Opn. No.

New York Attorney General Reports·Decided July 25, 2006·Published

Opinion

Lawrence Praga Informal Opinion Keane Beane, P.C. No. 2006-6 445 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601

Neal Schwarzfeld Village of Pelham Manor Village Attorney 4 Penfield Place Pelham Manor, NY 10803-3298

Dear Mr. Praga and Mr. Schwarzfeld:

As attorneys for the Pelham Union Free School District ("the School District") and the Village of Pelham Manor ("the Village"), you have asked whether Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") § 1640(a)(22), which authorizes cities and villages to enact regulations setting aside parking spaces on public highways "in designated areas reserved for public business at or adjacent to a government facility," is limited in its application to those highways that touch the property on which the government facility is located. The Village of Pelham Manor has also raised several questions relating to the exercise of its discretion under this statute.

Your questions stem from a request of the School District to the Village of Pelham Manor to set aside parking on specified streets in the Village for the use of employees who work in the School District's high school/middle school building. According to your letters, the streets on which the School District has requested that the Village of Pelham Manor set aside parking are located near the property on which the school building is located, but do not border the school property.1

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the statutory authorization was intended to allow the setting aside of on-street parking in those areas located closest to the facility, which will generally be those areas on bordering highways that abut or are directly across from the facility, or that extend a reasonable distance from these areas. Thus, areas on highways that do not border the facility are unlikely to be considered "adjacent" within the meaning of this statute. With respect to a village or city's exercise of its discretion in setting aside parking for the users of a building that belongs to another government entity, we conclude that the city or village may reasonably require that entity to demonstrate the facts necessary for the legislative body of the city or village to determine whether the requested parking regulations are reasonable, including whether the designated parking areas are "at or adjacent to" the government facility.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

VTL § 1640(a)(22) delegates to cities and villages the power to regulate the use of highways within their boundaries and in particular to "[p]rohibit or regulate the stopping, standing and parking of vehicles in designated areas reserved for public business at or adjacent to a government facility." We have previously concluded that this provision permits a village to enact regulations setting aside parking spaces on highways in the village adjacent to a public school for use by employees of the school, as long as such restrictions are reasonable and rationally related to a legitimate public purpose. Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) No. 2005-15.

You have asked whether the reference to "adjacent" in this statute refers to only highways that touch the property on which the government facility is located, or also may include highways that are near, but do not border the property. While you have framed the question in terms of the adjacency of the highway, we note that the terms "at or adjacent to a government facility" in section 1640(a)(22) modify the words "designated areas reserved for public business." Thus, as explained below, the statute does not describe the authorization in terms of highways that are adjacent to the government facility, but more narrowly requires that the regulated parking areas be "at or adjacent" to the government facility.

ANALYSIS

There are no reported decisions construing the scope of the authority granted by VTL § 1640(a)(22), and nothing in the legislative history of this provision specifically addresses the meaning of the phrase "at or adjacent to." By its terms, the statute authorizes the setting aside of parking areas that are "at" or "adjacent" to a government facility. The Legislature's use of the terms "at" and "adjacent to" in the disjunctive indicates that each term was intended to have a separate meaning in the statute. See, e.g., Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini Spencer, 97 N.Y.2d 95, 104 (2001) (relying on fact that statute authorized two separate standards joined by the word "or" to reject interpretation that would define each standard by same criteria because it would render one standard superfluous); Statutes § 231, 1 McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. at 388 (1971) (each word in a statute should be given meaning and effect and words should not be rejected as superfluous when it is reasonable to give each word a distinct and separate meaning). The reference to designated parking areas "at" the government facility is reasonably understood to refer to areas of the bordering highways that are directly in front of, on the sides of or behind the facility. Thus, the language of the statute indicates that "adjacent to" was intended to refer to other areas of on-street parking.

As you recognize, the term "adjacent" is ambiguous — it can be used in a narrow sense to mean next to, touching or abutting, or in other contexts it may mean located near or close to, without necessarily touching. See Ballentine's Law Dictionary 30 (3d ed. 1969) (defining "adjacent" as near or close to, but sometimes meaning touching or contiguous); Black's Law Dictionary 44 (8th ed. 2004) (near or close to, not necessarily touching). Courts look to the context and purpose of a statute to ascertain the intended meaning of "adjacent" in a particular statute.See, e.g., United States v. St. Anthony R.R. Co.,192 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1904); Ranke v. State, 206 Misc. 569, 573-74 (Ct. Claims 1954), aff'd without opn. 285 A.D. 1113 (4th Dep't 1955). Further, because "adjacent" is an imprecise and relative term, it does not connote a specific distance; the determination of whether two objects are adjacent will often depend on the particular facts to which the statute is being applied. SeeUnited States v. St. Anthony R.R., 192 U.S. at 530, 537 ("As the word is frequently uncertain and relative as to its meaning, . . . it must be defined with reference to the context, at least to some extent.").

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