Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Roth

159 S.W. 176
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 7, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 159 S.W. 176 (Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Roth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Roth, 159 S.W. 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 1913).

Opinion

CONNER, C. J.

On the 31st day of July, A. D. 1895, the Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, a fraternal organization, issued to Wm. Henry Roth its certificate of membership whereby the said Roth became a member in good standing, and whereby his beneficiary became entitled to receive, in event he should suffer, “during the continuance of his membership and while in good standing, bodily injury effected through external, violent, and accidental means, which alone should occasion death immediately or within six months from the happening thereof, a sum not exceeding $5,000, and the further sum of $1,300, the latter sum payable in weekly installments of $25 each, the constitution of the order providing ‘that payments authorized under the provisions’ of section 6 of said constitution ‘shall not cover or extend to any death, disability or loss * * * happening directly or indirectly in consequence of disease, or caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease * * * or by any surgical operation or medical or mechanical treatment * * * or to any case except where the injury is external, accidental, and the proximate and sole cause of the death, disability or loss.’ ” Roth died March 5, 1905, while a member in good standing, from paralysis caused by a blood clot in the fourth ventricle of his brain. Defendant having denied liability, this suit was instituted by appellee, Mrs. Jennie Roth, as surviving wife and beneficiary of W. H. Roth under his certificate of membership, and it was agreed that Mrs. Roth was entitled to recover, “providing she proves that he died as a result of accident, and in no other event.” A trial was had on the 2d day of February, 1912, before the court and a jury. Upon issues *177 submitted to them, such jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee, and judgment was rendered thereon in her favor, and against said order of United Commercial Travelers of America for the sum of $8,707.-35, with interest at 6 per cent, from date of judgment, from which judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal.

[1] Appellant’s first assignment is that “the court erred in that it refused to give special charge No. 1, requested by the defendant.” The special charge referred to in the assignment was a peremptory one in appellant’s favor. The assignment is objected to by appellee on the ground that it does not refer to that portion of the motion for a new trial in which the error attempted to be raised is complained of, as provided in rule 25 for the Courts of Civil Appeals (142 S. W. xii), but the objection under any construction of the rule seems now unavailing, in view of the amendment of Revised Statutes, article 1612, effective April 4, 1913 (Acts 33d Leg. e. 136), providing, among other things, that the motion for new trial itself, when one is filed, shall constitute the assignments of error. Here a motion for new trial was filed which contains a distinct specification of the error complained of, and which therefore is sufficient under the amendment.

[2] This brings us to a consideration of the assignment, and in the conclusion reached we all agree. Appellant insists in effect that if the evidence is not conclusive against plaintiff’s contention that W. H. Roth’s death was caused through external, violent, of accidental means, which alone and independent of all other causes brought about his death, it at least does not affirmatively show this fact with reasonable certainty, that the cause of his death at best is conjectural under the evidence, and that therefore, the burden of proof being upon the plaintiff, the peremptory instruction should have been given.

Before reviewing the testimony, it will 'be well to have in mind the precise manner in which the court submitted the issues. The court gave the following general charge:

“Gentlemen of the jury, if you believe from the evidence that on January 14, 1905, plaintiff’s husband, William Roth, accidentally fell upon the ice while skating, and that by reason of such fall his head struck the ice and was thereby injured, and that said injury to his head, if any, alone caused him to die within six months from the date of the happening of said accident, then you will find for the plaintiff in any sum not exceeding $5,000 with interest on the same at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from July 5, 1905, to the present time, and also the sum of $1,300, with interest on the same from July 5, 1906, to the present time at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum.

“The foregoing instruction is given subject to instructions hereinafter given you, in subsequent portions of this charge. If you do not believe from a preponderance of the evidence that William H. Roth sustained an accidental injury by his fall upon the ice, which alone caused his death within six months from the date of said accident, your verdict will be for the defendant.

“You are further instructed that if you believe from the evidence that the said William H. Roth died directly or indirectly or his death was caused, wholly or in part, in consequence of bodily infirmity or disease, you will find for the defendant.

“You are instructed that the burden is upon the plaintiff to make out her case by preponderance of the evidence, and unless she has done so, it will be your duty to find for the defendant. You are the exclusive judges of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and of the fact proved, but the law you will receive from the court, as herein given you in the charge, and be governed thereby.”

The court also gave at appellant’s request the following special instruction:

“You are instructed if from the evidence you cannot say with reasonable certainty whether said W. H. Roth came to his death by reason of his alleged fall, if any, upon the ice, or that his death was caused by natural causes, or wholly or partially as the result of disease or bodily infirmity, then you will fiiid the verdict for the defendant.”

The evidence is quite voluminous, and we will not undertake to do more than to briefly give its substance as we find it. As stated in the beginning, Roth was a member of the appellant order in good standing, when on the 15th day of January, 1905, he, together with a friend, repaired to a frozen lake some half mile or more from the town of Henryetta in Oklahoma, for the purpose of skating on the ice. There were a number of others on the lake or pond at the time and W. H. Roth and his friend, G. E. White by name, started off skating across the pond side by side, holding each other’s hands, and after skating some little distance their feet became entangled, and both fell; W. H. Roth falling, as one witness testifies, full length on his head and shoulders, with hands outstretched. White recovered himself, and assisted Roth to get up, but whether assistance was necessary does not certainly appear. Roth at the time complained only of an injury to his wrist. The evidence is not entirely certain as to whether the parties continued their skating. Some of the testimony indicates that they did so for something like half an hour. Another witness, however, gave it as his best recollection that White, after assisting Roth to arise, took off his skates, and they immediately left the pond. At all events, shortly after the fall White and Roth returned to Henryetta. On their return they were met by Mr. Sulling, *178 who testified that White said that Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
159 S.W. 176, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/order-of-united-commercial-travelers-of-america-v-roth-texapp-1913.