Orange Owner, LLC v. M & E 336-348 E. 18th St., LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 30874(U)
CourtNew York Supreme Court, New York County
DecidedMarch 6, 2026
DocketIndex No. 850527/2025
StatusUnpublished
AuthorFrancis A. Kahn III

This text of 2026 NY Slip Op 30874(U) (Orange Owner, LLC v. M & E 336-348 E. 18th St., LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court, New York County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Orange Owner, LLC v. M & E 336-348 E. 18th St., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 30874(U) (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2026).

Opinion

Orange Owner, LLC v M & E 336-348 E. 18th St., LLC 2026 NY Slip Op 30874(U) March 6, 2026 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 850527/2025 Judge: Francis A. Kahn III Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.

file:///LRB-ALB-FS1/Vol1/ecourts/Process/covers/NYSUP.8505272025.NEW_YORK.001.LBLX000_TO.html[03/17/2026 3:45:51 PM] !FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/09/2026 10: 57 AM! INDEX NO. 850527/2025 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 53 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/06/2026

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. FRANCIS A. KAHN, Ill PART 32 Justice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 850527/2025 ORANGE OWNER, LLC , MOTION DATE 01/27/2026 Plaintiff, MOTION SEQ. NO. 001 - V -

M & E 336-348 E. 18TH ST. , LLC,STEVEN CROMAN, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD , EDWARD CROMAN , EDWARD L. DECISION + ORDER ON CROMAN REVOCABLE TRUST-S, NYC BUREAU OF MOTION HIGHWAY OPERATIONS , NYC DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION , JOHN DOE

Defendant. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 21, 22 , 23, 24, 25 , 26,27 , 28,29, 30, 31 , 32 , 33, 34, 35, 36 , 37 , 38, 39,40,41,42,43,44,45, 46, 47,48,49, 50, 51, 52 were read on this motion to/for APPOINT - FIDUCIARY

Upon the foregoing documents, the motion is determined as follows:

In this action, Plaintiff seeks to foreclose on a CEMA Mortgage, dated January 21 , 2016, encumbering a parcel of improved real property located at 336/338 East 18th Street, New York, New York. Plaintiff commenced this action wherein it is alleged Defendants defaulted in repayment of the note. Now, Plaintiff moves pursuant to RPL §254[10] and RP APL §1325[1] for the appointment of a temporary receiver of the rents of the mortgaged premises. Mortgagor and Guarantor Defendants oppose the motion.

Under Real Property Law §254[1 0] , the appointment of a receiver in the event of a default is proper where the parties to the mortgage agree to same even without notice or without regard to the sufficiency of security (see ADHY Advisors LLC. v 530 W 152nd St. LLC, 82 AD3d 619 [l5t Dept 2011]; 366 Fourth St. Corp . v Fox.fire Enters., 149 AD2d 692 [2 nd Dept 1989]). Despite the parties' assent, the appointment is not perfunctory and the Court, in the exercise of its equitable power, retains the discretion to deny the appointment of a receiver (see ADHY Advisors LLC. v 530 W 152nd St. LLC, supra; Nechadim Corp. v Simmons, 171 AD3d 1195, 1197 [2d Dept 2019]).

Section 13 .1 of the mortgage provides, in pertinent part, as follows :

(9) Receiver or Possession. (a) Lender shall be entitled, as a matter of strict right, without notice to any Person and ex parte, and without regard to the value, condition or occupancy of the security or of the Property, or the solvency of Borrower or of any Guarantor or Indemnitor, or the adequacy of the Property as security for the Note, to have

850527/2025 ORANGE OWNER, LLC vs. M & E 336-348 E. 18TH ST., LLC ET AL Page 1 of 5 Motion No. 001

[* 1] 1 of 5 !FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/09/2026 10: 57 AMI INDEX NO. 850527 12025 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 53 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/06/2026

a receiver appointed to enter upon and take possession of the Property, collect the Rents and apply the same in accordance with the terms of this Mortgage, such receiver to have all the rights and powers permitted under the Laws of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. Borrower hereby waives any requirements on the receiver or Lender to post any surety or other bond. Lender or the receiver may also take possession of, and for these purposes use, any and all Personal Property which is a part of the Property and used by Borrower in the rental or leasing of all or any part of the Property. Borrower is liable for repayment of all of the expenses of any such receiver (including, without limitation, the receiver's fees, counsel fees, costs and agent's compensation) incurred pursuant to the powers herein contained. Lender shall apply such Rents received by it in accordance with the terms of this Mortgage. The right to enter and take possession of the Property, to manage and operate the same, and to collect the Rents, whether by receiver or otherwise, shall be cumulative to any other right or remedy hereunder or afforded by Law, and may be exercised concurrently therewith or independently thereof. Lender shall be liable to account only for such Rents actually received by Lender.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the parties' mortgage provides that Plaintiff may apply for the appointment of a receiver and Plaintiff pled that Defendants, inter alia, defaulted in repayment of the indebtedness, a default event under the loan documents. Accordingly, Plaintiff established its entitlement to the appointment of a receiver of the mortgaged premises (see eg SKW Hillside Bleeker Lender LLC v 145 Bleeker LLC, 217 AD3d 536 [P1 Dept 2023]; CSFB 2004-CJ Bronx Apts LLC v Sinckler, Inc., 96 AD3d 680 [ P1 Dept 2012]). In opposition, Defendants have not demonstrated that denial of the appointment of a receiver is an appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion (see id.; US Bank, NA . v Rufai, 202 AD3d 719, 721 [2d Dept 2022] ; Shaw Funding, LP v Bennett, 185 AD3d 857, 858 [2 nd Dept 2020]).

In opposition, Defendants have not demonstrated that denial of the appointment of a receiver is an appropriate exercise of the Court' s discretion (see id.; US Bank, NA. v Rufai, 202 AD3d 719, 721 [2d Dept 2022]; Shaw Funding, LP v Bennett, 185 AD3d 857, 858 [2 nd Dept 2020]). To the extent Defendants' opposition is based on cases where appointment of a receiver was sought pursuant to CPLR §6401 it is unavailing (see eg Groh v Halloran, 86 AD2d 30 [1 st Dept 1982]). The Appellate Division cases are clear that where, as here, the mortgage contains a provision that a lender may apply for a receiver, the mortgagor may seek such relief "'regardless of proving the necessity for the appointment"' (see GECMC 2007-C 1 Ditmars Lodging, LLC v Moho/a, LLC, 84 AD3d 1311 , 1312 [2d Dept 2011 ], citing Naar v. J.J Litwak & Co., 260 AD2d 613 [2d Dept 1999] ; see also SKW Hillside Bleeker Lender LLC v 145 Bleeker LLC, supra).

The argument that Plaintiff's affidavit of Gerson Monzon, the Senior Vice President of Bellwether Management LLC, the alleged servicer for and an authorized signatory of plaintiff, is insufficient to support this motion fails. This is neither a motion for a default judgment nor for summary judgment which are authorized by statutes that contain express evidentiary requisites (see CPLR §§3212[b] and 3215[£]). No similar provision is contained in either RPL §254[10] or RPAPL §1325[1] (see SKW Hillside Bleecker Lender, LLC v 145 Bleecker LLC, supra at 537). Indeed, "[c]ases hold that a receiver may be appointed so long as an action has been commenced" (HSBC Bank USA , NA. v Rubin, 210 AD3d 73 , 83 [2d Dept 2022]). The claim that presently unpled defenses and other purported deficiencies in its action defeats this motion is without merit. A plaintiff "may apply for the appointment of a receiver, without notice and without regard for adequacy of the security for the debt, and without requirement that plaintiff demonstrate more than what is required by Real Property Law § 850527/2025 ORANGE OWNER, LLC vs. M & E 336-348 E. 18TH ST., LLC ET AL Page 2 of 5 Motion No. 001

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Related

Shaw Funding, LP v. Bennett
2020 NY Slip Op 3936 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2020)
ADHY Advisors LLC v. 530 West 152nd Street LLC
82 A.D.3d 619 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011)
GECMC 2007-C1 Ditmars Lodging v. Mohola
84 A.D.3d 1311 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011)
Groh v. Halloran
86 A.D.2d 30 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1982)
Naar v. I.J. Litwak & Co.
260 A.D.2d 613 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1999)
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Rubin
210 A.D.3d 73 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2022)

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Bluebook (online)
2026 NY Slip Op 30874(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/orange-owner-llc-v-m-e-336-348-e-18th-st-llc-nysupctnewyork-2026.