Orchard Hills Cooperative Apartments, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp.

779 F. Supp. 104, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18526, 1991 WL 269679
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedNovember 25, 1991
Docket91-3003
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 779 F. Supp. 104 (Orchard Hills Cooperative Apartments, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Orchard Hills Cooperative Apartments, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 779 F. Supp. 104, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18526, 1991 WL 269679 (C.D. Ill. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION

RICHARD MILLS, District Judge:

Sadly, we face here the failure of another Savings & Loan.

The issue: whether a complaint against the Resolution Trust Corporation, as receiver of a failed financial institution, must be dismissed when the plaintiff filed its claim in United States District Court prior to pursuing federally mandated administrative remedies.

Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies as required by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) before bringing its claim in federal court.

I. Facts

This is not the first time that we have visited this matter. See Orchard Hills Cooperative Apartments, Inc. v. Germania Federal Savings and Loan Association, 720 F.Supp. 127 (C.D.Ill.1989). 1 We will not repeat the lengthy facts detailed in its prior decision, however some supplementation is necessary. Orchard Hills Cooperative Apartments, at 128-29. After this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Germania Federal Savings & Loan (Germania) in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County on June 26, 1990. The complaint contained three counts: Count I alleged common law fraud; Count II alleged that Germania breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff; and a breach of contract claim was brought in Count III.

Four days prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was appointed conservator of Germania. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(l)(B) (1989), RTC filed a motion to remove this action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois where it was also substituted as the defendant. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a motion for change of venue to the Central *106 District of Illinois because this Court was well acquainted with the facts of this case. Plaintiffs motion was granted and this case was transferred to this Court on December 27, 1990.

On July 26, 1991, Defendant was appointed receiver of Germania and this Court granted its motion to substitute RTC as receiver as the defendant in this case. Defendant now seeks to have this case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative procedures for bringing claims against the RTC as established in the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1989).

II. Motion to Dismiss

When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(1), the court must take all of the plaintiffs allegations as true and must view them, along with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Brown v. Keystone Consolidated, Industries, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 1212 (N.D.Ill.1988). A district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted relevant to the determination of jurisdiction. Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.1979). Dismissal is proper when the complaint fails to sufficiently allege the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Brown, at 1215.

III. Analysis

In response to the savings and loan crisis, Congress enacted FIRREA in order to provide a regulatory framework in which claims against failed financial institutions could be handled “expeditiously and fairly.” Hermitage Associates v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 91-2027, 1991 WL 281737, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15507 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1991) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 54(1), 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 419 (1989, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1989, p. 86)). To help attain this goal, FIRREA created the RTC to manage, contain and resolve all cases involving failed savings institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(A) (1989). Under 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4) (1989), RTC has the same powers and rights to perform its duties as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has according to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1822, and 1823 (1989). Decrosta v. Red Carpet Inns Int’l Inc., 767 F.Supp. 694 (E.D.Pa.1991).

The resolution procedure for claims filed against a financial institution in RTC receivership are set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d). First, a claimant may file its claim with the RTC which has 180 days to allow or disallow it. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i) (1989). Afterwards, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the results, it has 60 days to obtain de novo judicial review of the RTC’s determination pursuant to § 1821(d)(6)(A) which provides in pertinent part:

the claimant may request administrative review of the claim in accordance with subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (7) or file suit on such claim (or continue an action commenced before the appointment of the receiver) in the district or territorial court of the United States for the district within which the depository institution’s principal place of business is located or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (and such court shall have jurisdiction to hear such claim).

This is the only path that a claimant can follow to the federal courts. United States v. Altman, 762 F.Supp. 139 (S.D.Miss.1991). Section 1821(d)(13)(D) limits the jurisdiction of district courts to de novo review of claims first presented to the RTC:

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction over—

(i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been assigned receiver, including assets which the Corporation may acquire from itself as such receiver; or
*107

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

C. ROBERT SUESS v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
770 F. Supp. 2d 32 (District of Columbia, 2011)
Beres v. Village of Huntley, Ill.
824 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Illinois, 1992)
Freiburger v. Emery Air Charter, Inc.
795 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Illinois, 1992)
Solano v. Southeast Bank, NA
796 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Florida, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
779 F. Supp. 104, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18526, 1991 WL 269679, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/orchard-hills-cooperative-apartments-inc-v-resolution-trust-corp-ilcd-1991.