court permitting such signature and verification. We do not think this practice should be encouraged, "but under the circumstances of this case we cannot say that the [617]*617court was in error in making the order, upon the showing that the libelants were absent from the state of Washington, as appears from the recital contained in the order.

The pleadings present two questions upon the merits: First, whether the vessel was in a seaworthy condition when she set out on her voyage from Nome to Seattle; and, second, whether the officers and agents of the vessel were guilty of negligence in failing to keep the vessel in a cleanly condition, and to supply the libelants with suitable accommodations and a sufficient quantity of wholesome food and provisions for the voyage. The contract involved in this case is a contract for the carriage of passengers, with respect to which the carrier is not an insurer, as would be the case if the contract were for the carriage of goods. In the latter case the carrier is liable absolutely for goods lost or destroyed, unless such loss or destruction is occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy. In the former case the carrier is liable only on the ground of negligence. 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 222. In the leading case of Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181, 191, 10 L. Ed. 115, the distinction between these two classes of contracts is stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, as follows:

“It is certainly a sound principle that a contract to carry passengers differs from a contract to carry goods. For the goods the carrier is answerable, at all events, except the act of God and the public enemy.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
133 F. 609, 68 C.C.A. 603, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oregon-ca9-1904.