Order of the United Commercial Travelers of America v. Nicholson

9 F.2d 7, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2304
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJune 16, 1925
Docket152
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 9 F.2d 7 (Order of the United Commercial Travelers of America v. Nicholson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Order of the United Commercial Travelers of America v. Nicholson, 9 F.2d 7, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2304 (2d Cir. 1925).

Opinion

ROGERS, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). This action was brought to recover on an insurance certificate issued by the Order of the United Commercial Travelers of America, defendant herein, to Lewis Ostrander, wherein it insured him, among other things, against loss of life as the direct and proximate result of, and caused solely and exclusively by, external, violent, and accidental means, provided such loss should occur within 180 days after the accident which caused it. The insurance was for the amount of $6,300. The certificate provided that $5,000 of this sum should be paid within 90 days from the receipt by the Supreme Executive Committee of satisfactory and final proof of death, and the remaining $1,300 was to be paid in weekly installments of $25 each, beginning 90 days from the receipt of such final proof.

Lewis Ostrander, as a member of the defendant organization at the time of his death, had paid to it all dues and assessments, and *9 liad performed all the terms and conditions of the certificate which was issued to him, and each and every obligation and duty as a member of the order which he was bound to perform he had fulfilled.

The insured died on December 23, 1922, and this action was commenced originally in the Supreme Court of Cayuga county in the state of New York, in June, 1923, and was then removed upon defendant’s motion into the District Court of the United States. The trial began in that court on December 10, 1923, and a verdict was rendered on December 14, 1923, in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of $4,330.

While the certificate insured Ostrander in the sum of $6,300, and the complaint as filed demanded that amount, it appeared that he left three children surviving him; two daughters, who were the plaintiffs in this action, and a son, who was an incompetent and not a party. At the close of the trial, and before the jury was charged, the counsel for the defendant suggested that, if the jury should find that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, they were entitled to recover only two-thirds of $6,300, the amount for which the action was brought. And counsel for the plaintiffs then stated that he agreed that such was the ease. The court instructed the jury accordingly, and charged that “your verdict will be either $4,330 for the plaintiffs, or no cause of action.”

Lewis Ostrander died on December 23, 1922. If he had lived until the following March 6th he would have been 70 years of age. At the time of the accident complained of, he was living at the Salvation Army Hotel in Auburn, New York. He came into the hallway of the hotel from the street about 9 o’clock on the evening of December 14, 1922. Whether he fell before he started to ascend the stairs which led up to the office on the. second floor, or fell before he started up the stairway, is not clearly established by the evidence. The fact is that he fell; that his fall was heard in the office; that he was picked up and carried to his room and the next day removed to the City Hospital, where he died on December 23, 1922. The testimony shows that no bones were broken in his fall. There were some abrasions on the left wrist and an abrasion on his right elbow. The physician who attended him stated that his death resulted from lobular pneumonia. He was asked the following question:

“Q. The question is, Can you say with reasonable certainty, based upon your experience, Avhether or not the pneumonia of which he died was a natural and proximate result of the fall he sustained on the 14th day of December, 1922?”

This was objected to, and the objection overruled, and the witness answered, “Yes.” Then he was asked:

“Q. Now, will you please state whether or not the pneumonia which you found and which existed in Mr. Ostrander on December 21 or 22,1922, was a natural and proximate result of the condition in which you found him on the 14th day of December, 1922?”

And over objection he was allowed to answer :

“Q. The court says you may answer the question, Doctor? A. It was, yes.
“Q. It was the natural and proximate result? A. Yes, sir.”

The only other medical witness called by the plaintiffs was a lecturer on pathology at Bellevue Medical College at New York City. He had no personal knowledge of the case, and had never soon the deceased. His testimony was given as an expert. A long hypothetical question was put to him; the concluding portion of which was as follows:

“Q. Assuming that a man that is 69 years of age, in ordinary health, on the 14th day of December fell down several steps in a stairway, causing an abrasion of the elbows and forearms; * * * that he showed no evidence of arteriosclerosis in the palpable arteries beyond that which is usual to a man of his age; that during the night of December 21st he showed evidences of having pneumonia; that he died on the 23d' day of December — can you, with reasonable certainty, based upon your experience, say whether or not the fall that he sustained was a competent producing cause of the pneumonia which developed on or about the 21st of December ?”

He was allowed to state over objection that he could, and he was then asked and allowed over objection to answer:

“A. It is a very likely and probable result of the injuries. It is what we look for and watch for in such eases.”

He stated that the older a man gets, and the more he suffers from hardening of the arteries and various other things, the less his resistance becomes to disease and the accumulation of these germs. And he further said that all persons have pneumonia germs in their systems all the time, generally speaking, and it does not require, in itself, any outside, external, or violent means to start up these in cases of lobar pneumonia but not usual in lobular.

One of the plaintiffs, Ostrander’s daughter, testified that her father came to live with *10 her in New York City some two years before his death, and that she had never noticed anything unusual in his method of ' walking. She never observed him when he had any dizzy spells, nor saw him fall. She said:

“I' have noticed no change in his manner or method of walking during those two years that he lived with us, or the latter part of those two years, and the time that I knew him as a girl. That is the one thing I noticed.”

The husband of the above witness also testified: '

“I -did not observe anything particular about his physical condition while he was living with us. He had a peculiar walk; ‘rather a deliberate, easy walk, not a rapid walk. He had that manner of walk as long as I knew him, but I.did not observe any signs of a. particular change during the last few years.”

A New York City physician, a. graduate of Columbia College and of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of New York, who had studied abroad, and who was called by the defendant, testified that he was present at the autopsy performed on Ostrander’s body. He positively denied that the man had had lobular pneumonia, and stated that he had lobar pneumonia, which he said was a form of pneumonia that old' people are peculiarly affected by.

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Bluebook (online)
9 F.2d 7, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/order-of-the-united-commercial-travelers-of-america-v-nicholson-ca2-1925.