Order on Motion - Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State

Opinion

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ALDIN ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT ET AL.

(SC 21103)

The defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal, having been presented to the court, it is hereby ordered that the motion is granted, the appeal is dismissed , and the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court pertaining to the plaintiff’s writ of mandamus are vacated.

August 26, 2026

PER CURIAM. The defendants, the state of Connecticut and the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection (commissioner), move to dismiss the certified appeal of the plaintiff, Aldin Associates Limited Partnership, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying the plaintiff’s request for a writ of mandamus. The plaintiff sought issuance of the writ to compel the defendants to pay the plaintiff’s approved claims pursuant to the underground storage tank petroleum clean-up program (program), which was administered by the commissioner and governed by a statutory scheme codified at General Statutes § 22a-449a et seq. The defendants argue that the appeal is moot because of legislation that repealed the program. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendants, grant their motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal, and vacate the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court pertaining to the plaintiff’s writ of mandamus.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff commenced this action in 2019, alleging unreasonable delays in the processing of its applications for payment under the program. Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State, 209 Conn. App. 741, 746, 269 A.3d 790 (2022) (Aldin I). In its original complaint, the plaintiff sought (1) a writ of mandamus to compel both payment for its approved claims and adjudication of its pending claims, (2) monetary damages based on allegations of the commissioner’s delays and violation of the plaintiff’s rights to equal protection and due process under the Connecticut constitution, and (3) damages for an unlawful taking of its property. Id., 746–47. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Id., 747–49. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment only with respect to the mandamus count and remanded the case for further proceedings on that count. Id., 779. None of the parties appealed from the Appellate Court’s judgment in Aldin I.

“Following . . . remand, the plaintiff filed a single count, amended complaint seeking a writ of mandamus ‘ordering the commissioner to request the [state comptroller ] to make payments for [the plaintiff’s] approved claims . . . .’ ” Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State, 230 Conn. App. 223, 229, 330 A.3d 613 (2025) (Aldin II). The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for a writ of mandamus; id., 232; concluding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a complete and immediate right to be paid. See id., 236. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court; id., 224; which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id., 259.

The plaintiff filed a petition for certification to appeal to this court from the Appellate Court’s judgment in Aldin II, which we granted.1 After we granted 1 We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the plaintiff bore the sole burden of proof with respect to its entitlement to a writ of mandamus and that the trial court could not impose a burden shifting requirement consistent with the language of General Statutes § 22a-449c?” And (2) “[d]id the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court had properly found that the plaintiff was not entitled to a writ of mandamus when the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving that there were no pending reimbursement claims and, therefore, that funds were available to reimburse the plaintiff for its approved claims?” Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State, 351 Conn. 911, 330 A.3d 882 (2025).

certification, the legislature passed No. 25-168 of the 2025 Public Acts (P.A. 25-168), which cancelled all pending and approved applications pursuant to the program; see P.A. 25-168, § 152;2 and diverted all the remaining funds in the program to the general fund of the state. See P.A. 25-168, § 151.3 The 2025 legislation also repealed the program’s entire statutory scheme. See P.A. 25-168, § 158.4 As a result of this legislation, prior to briefing in this case, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal on the ground that it is moot. We then ordered, sua sponte, the parties to brief the following issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s certified appeal has been rendered moot, as argued in the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and (2) whether this court should vacate the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court if it grants the motion to dismiss.

We first consider whether the present appeal is moot. “[M]ootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve before we may reach the merits of an appeal. . . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the [parties] in any way.” (Citation omitted ; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guild, 353 Conn. 76, 85–86, 340 A.3d 451 (2025). 2 Public Act 25-168, § 152, provides: “Any application pending under the underground storage tank clean-up program, including, but not limited to, any application that was approved by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection but not yet paid, shall be deemed cancelled.”

3 Public Act 25-168, § 151, provides: “All amounts appropriated and remaining for the underground storage tank petroleum clean-up program shall be transferred and credited to the resources of the General Fund.”

4 Public Act 25-168, § 158, provides: “Sections 22a-449c to 22a-449g, inclusive, and sections 22a-449r and 22a-449t of the general statutes are repealed.”

The plaintiff does not challenge the defendants’ interpretation of P.A. 25-168, §§ 151 and 152, as cancelling its applications and defunding the very program under which the plaintiff seeks to compel payment through this mandamus action. The plaintiff argues, however, that P.A. 25-168, §§ 151 and 152, should not be read as rendering its appeal moot because dismissal would deprive it of vested property interests it holds in its applications that the commissioner already approved but has not yet paid. It further argues that the mootness issue “is inextricably intertwined” with the merits of its appeal and, therefore, should not be decided before the merits have been briefed. We are not persuaded.

The plaintiff’s appeal relates solely to its mandamus claim seeking payment from the defendants under the program. The certified issues concern the legal standards employed by the commissioner in administering the program and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the remedy of mandamus to compel payment pursuant to that program . See footnote 1 of this opinion. Public Act 25-168, §§ 151 and 152, as the plaintiff concedes, has cancelled its applications and defunded the program. Given that the plaintiff’s applications have been cancelled and the related funds transferred to the state’s general fund, this court can no longer mandate payment under the program. Therefore, even if the plaintiff could demonstrate that it is entitled to a writ of mandamus, this court could not grant relief because the plaintiff’s applications and the program’s funds no longer exist. Accordingly, we agree with the defendants that there is no longer any practical relief that we can grant the plaintiff in connection with its appeal and that the appeal has been rendered moot.

The plaintiff asserts that the appeal should not be dismissed as moot because this court could still address whether the provision in § 152 of P.A. 25-168 cancelling already approved applications effected an unlawful taking of its vested property interest in the funds. See footnote 2 of this opinion. We disagree. Whether P.A. 25-168, § 152, effected an unlawful taking was not litigated below and is not at issue in this appeal. Indeed, as we explained, P.A. 25-168 was passed after we granted certification to appeal. Therefore, any controversy involving the effect of that legislation is not properly before us. Properly understood, the plaintiff’s argument is not that the present appeal remains a live controversy despite the legislature’s passage of P.A. 25-168; it is that the legislature’s action simultaneously gave the plaintiff a new, separate legal claim for an unlawful taking. The existence of a new and different controversy, however, does not rescue the original controversy from mootness. See, e.g., Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State, 350 Conn. 753, 760–61, 326 A.3d 235 (2024) (“[m]ootness presents a circumstance [in which] the issue before the court has been resolved or ha[s] lost its significance” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); O’Bymachow v. O’Bymachow, 10 Conn. App. 76, 78, 521 A.2d 599 (1987) (upon modification of trial court’s judgment, “a different controversy will be presented and the court’s original action will be moot”).

For the same reason, we disagree with the plaintiff’s argument that the mootness issue “is inextricably intertwined ” with the merits of the present appeal and, therefore , should not be decided before the merits have been briefed. In the present case, the plaintiff seeks to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel payment through the program itself. Although related, a claim that the enactment of P.A. 25-168, § 152, resulted in an unlawful taking would involve facts that are beyond, and arose subsequent to, the pleadings in the present action, would involve a set of legal elements distinct from a mandamus action, and would potentially involve relief more in the nature of damages for the cancellation of the plaintiff’s applications rather than payment under the program. We need not consider the merits of the plaintiff’s argument that P.A. 25-168, § 152, effected an unlawful taking in order to determine that there is no practical relief that we can grant the plaintiff on the merits of the pending appeal.

Turning to the issue of vacatur, we conclude that the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court pertaining to the writ of mandamus should be vacated. “Vacatur is commonly utilized . . . to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences. . . . In determining whether to vacate a judgment that is unreviewable because of mootness, the principal issue is whether the party seeking relief from [that] judgment . . . caused the mootness by voluntary action. . . . A party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance , ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment. . . . The same is true when mootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below. . . . Application of the doctrine of vacatur eliminates the possibility, however remote or unlikely, that an otherwise moot decision might implicate some lingering or residual harm for the appellant, despite the lack of reasonably possible collateral consequences that otherwise would save the appeal from mootness.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guild, supra, 353 Conn. 94.

Here, the mootness of the plaintiff’s appeal was caused solely by the enactment of P.A. 25-168. Indeed, the defendants do “not contest that, in enacting P.A. 25-168, the legislature acted unilaterally in a manner that rendered Aldin II moot.” Additionally, there is no indication in the record, and the defendants do not assert, that the plaintiff caused the mootness in any way. We cannot say with absolute certainty that there is no possibility that the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court would result in some future detriment to the plaintiff. On the contrary, the plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to the motion to dismiss demonstrate its ongoing conviction that its rights have been violated by the state, most recently through the enactment of P.A. 25-168 itself. There remains at least a remote possibility that the plaintiff could suffer harm from the judgments rendered against it in Aldin II. Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiff that vacatur of the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court in Aldin II is warranted.

The same cannot be said for the judgments in Aldin I. There, review of the Appellate Court’s judgment was not rendered moot by some action of the legislature. Rather, the plaintiff chose not to seek review. Accordingly, there is no basis to vacate the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court in Aldin I.

The appeal is dismissed and the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court pertaining to the writ of mandamus are vacated.