O'quinn v. Chambers County

672 F. Supp. 279, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12499
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 16, 1987
DocketCiv. A. G-85-308
StatusPublished

This text of 672 F. Supp. 279 (O'quinn v. Chambers County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'quinn v. Chambers County, 672 F. Supp. 279, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12499 (S.D. Tex. 1987).

Opinion

ORDER

HUGH GIBSON, District Judge.

Before the Court are the summary judgment motions of defendants Chambers County, Texas, and Sheriff C.E. Morris. The background of this case is set forth in this Court’s order at 636 F.Supp. 1388. At this juncture plaintiffs claim, pursuant to § 1983, § 1985(2) and § 8 of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985 (FLSA), [280]*280that they were retaliated against for requesting overtime compensation that they believed they were entitled to under the law. Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 1983 and § 1985 claims.

After reviewing the arguments and evidence 1 under the applicable summary judgment standard, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir.1986), the Court finds that defendants have not retaliated against plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court finds that the depositions of plaintiffs Jackson and Golleher establish that no retaliatory action has been taken against them. Defendants suspended and then fired plaintiff O’Quinn, which could be construed as retaliation. The deposition testimony, however, establishes sufficient independent reasons for defendants’ acts and plaintiff has not shown that these reasons were merely pretextual. Therefore, the Court grants defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

Defendants also seek attorneys fees and costs. Although defendants are entitled to costs as provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), they are not entitled to attorneys fees under § 1988 unless the suit was frivolous. See Lopez v. Aransas County Independent School District, 570 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.1978); Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1985). The Court finds that this suit was not frivolous and therefore denies defendants’ motion for attorneys fees.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:

1. defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;

2. defendants’ motion for attorneys fees is DENIED; and

3. this case is DISMISSED.

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Related

Marian Fontenot, Etc. v. The Upjohn Company
780 F.2d 1190 (Fifth Circuit, 1986)
O'QUINN v. Chambers County, Tex.
636 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D. Texas, 1986)
Lopez v. Aransas County Independent School District
570 F.2d 541 (Fifth Circuit, 1978)
Colombrito v. Kelly
764 F.2d 122 (Second Circuit, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
672 F. Supp. 279, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12499, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oquinn-v-chambers-county-txsd-1987.